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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Melissa S. Sexton 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of English 
 
June 2012 
 
Title: “An Aligned, Transformed Constructed World”: Representing Material 
Environments in American Literature 1835-1945 
 
 
This dissertation seeks to avoid two extremes that have polarized literary debate: 
on the one hand, a strong constructivism that reduces environments to textual effects; 
and, on the other hand, a strong realism that elides language’s constructive power, 
assuming texts’ mimetic transparency. Positioning itself within the ecocritical attempt to 
reconnect text and environment, my project articulates a constructive vision of material 
representation that I call “constrained realism.” Katherine L. Hayles’s “constrained 
constructivism” emphasizes the constructed nature of scientific knowledge while 
asserting science’s truth; conversely, “constrained realism” re-emphasizes the material 
real’s influence on literature while acknowledging representation’s limitations. My 
project adapts Bruno Latour’s work in science studies to literary texts, reconceiving 
written representation as a dynamic process of human/material interaction.  
My reassessment of literary materiality extends to both canonical and neglected 
American texts that address representational anxieties about materiality. First, I examine 
how the work of Henry David Thoreau presents the relation between a material world and 
written text as actively constructed and mutually constituted, a relationship that 
necessitates Thoreau’s self-reflexive engagement with language. A similar dynamic 
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between material observation and skepticism about language informs Frank Norris’s The 
Octopus. Through the poet character Presley’s quest to represent the West, this novel 
questions aesthetic representation’s power to shape material conditions. In the cases of 
William Faulkner and James Agee, the authors’ self-reflexive agonizing about language’s 
referential capacity tends to overshadow the material conditions that frame their projects. 
This dissertation argues that both Faulkner’s and Agee’s works mask a sense of urgency 
about the changing material environment of the American South. While Faulkner’s 
fiction develops a concept of “the substance of remembering” in an attempt to understand 
the hybrid mixture of language and materiality constituting historical memory, Agee’s 
non-fiction demonstrates a similar desire to translate material evidence into text, 
expressed as the author’s commitment to do “what little he can in writing.”  
By attending to the discursive practices that construct literary representations of 
the environment, this project argues that texts’ representational anxieties and their 
material concerns can be understood as political projects aimed at changing human 
relationships to the material environment.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION – THE WAY WE THINK ABOUT THINGS: 
MATERIAL RELATIONS AND IMAGINATIVE TRANSFORMATIONS IN 
ECOCRITICISM 
Can anyone imagine a study that would treat the ozone hole as 
simultaneously naturalized, sociologized and deconstructed? A study in 
which the nature of the phenomena might be firmly established and the 
strategies of power predictable, but nothing would be at stake but meaning 
effects that project the pitiful illusions of a nature and a speaker? Such a 
patchwork would be grotesque. Our intellectual life remains recognizable 
as long as epistemologists, sociologists, and deconstructionists remain at 
arm’s length, the critique of each group feeding on the weaknesses of the 
other two. 
Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern 
 
 A 2011 ExxonMobil commercial called “Unlocking a Century’s Supply of 
Natural Gas” opens with a smiling scientist reflecting on the ease with which Americans 
could access natural gas reserves and transform their energy futures.1 “Things are right 
under our feet,” he muses, “and all we need to do is change the way we’re thinking about 
them.” Natural gas appears here as latent potential, energy trapped by inert matter and 
waiting for human ingenuity to set it free. The commercial reimagines fuel scarcity, 
changing material lack into a problem of imagination. The search for energy is not a 
problem of resource availability, since the “things” which provide energy are already 
“right under our feet.” Rather, discovering energy simply requires us to “change the way 
we’re thinking” about these material things. For instance, the scientist encourages the 
viewer to reimagine rocks as containers of potential energy. “We never knew how much 
natural gas was trapped in rocks,” he claims, enthusing over the technological advances 
                                                 
1
 The full commercial is available online at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XDfVycbnaBc>. 
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that make it possible to see energy within what was once wasted space. The camera pans 
over rocky landscapes, then cuts away to spacious suburban houses dotted with lights and 
streets full of cars; this juxtaposition encourages the viewer to imagine empty landscapes 
as an energy source and as future social space. The barren fields can be transformed into 
aesthetically pleasing and economically vibrant neighborhoods, and the energy to fuel 
this transformation lies waiting in the earth itself. All it takes to solve the energy crisis, to 
access that potential, and to maintain the American standard of living is a little human 
imagination.   
This commercial’s defense of existing energy corporations exemplifies a pattern 
in recent discourse about energy. The problem in this commercial is not about 
sustainability and lifestyle choices, but about ingenuity and technology; the possible 
energy shortage we are currently facing is figured not as a material shortage but as a lack 
of scientific imagination. Such thinking relies on a logic predominant in environmental 
thought in general: that we need to change the way we think about things in order to 
change our environments. Pushes to pursue technological development and pushes to 
curtail consumption depend equally on the belief that our attitudes towards the material 
environment are responsible for environmental problems like the energy crisis. Thus, the 
answer to these problems is ultimately an imaginative transformation. The commercial 
focuses not, that is, on the material changes required by the production of energy and the 
extraction of natural gas but primarily on the power of imagination and innovation. The 
physical removal and chemical reconstitution of raw materials; the creation of extraction 
plants, processing plants, and networks of distribution; the relocation of human bodies to 
provide labor – the ExxonMobil commercial elides all these material transformations by 
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insisting that “all we need to do is change the way we’re thinking” (emphasis mine). 
However, oil companies encouraging extraction policies are not the only ones focusing 
on imagination as a way to change the world. The environmental pushes to “Go green,” 
become “environmentally friendly,” or “Think global and act local” similarly prescribe a 
change in thinking as a way of transforming material practice and consequently 
impacting the environment. The future of the planet, whether brought about through the 
innovations of technoscience or the intervention of environmental activism, requires 
individuals and society at large to transform their relationship to the material world 
through a mixture of affect and action. 
 Environmental rhetoric, then, relies upon a curious mixture of material and 
affective concerns. In other words, calls to change our relationship to the environment 
encourage us to change both how we use our environmental resources and how we think 
and feel about our environments. Thus, criticism of environmental rhetoric needs to 
address both the material and the affective – on the one hand, biological and economic 
realities, and on the other, cultural attitudes and perceptions – in order to analyze how 
“the way we think about things” impacts what we do to the many, many “things” 
constituting our environments. To understand the environment, we must understand the 
things themselves - the material realities of biological agents and ecosystems, of 
economic systems and material resources. However, the political decisions we make 
about environments and the ways we continue to reshape these environments are also 
based on how we think. It is this equally important role of attitude, imagination, and 
cultural representation that has made space for the environmental humanities and led to 
the creation of fields such as ecocriticism, the study of literature and the environment that 
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focuses the theoretical concerns of literary criticism towards human representations of the 
material world and the more-than-human environment.   
 Ecocriticism builds on the proposition that cultural narratives and representations 
impact material conditions, political systems, and human action towards the environment. 
The way societies choose to use or not use, cultivate or preserve, ignore or worship 
different environments depends to a large extent on what kinds of environments we value 
aesthetically and how we imagine our moral and ethical relationship to these 
environments. In other words, environmental politics relies upon stories about and 
representations of the environment as much as it relies on ecological understandings of 
relationships between organisms or economic concerns about resource management. This 
recognition of representations’ power sketches a hopeful role for ecocriticism, suggesting 
that critical analysis of culture can meaningfully contribute to the struggle for better 
environmental practice. Material environmental change requires a parallel transformation 
of environmental representation, and ecocriticism can give us the tools to work towards 
such representation. Ecocriticism thus investigates the way cultural artifacts, from literary 
texts to television commercials, influence and register attitudes about the environment. 
Ecocriticism also intervenes in our thinking about things, asking about the nature of 
representation and the relationship between the rhetorical, the literary, the imaginative, 
and the material. In the words of Ursula K. Heise, ecocriticism cultivates a “triple 
allegiance to the scientific study of nature, the scholarly analysis of cultural 
representations, and the political struggle for more sustainable ways of inhabiting the 
natural world” (505).  
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This triple allegiance is by no means an easy one, however, as “science” is 
frequently imagined as the opposite of “culture” and “politics.” Commitment to “the 
scientific study of nature” suggests a belief in the objective truth of scientific data. And if 
the sciences provide truthful information about the material world, it is only reasonable to 
use scientific knowledge as the foundation for environmental decisions. In this case, the 
sciences of ecology and biology would seem to provide a more effective knowledge to 
inform environmental decision-making than the study of representation or rhetoric. 
Ecocritics must ask, what does environmental criticism do besides talk about what people 
like or what people think? Isn’t such cultural analysis less pressingly true – or, at the very 
least, less politically effective – than discussions of what to do with specific things from 
the environment? While questions about the “realness” of textual analysis and the 
“objectivity” of science may seem like tired re-hashings of purely rhetorical or 
disciplinary debates, these are questions ecocriticism has had to reconsider in its pursuit 
of the allegiance Heise describes. It will never be easy to combine a scientific 
commitment to a knowable material world; a political commitment to taking action and 
considering competing interests; and a literary commitment to recognizing subjective 
positionality, the influence of culture, and the power of language.  
Indeed, this combination creates uncomfortable positions, as evident in the mess 
Bruno Latour describes in the epigraph to this introduction. Latour recognizes that careful 
environmental thinking requires us to see things as “simultaneously naturalized, 
sociologized and deconstructed,” but the results of such multi-tiered thinking can be 
contradictory. Such a transformation to the way we think about things might make our 
intellectual life unrecognizable, as he fears, by challenging long-entrenched disciplinary 
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methodologies. However, how else are we to explain environmental problems that have 
material consequences but are difficult to discern through simple observation, such as the 
hole in the ozone layer which he contemplates? How else are we to think about politically 
contentious processes like natural gas extraction, where discussion involves economic 
concerns, technological capacities, ecological impacts, and aesthetic changes to 
landscape? How else do we discuss a commercial that uses ecology, technology, 
aesthetics, politics, and economics to make appeals? How else do we understand 
environmentalism as a whole, where decisions involve the competing needs of aesthetics, 
economics, and biology? Beauty, biodiversity, sustainability – these are all potentially 
powerful concepts for environmental discussion. Yet they are all equally potential 
liabilities that can contribute to or even veil environmental exploitation. Unrecognizable 
or not, convenient or not, our thinking about things must address the difficult intertwining 
of the natural and the social, the cultural and the material. 
To “change the way we think about things,” then, turns out to be a tricky 
proposition, for literary insistence on “deconstructing” problems like the hole in the 
ozone layer can appear at odds with scientifically motivated belief in this hole’s actual, 
material existence. Deconstructive or rhetorical analyses seem to undermine the sciences’ 
claims to capture definitive, objective truth. The desire for objectivity – for a science that 
lies outside discourse and that cannot be questioned – is at its root a longing for a way to 
definitively establish the best course of ecological action. Latour describes this longing as 
a desire to short-circuit the convoluted processes of politics. In Pandora’s Hope: Essays 
on the Reality of Science Studies, he explains how the use of scientific rhetoric in political 
debate often attempts to replace the struggle of competing human voices with the neutral, 
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definitive voice of things. According to this line of reasoning, if global warming is a 
concrete thing, a verifiable reality, then political debate will simply stop. The best way to 
think about things and solve environmental problems would be to escape thinking 
altogether and simply access the things themselves. Thus, the dangers of political 
rhetoric, individual interpretation, and competing ethical claims would vanish. Self-
evident truth would present itself as the environment told us its needs.2  
This dream of self-evident truth, accessed through direct contact with the material 
world, shapes the nature writing tradition as much as the scientific tradition. According to 
the former, if we could just get out and see the things correctly, by walking through the 
woods and seeing as writers before us have seen, we would automatically develop a 
viable environmental ethics; as Timothy Morton explains, this brand of 
environmentalism’s appeal to the power of observation and experience posits that 
“Ecological awareness would just happen to us, as immersively and convincingly as a 
shower of rain” (182-83). Dana Phillips expresses nature writing’s appeal to accessible, 
objective truth thus: “The nascent ecocritic has been up early wrestling with abstruse, 
difficult texts, and once he has seen the light of day and the Wordsworthian ‘light of 
things,’ these ‘postmodern’ texts will figure not as part of the solution, nor as part of the 
problem, but quite simply as the problem he must resolve or, in a concession of defeat, 
push to one side” (4). But nature writing and problems like global warming both 
demonstrate that there is nothing automatic about ecological awareness. The things 
themselves do not provide a stopping point where ethical, ecological behavior becomes 
uncontestable. Rather, political change always demands imaginative transformation as 
                                                 
2
 In Ecology Without Nature, Timothy Morton uses the term “factual brutalism” to describe this tendency to 
appeal to an idealized, objective truth that can be located in concrete, observable things (123). 
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well as contact with things. Whether aesthetically or scientifically motivated, 
environmentalism uses imaginative transformations to translate material observation into 
ethical commitment and action. And whether aesthetically or scientifically motivated, 
environmental rhetoric keeps coming back to the tricky dance between words and things. 
Therefore, ecocriticism’s blend of rhetorical, cultural, and literary analysis can help to 
clarify the complexity of using scientific facts and appeals to material things in political 
discourse.  
Returning to the ExxonMobil commercial reveals the dense tangle between 
thinking and things. This commercial is an example of a text that demands analysis of 
rhetoric, thoughtfulness about material things, and awareness of potential political 
consequences. It shows us that the insistence that all we need to do is change our thinking 
to change the world can be used for ecologically troubling purposes and can erase real 
material consequences from consideration. On the one hand, the dream of self-evident 
truth shapes its rhetoric. We don’t have to choose to extract that energy trapped in rocks, 
the commercial claims; it’s been waiting all along, defining the nature of the things it 
inhabits. We just could not see it. Thus, the development of new natural gas technology 
will be a way of seeing the things rightly, understanding our environment correctly. On 
the other hand, the commercial ignores material things and uses the logic of “change your 
thinking and change the world” to forward less ecologically favorable ends. It appeals 
both to scientific development and to aesthetic landscapes to argue that current levels of 
extraction and consumption can be sustained, given sufficient innovation. This 
commercial imagines the things of the environment as not-yet-activated resources. These 
things should not be described, experienced, or measured, but used. Such an imperative 
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reveals the political contingency of aesthetic and scientific appeals to ecology and to 
things. That is, the commercial shows us that we cannot escape political discussion about 
environmental practice: the self-evidence of things and the power of imagination can both 
be used to either challenge or support the continued use of non-sustainable energy, and it 
is rhetoric rather than self-evident material fact that will decide how we use available 
energy resources. 
The commercial not only implies the technological possibility of sustainable 
energy extraction but also hints at the naturalness of such extraction, depicting the 
environment as a system of potential energy relations. In this view, material artifacts like 
rocks become temporary crystallizations of a larger energy flux: why not transform the 
less-pleasing rocks into more-pleasing networks of transportation and housing? Here, the 
vision of a web of ever-changing energy naturalizes human extraction processes and 
posits an easy harmony between social development and sustainable environments. This 
naturalization in turn points to the ambiguity of terms like “nature” and the uncertainty of 
their use in environmental rhetoric. If humans are in fact “natural” and should be getting 
more closely in touch with their natural environment, why shouldn’t we begin to see all 
human activity as natural, part of the competition for resources and energy in which all 
life forms participate? Yet such logic ignores the human species’ ability to monopolize 
resources and reshape ecosystems at a level unmatched by other species. Instead, by 
marrying technology to the natural world through the conduit of human intellect, the 
commercial suggests that it would be unnatural not to use the evolutionary advantage of 
ingenuity to tap into the passive resources of the material environment.  
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The commercial also relies on cultural representations both to support its case and 
to aestheticize the natural gas extraction process. Not only does the energy want to come 
out; not only is it natural for this energy to circulate through human society; but it is 
pleasing for such energy to emerge. The commercial appeals to sentimental visions of an 
American homeland and to pleasant landscapes, juxtaposing shots of green trees with 
colorful computer displays, clean suburban streets, and the ever-smiling scientist. Such 
juxtaposition suggests that the right application of technology can give us our energy and 
our pretty places, too. While a combination of scientific and aesthetic transformations can 
encourage sustainable ways of engaging the material world, the same potentials for 
imaginative transformation can also support industrial development and resource 
extraction. 
The ExxonMobil commercial thus suggests that changing the way we think about 
things can change our ethical commitments. This ethical ambiguity points out the futility 
of appealing to science, nature, ecology, or material truth as a way of short-circuiting 
political debate. And the rhetorical appeals of this minute-long commercial point to the 
slippery and difficult process of trying to think about and represent “things.” While the 
commercial exemplifies the political and rhetorical power of appealing to the material, it 
also demonstrates the way that politics and rhetoric slide away from the supposed self-
evidence of materiality. A close analysis of how this commercial legitimizes resource 
extraction points to the difficult task facing ecocriticism: the need to keep ontological 
paradoxes like the status of things in mind without abandoning an equal commitment to 
the realness of environmental problems. In order to critically respond to political appeals 
like the ExxonMobil defense of extraction, ecocriticism needs to keep thinking – both 
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about things and about thinking. While recognizing that appeals to “things in themselves” 
have no guaranteed authenticity or automatic value to sustainable practice, ecocriticism 
and environmentalism cannot lose sight of material things. We do have to change the way 
we think about things – learning to see them as the foundation of our appeals to material 
and scientific truth but also as potential ideological tools mobilized in defense of a wide 
range of ethical and political positions.  
Ecocriticism, as I have sketched above, is one of the fields within the 
environmental humanities that has influenced the critical redefinition of how we think 
about things. Wendy Wheeler calls the field a “properly provocative attempt to reframe 
critical understandings of the relationship between signs, texts, languages, and the world” 
(139). This dissertation project participates in ecocriticism’s ongoing exploration of 
language and materiality. In the following chapters, I thread a path between the tyranny 
of the object Latour and Morton describe and the material elision finally evident in the 
ExxonMobil commercial. The project thus works towards what Heise calls a “weak 
constructivist [position] that analyze[s] cultural constructions of nature with a view 
toward the constraints that the real environment imposes” (512). Latour’s Pandora’s 
Hope and The Politics of Nature convincingly argue for the value of such weak 
constructivist positions, insisting that valid politics – and particularly, valid 
environmental politics – require us to acknowledge the constructed nature of scientific 
fact without ignoring the validity of material observation. As a way of holding on to a 
belief in reality while also acknowledging the contingencies and dangers of construction, 
Latour argues for process-based attention that focuses on how scientific knowledge 
develops. Rather than dismissing or idealizing science, a close attention to scientific 
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process and its use of material things helps to qualify our scientific faith; unless we 
acknowledge that all knowledge is produced, we start to use things like “energy science” 
as blunt instruments. According to Latour, material things and material facts need to be 
considered valid participants in political discussion rather than the ending point or 
foundation of debate. Rather than accept scientific fact unquestioningly, we must ask 
ourselves how such facts are being produced and being used. 
This project adopts some of the questions Latour and other science studies 
scholars use to assess the sciences and turns these questions on American literature. In 
putting scientific knowledge about the environment in dialogue with critical theory and 
philosophy, science studies has offered a number of convincing arguments about the 
construction of scientific knowledge within socially normalizing systems, as well as 
arguments about the sciences’ historical use to forward systems not conducive to “more 
sustainable ways of inhabiting the natural world” (Heise 505).3 Cultural representations 
and political decisions end up impacting how scientific information can be used, and 
recognizing scientific knowledge as a constructed product rather than seeing it as the 
objective voice of nonhuman things enables us to accord science an influential rather than 
all-powerful role in our ecological debates. 
In his analysis of the sciences’ construction, Latour demonstrates how scientific 
knowledge is the product of both material things and human construction, and Pandora’s 
Hope carefully traces the emergence of scientific knowledge from human interaction with 
material things. Pandora’s Hope also documents the creation of texts from scientific 
                                                 
3
 The Science Studies Reader, edited by Mario Biagioli, gives a helpful overview of the main questions 
framing inquiry in science studies, including historical, sociological, and philosophical interrogations of the 
sciences as well as examinations of the relationship between the sciences, textual representations, and the 
natural world. 
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research, making a case for the material construction of scientific writing. His work 
models a way of reading texts that accounts for their construction without disavowing all 
relationship between written representation and the material world. This project insists 
that a similar accountability to both material reality and to literary construction can be 
valuable for literary criticism. While not all texts exhibit a primary interest in 
representing the world as it is or basing artistic creation in material fact, there are texts 
that do, including such diverse texts as the nonfiction nature writing treated in first wave 
ecocriticism, the realist fiction of the American nineteenth century, and even 
experimental historical fiction from the post-modern and contemporary periods. But 
while science studies has emphasized the constructed nature of scientific knowledge as a 
counter to the uncritical acceptance of the sciences as “real,” up until recently, 
ecocriticism has emphasized literature’s potential for representing the real as a counter to 
the predominant assumptions of poststructuralist critical theory.  
This project positions itself within the realist ecocritical tradition best exemplified 
by Lawrence Buell’s 1995 The Environmental Imagination. Like Buell, this project 
insists that literary criticism has prioritized aesthetic, ideological, or imaginative concerns 
over literary projects that strive to represent accurately and intervene politically. 
Ecocriticism has provided a much-needed correction to this theoretical asymmetry, 
capitalizing on growing cultural urgency regarding the material and cultural 
environmental crises of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century in order to 
reinsert the political potential of material representation into the critical conversation. But 
fifteen years after Buell’s seminal ecocritical work challenged the primacy of textuality 
and the futility of reference, ecocritical debate continues to go around and around the 
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question of representation: can words represent things, or is the connection between 
language and the material world only an arbitrary projection? The development of weak 
constructivist positions to which this project contributes continues to challenge the 
usefulness or accuracy of ontological dualisms that begin by positing an inherent division 
between words and things and that end by implying a fundamental separation between 
the ideal realm of human thought and the material realm of the natural environment.  
The solution that science studies offers and that this project adapts is to focus on 
processes of construction, showing how language, knowledge, and texts are human-made 
but also emphasizing how they are made out of encounters with the material world. By 
recognizing that “constructed” is not the opposite of “real,” ecocriticism can assert that 
texts are able to transmit accurate, factual information about the material world and make 
political interventions in environmental questions that go beyond the simple reproduction 
of ideology.  
Chapter II summarizes some major ecocritical texts that engage with questions of 
material representation, constructivism, and realism. The chapter explores ecocriticism’s 
development in the aftermath of the Science Wars of the 1990s, arguing that the 
ecocritical reassertion of material reality responds directly to the tendencies of post-
structuralist, postmodern theory to downplay texts’ interest in or ability to represent the 
material world. The chapter sketches a history of representational debate in ecocriticism 
and explores potential theoretical development, drawing on work in environmental 
aesthetics, phenomenology, and science studies. I use Bruno Latour’s process-based 
exploration of scientific representation and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s process-based 
exploration of perception to imagine real/constructed visions of the material world. Both 
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of these thinkers argue that we get caught in a reductive binary of language and 
materiality when we ignore the processes contributing to our knowledge of the world. 
When we pay attention to these processes, however, we can see that we never leap from 
things to words or from an environment to a text. Instead, observation, experimentation, 
transformation, and movement allow us to develop knowledge of the world over time and 
translate this knowledge into language and textual representations. I adapt this attention 
to historicity, process, and construction, as well as Katherine L. Hayles’s concept of 
“constrained constructivism,” to offer what I call a “constrained realist” approach to 
literary studies: a belief that, while fully aware of texts as cultural, linguistic 
constructions, we can also insist on their potential to engage material environments.  
The remaining chapters focus on American texts from the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century whose interest both in material environmental realities and in the 
complications of material representation could be categorized as illustrations of 
constrained realism. While the project situates itself within contemporary theory and 
present-day environmental representation, it focuses on a historical period that was 
critical to the development of American environmental rhetoric. The dissertation thus 
extends its consideration of material representation to four Anglo-American authors from 
the period between 1835 and 1945. Each author is shown to have focused on a 
contemporary environmental problem. In Walden, Henry David Thoreau, writes against 
the increasing industrialization of the Concord area and challenges humans to rethink 
their relationship to the nonhuman world. In The Octopus, Frank Norris explores the 
industrialization of the wheat industry in California and the resulting exploitation of 
ranchers, farmers, and lower-class workers. In Absalom, Absalom! and Go Down, Moses, 
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William Faulkner writes about the post-bellum collapse of the Southern economy as well 
as the deforestation of the post-plantation South. Finally, in Let Us Now Praise Famous 
Men, James Agee is haunted by the question of how best to represent the worlds of three 
poverty-stricken tenant families in rural Alabama, farming amidst national depression 
and environmental disaster in the mid-1930s.  
While all of these writers rely upon realistic depictions of the environment to 
make critiques, they also all demonstrate anxiety about the possibilities and limits of 
representation. Their texts integrate theoretical questions about language’s success or 
failure with political questions about how best to represent the material world in order to 
change existing social as well as ecological conditions. Each of these authors has also 
been at the center of critical debates about the relationship between environmental and 
textual concerns. How do Thoreau’s philosophical flights of fancy and his rhetorical 
reduction of his two years’ stay at Walden Pond to the single symbolic year of Walden 
affect the accuracy of his environmental depiction? How much should we emphasize The 
Octopus’s connection to historical events of the Mussel Slough incident and the 
development of the California railroad systems? Is Faulkner merely interested in the play 
of language, and if so, how do we understand the close relationship that exists between 
his invented Yoknapatawpha County and historical Mississippi? Finally, what do we 
make of Agee’s seemingly conflicting commitments to ethical, political representation of 
the tenant farmers and to self-reflexive, tortured prose? All of these questions suggest that 
the complicated relationship between material environments and language is a central 
concern pervading these literary texts.  
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Chapter III explores one of the key writers for first wave ecocriticism and for 
Buell’s own realist revision, Henry David Thoreau. The chapter explores how Thoreau’s 
Walden self-consciously plays with the relationship between text, experience, and world, 
using nonfiction to depict the processes by which an author transforms the actual world 
into the textual. At the same time, however, Thoreau’s work clearly encourages readers to 
change the way they think about the world, demanding that they recognize how their own 
economic and political decisions contribute to changes such as the deforestation of the 
Walden area. Thoreau playfully imagines the world as textual and carefully interrogates 
how his escape into closer contact with the things of his world leads to writing as well as 
clearer knowledge.  
Chapter IV turns away from nonfiction to explore historical and realist fiction, 
focusing on Frank Norris’s The Octopus as an example of work that carefully balances 
material concern, historical grounding, and literary artifice, all in service of creating a 
politically powerful, ethically thoughtful, and literarily successful work criticizing the 
emerging railroad trusts’ influence on California agriculture. By making a poet and a 
potential activist the central character of the novel, Norris explores how textual creation 
impacts political action and how both rely upon material things.  
Chapter V continues the exploration of historically based fiction by focusing on 
William Faulkner’s Go Down, Moses and Absalom, Absalom!. Faulkner’s creation of an 
imagined county based closely on a real one, as well as his dual interest in historical 
events and the failures of language, demonstrate his novels’ fundamental interest in the 
relationship between material reality and literary representation. These novels’ obsessions 
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with the processes of memory and the role of material artifacts mirror the critical 
concerns of this project as a whole.  
Finally, in Chapter VI, the project returns to nonfiction by examining writer 
James Agee and photographer Walker Evans’s Let Us Now Praise Famous Men. Agee 
adopts Faulkner’s tortured and self-referential style to describe his own experience 
staying with three tenant families. His need to speak in order to represent the families and 
the lands that he has seen, paired with his uncertainty about the ethical possibilities of 
language, returns us to our initial questions about thinking and things: can we write about 
things in such a way as to represent them accurately, or are we always just mobilizing 
things to use them for our own political purposes? Do the things themselves tell us 
something true about the world in which we live? How should we think about – and write 
about – things in order to be ethical and to stop abuse of the environment? 
Agee’s anguished commitment to do “what little I can in writing” and his loyalty 
to both detailed material representation and to self-effacing awareness of language’s 
failures help to contextualize the difficult position ecocriticism faces (10). The 
environmental problems motivating ecocriticism are very real. Very real things are going 
to have to change in our relationship to the material environment if we are going to 
maintain human society, protect other species, and keep an inhabitable environment; such 
change is indeed going to require us to change the way we’re thinking. But in changing 
our thought, we have to be careful to really think about things – environmental things and 
material things. Thoreau, Norris, Faulkner, and Agee give us lots of ideas and lots of 
language, but their works show us that ideas and texts never exist apart from events and 
actions and things. It does not “just” take an idea for us to have energy security and 
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economic prosperity. We are going to need lots of intellectual creativity to secure a 
sustainable future, but we have to make sure that the real processes and effects of our 
decisions are being depicted when we enter into the political discussions of how to fuel 
such futures. By beginning with environmental texts and material environmental 
problems a little further removed from our current political sense of crisis, we can begin 
to hone a delicate rhetorical approach that respects how much thinking fuels our actions 
while also insisting that, rather than stay lost in thought, we need to turn our thoughts to 
things as well.  
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CHAPTER II 
“PACK[ING] THE WORLD INTO WORDS”: 
TOWARDS A CONSTRAINED REALISM IN ECOCRITICISM 
To give a sufficiently generous account of literature’s environmental 
sensitivity, we need to find a way of conceiving the literal level that will 
neither peremptorily subordinate it nor gloss over its astigmatisms. 
   Lawrence Buell, The Environmental Imagination 
 
We have taken science for realist painting, imagining that it made an exact 
copy of the world. The sciences do something else entirely – paintings too, 
for that matter. Through successive stages they link us to an aligned, 
transformed, constructed world. 
Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science 
Studies 
 
Constructed or True? Ecological Risk and the Modern Constitution 
Michael Crichton’s 2004 novel State of Fear stirred plenty of controversy among 
scientists and environmentalists alike for its skeptical depiction of climate change and 
institutional science.4 Throughout the novel, Peter Evans, a lawyer for multi-millionaire 
clients and their environmental organizations, becomes increasingly skeptical about the 
reality of climate change. Evans’s growing skepticism stems in part from his introduction 
to a world of espionage and conspiracy; his legal work sends him stumbling into contact 
with a terrorist group that engineers catastrophic climate events intended to fool the 
media into believing climate change is real. Under the tutelage of John Kenner, a 
skeptical physicist and paramilitary operative, Evans questions not only terrorist-
                                                 
4
 Challenges to Crichton’s novel include Peter Doran’s New York Times article “Cold Hard Facts,” where 
he claims, “I would like to remove my name from the list of scientists who dispute global warming”; Myles 
Allen’s Nature review “A novel view of global warming,” which challenges the poor science of Crichton’s 
novel and rejects the public reception of it as “a serious contribution to the climate-change debate” (198); 
and Harold Evans’s “Crichton’s conspiracy theory,” which claims that the novel misunderstands scientific 
“consensus” as inherently subjective and uses this “flawed” understanding of human science to dodge 
responsibility for anthropogenic climate problems. On the other hand, Senator James M. Inhofe asked 
Crichton to speak to the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, of which he is chair, and 
made State of Fear “required reading for this committee” (Janofksy).  
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engineered environmental catastrophes, but also the charts, graphs, and scientific 
interpretations fed to the public through the media. Thus, beneath the novel’s conspiracy 
theory lies a critique of scientific research and its effect on public opinion. As Myles 
Allen put it in a review in Nature, “The central thesis of the book is that we scientists are 
collaborating with the environmental movement, bending facts in a cavalier manner to fit 
our mad global-warming theories — and when the facts won’t bend far enough, we make 
them up” (198). State of Fear rejects the fabricated nature of scientific facts and longs to 
access environmental realities without the interference of politics. The novel’s central 
question, voiced by Kenner, is, “If something is real, if it is a genuine problem that 
requires action, why does anybody have to exaggerate their claims? Why do there have to 
be carefully executed media campaigns?” (272). If climate change is real, that is, the facts 
of climate change should speak for themselves and there should be no need for 
environmental rhetoric.  
The novel thus argues that collusion with politics and culture invalidates science. 
At the novel’s end, millionaire and environmental activist George Morton even gives up 
ecological activism in favor of starting a utopian organization that purifies science from 
politics and human interests – a dream echoed by Crichton’s own appendix, “Why 
Politicized Science is Dangerous” (631). Encouraging readers to keep their facts and their 
opinions neatly separated, Crichton argues that “the intermixing of science and politics is 
a bad combination” (638). The popularity of and controversy over State of Fear shows 
that such debates about the construction of scientific facts and about science’s ability to 
describe the “real world”  can affect public perceptions of environmental problems. 
Crichton’s advocacy for objective, apolitical science was appealing. While Nature and 
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the BBC were quick to dismiss Crichton’s claims as conspiracy theories or the product of 
scientific ignorance, some institutions embraced Crichton’s theories as a way of 
debunking climate change, suggesting that his rejection of political science resonated 
with the American public.5  
But according to Bruno Latour, Crichton’s dream of an apolitical, objective 
science does not describe how the sciences actually work and cannot provide a viable 
model for ecological practice. In Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into 
Democracy, Latour explains, “We have no choice: politics does not fall neatly on one 
side of a divide and nature on the other. From the time the term ‘politics’ was invented, 
every type of politics has been defined by its relation to nature” (1). Latour attributes the 
persistent cultural impetus to separate science and politics, clearly evident in State of 
Fear, to what he calls “the modern constitution” (Modern 32). He argues that the need to 
purify two separate realms – an objective nature and a subjective culture – defines 
“modern” reality and facticity. “Modernization,” he explains, “consists in continually 
exiting from an obscure age that mingled the needs of society with scientific truth, in 
order to enter into a new age that will finally distinguish clearly what belongs to 
atemporal nature and what comes from humans” (Modern 71). This division reaches its 
logical extreme in the purification of science, the study of “nature,” from any fields that 
study human thought: politics or the humanities, for example. But Latour argues that this 
purification is at odds with the actual practices of the sciences, which develop knowledge 
                                                 
5
 According to Evans, “the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, honoured Crichton with an 
invitation to Washington to address its members - not on the novel, but on science policy in the 21st 
Century.” Allen argues, “It is a sad indictment of the image of modern science that many readers will find this 
thesis entirely plausible, even if they don’t buy the specific scenario of ecoterrorists setting off a train of 
synthetic natural disasters to provide mood music for an international climate conference” (198). 
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by creating hybrids of the natural and the social.6 Ecological politics are not misguided or 
deceptive when they mix political and scientific questions, but are reflecting the messy 
hybrid state of the lived-in environment. Demanding that “real” ecological problems be 
defined by objective and apolitical science sets up a world where no ecological problems 
can meet the standards of truth and where no proposed solution can escape accusations of 
ideological bias or subjectivity. Crichton’s proposed purification thus leads to a number 
of questions about how we understand the environment and truth: are constructed things 
true, and is there anything in the larger environment that is not constructed?  
 While Latour insists that scientific and political questions cannot finally be 
separated, the desire for purified realms of science and society permeates real world 
discussions about environmental politics, not just novels. While Crichton’s climate 
conspiracies are easily dismissed, it is harder to escape the nagging notion that the 
‘subjectivity’ of politics compromises scientific descriptions of the ‘real’ world. It can be 
difficult to think outside of the seemingly fundamental dualism between a real, material 
world independent of humans and an imposed world of human concepts, ideas, and 
language. As an example of how deeply the modern constitution affects thinking, Latour 
begins Pandora’s Hope by describing a strange conversation that he had at an 
interdisciplinary conference. A scientist asked Latour, “Do you believe in reality?” and 
looked genuinely relieved when Latour answered, “But of course! [. . .] What a question! 
Is reality something we have to believe in?” (1). This question prompted Latour to ask 
                                                 
6
 Latour explains the “modern constitution” as a series of paradoxical “guarantees” that, when considered 
simultaneously, reveal the fundamental problems with nature/society and subject/object divides. After all, 
he argues, Nature is both “not our construction” and “our artificial construction of the laboratory” (Modern 
32). The paradox is that “even though we construct Nature, Nature is as if we did not construct it” (32). The 
desire to evade such paradoxes drives thought into ever stricter separations of nature and culture: “Nature 
and Society must remain absolutely distinct” (32). But Latour insists, “The language that transports politics 
outside of science is precisely what we need to understand and explain” (16).  
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what conditions could have led to a situation where a scientist expects such a nonsensical 
answer. Latour realizes that the scientist’s skepticism stems from the “modern 
constitution[al]” separation of the human from the natural world. Under the terms of this 
purification, Latour’s work, which argues that the sciences are constructed, seems to 
imply that science is untrue.7 Here, then, Latour confronts the same question that plagues 
Crichton’s novel: can we know the world truly – and speak meaningfully about its 
conditions – if we know it through constructed processes and speak about it through 
human language?  
Crichton’s impossible science and Latour’s inquisitive scientist friend point to the 
continuing need to rethink what science is and how science works, and also what 
language is and how texts work. If we are committed to understanding ecological 
problems like climate change – problems that both have material effects and demand 
political action – then we need different visions of politics, language, representation, and 
science. The need to make political decisions about the material world challenges 
common-sensical dichotomies such as science/politics, nature/culture, text/world, and 
subject/object. If we believe that environmental problems do not, as John Kenner wishes, 
simply present themselves and automatically generate ecological action, then we must 
strive to understand how rhetoric, texts, and politics contribute to the development of 
ecology, using the word here to mean both the scientific study of the environment and the 
political struggle to develop more sustainable relationships with this environment.  
                                                 
7
 Latour argues that he does believe in the factualness of the sciences, but he does not think that the strict 
separation between subject and object, science and politics, adequately explains how science truly works. 
However, he realizes, “What I would call ‘adding realism to science’ was actually seen, by the scientists at 
this gathering, as a threat to the calling of science, as a way of decreasing its stake in truth and their claims 
to certainty” (Pandora 3).  
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The move towards “political ecology” by many environmental thinkers, including 
Latour, suggests that the pairing of science and politics Crichton despises is not in fact a 
danger but rather a necessity.8 Thus, instead of accepting politics, language, and texts as 
inherently disconnected from the material world, Latour asks not only if science can 
know the world but also if “our representations [can] capture with some certainty stable 
features of the world out there” (Pandora 13). Latour’s rejection of conventional 
dichotomies moves away from a science of objective material fact, instead imagining 
scientific reality as constructed. By providing a model that validates scientific 
representation, Latour’s work also provides a way of understanding other textual 
constructions as something more real than mimetic models, second-hand representations, 
or weak reflections of the environment.  
The Emergence of Ecocriticism and the Push for Constrained Realism 
A Latourian challenge to the modern constitution and to conventional models of 
representation thus proves useful to ecocriticism, the field of literary study dedicated to 
both a materially real world and to cultural representations of environment. Cheryll 
Glotfelty’s introduction to The Ecocriticism Reader traces ecocriticism’s emergence to a 
series of professional developments in the mid-nineties. While the origins of ecocritical 
inquiry can be traced back to literary criticism from the sixties and seventies, with the list 
including Leo Marx’s The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in 
America (1964), Roderick Nash’s Wilderness and the American Mind (1967), Raymond 
                                                 
8
 In Politics of Nature, Latour explains, “we cannot choose whether to engage in political ecology or not; 
but we can choose whether to engage in it surreptitiously, by distinguishing questions of nature and 
questions of politics, or explicitly, by treating those two sets of questions as a single issue that arises for all 
collectives” (1). Texts that similarly challenge conventional separations of nature and culture in pursuit of 
political ecology include Timothy Morton’s Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking Environmental 
Aesthetics; Timothy Luke’s Ecocritique: Contesting the Politics of Nature, Economy, and Culture; Patrick 
Curry’s “Nature Post-Nature”; Dana Phillips’s “Is Nature Necessary?”; and Kate Soper’s What is Nature?: 
Culture, Politics, and the non-Human. 
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Williams’s The Country and the City (1973), Joseph Meeker’s The Comedy of Survival 
(1974), and Annette Kolodny’s The Lay of the Land (1975), the solidification of diverse 
environmental interests into something like a coherent field did not occur until later 
(Heise 505; Buell Future 13-15). Of particular importance to the field’s emergence were 
the 1991 MLA special session “Ecocriticism: The Greening of Literary Studies,” 
organized by Harold Fromm; the 1992 American Literature Association symposium, 
chaired by Glen Love; the formation of the Association for the Study of Literature and 
the Environment (ASLE) at the 1993 annual meeting of the Western Literature 
Association; and the 1993 establishment of the journal Interdisciplinary Studies of 
Literature and the Environment (ISLE) (Glotfelty xviii).  
But while these events signaled ecocriticism’s “emerge[nce] as a recognizable 
critical school,” this school contained a heterogeneous collection of critical 
methodologies and theoretical approaches (Glotfelty xviii). Greg Garrard’s Ecocriticism 
sketches the variety of positions evident in ecocritical work, including deep ecology, 
ecofeminism, social ecology and eco-Marxism, and Heideggerian ecophilosophy (16-32). 
Buell separates ecocriticism’s interests into two categories, identifying a “first wave” of 
ecocriticism with nature-positive recuperations “appeal[ing] to the authority of 
experiential immersion and the efficacy of practice over against the authority of ‘theory’” 
(Future 6-7). By contrast, his “second wave” of ecocriticism reflects a circumspect 
engagement with theory, including more emphasis on nature as a sociocultural 
construction and recognitions of writing about nature as equally constructed. Thus, “a 
quest for adequate models of inquiry” led second-wave ecocriticism to engage with 
“Cybernetics, evolutionary biology, landscape ecology, risk theory, phenomenology, 
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environmental ethics, feminist theory, ecotheology, anthropology, psychology, science 
studies, critical race studies, postcolonial theory, [and] environmental history” (Future 
10).9  
Yet these wide-ranging approaches shared a commitment to rethinking 
conventional textual relationships with the more-than-human world. As Glotfelty 
explains, “Regardless of what name it goes by, most ecocritical work shares a common 
motivation: the troubling awareness that we have reached the age of environmental 
limits” (xx). Ecocriticism thus responded to increasing ecological risk and destruction by 
insisting that literary critical “work as usual seems unconscionably frivolous” (Glotfelty 
xxi). Rather than press ahead with “work as usual,” many ecocritics found it necessary to 
question literary models of representation that “efface the world,” as Buell describes 
(Imagination 5). Motivated by a threatened environment, ecocritical approaches figured 
the re-theorizing of representation as a political act, a way to “rescue a sense of the reality 
of environmental degradation from the obfuscations of political discourse” (Heise 505). 
As Buell argues in The Future of Environmental Criticism, 
A number of ecocritics looked to the movement chiefly as a way of 
‘rescuing’ literature from the distantiations of reader from text and text 
from world that had been ushered in by the structuralist revolution in 
                                                 
9
 While Buell’s “first” and “second wave” classifications have gained favor in present-day ecocritical 
discourse, Glotfelty offers an alternative categorization. She modifies Elaine Showalter’s model of 
feminism’s development in order to categorize ecocritical interests as a series of progressing stages: the 
first stage of ecocriticism focused on “how nature is represented in literature” and raised consciousness by 
identifying natural tropes and stereotypes perpetuated by cultural representations; second-stage ecocriticism 
attempted to “recuperate the hitherto neglected genre of nature writing” as well as “environmentally 
enlightened works” from poetry and fiction; Glotfelty’s third stage of ecocriticism attempted to more 
rigorously engage theory, from post-structuralist critiques of nature’s construction to pro-science 
formulations of “ecological poetics” or interdisciplinary collaborations (xxii-xxiv). 
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critical theory. These ecocritical dissenters sought to reconnect the work 
of (environmental) writing with environmental experience [. . .]. (6) 
Like the concerned scientist questioning Latour, ecocriticism asked if literary studies 
truly believed in the reality of the world anymore.10 Such belief was necessary for 
ecocriticism to become “part of the solution” to escalating environmental crisis (Glotfelty 
xxi). Thus, as Kate Rigby explains, “For the ecocritic, it is vital to be able to say, with 
Kate Soper, that ‘it is not language that has a hole in its ozone layer; and the ‘real’ thing 
continues to be polluted and degraded even as we refine our deconstructive insights at the 
level of the signifier’” (4). 
Thus, ecocriticism needed a model of reference that acknowledged the realness of 
the world while also respecting its difference from textual representations. As Buell 
explains, “To give a sufficiently generous account of literature’s environmental 
sensitivity, we need to find a way of conceiving the literal level that will neither 
peremptorily subordinate it nor gloss over its astigmatisms” (Imagination 90). But this 
meant a change in critical focus and methodology, since 
investigat[ing] literature’s capacity for articulating the nonhuman 
environment is not one of the things that modern professional readers of 
literature have been trained to do or for the most part wish to do. Our 
training conditions us, on the contrary, to stress the distinction between 
text and referent. (Imagination 10) 
                                                 
10
 Numerous examples of the move to reconnect with a real world appear in the 1999 PMLA “Forum on 
Literatures of the Environment.” Michael P. Cohen sums up this move clearly: “environment must be 
conceived of as more than [. . .] setting. Reading human beings into and out of texts is an activity that goes 
on in a real world humanity inhabits, a real world undergoing, right now, significant climate change, as a 
result of concrete human artifacts” (1092). 
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To lessen the importance of this distinction, Buell’s work encouraged environmental 
criticism to re-think ontological divides between subject and world, initiating what Dana 
Phillips called a movement of “ecocritics of the realist stripe” that attempted to balance 
constructivist claims about language with belief in the material reality of environments 
(16). But “the challenge for ecocritics [was] to keep one eye on the way in which ‘nature’ 
is always in some ways culturally constructed and the other on the fact that nature really 
exists” (Garrard 10). Similarly, ecocritics also had to keep one eye on the way in which 
literary texts are culturally constructed and the other on the fact that the material world 
these texts describe also exists. This multi-directional vision invites comparison between 
ecocriticism and science studies, as ecocriticism finds itself confronting the same poles 
and purifications that Latour identified as the products of the modern constitution.  
Like the sciences, ecocriticism recognizes a real world with real problems that 
demand human response. But ecocriticism also recognizes the influence of discourse, 
language, and ideology on human understandings of the environment. A viable theory of 
environmental representation must be situated between, on the one hand, a strong 
constructivism that reduces environments to textual effects, and, on the other hand, a 
strong realism that elides language’s constructive power, assuming texts’ mimetic 
transparency. To acknowledge the influence of discourse without “denying the extra-
discursive reality of nature,” ecocriticism needs models of reference that escape 
dichotomies of text and world (Soper 8). In this chapter, I argue that this parallel need in 
both ecocriticism and the sciences invites the extension of Latourian models of reference 
to ecocritical assessments of representation. By focusing on the production of scientific 
knowledge, Latour demonstrates that this knowledge is both constructed and real. 
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Knowledge is neither the projection of the human mind nor the self-evident testimony of 
objects, but involves mobilizations of the nonhuman and human world.11   
With this attention to construction and process, Latour’s work offers a model of 
what Katherine L. Hayles calls “constrained constructivism” (33). Hayles concedes that 
the human mind cannot know the world absolutely, but she also insists that the mind is 
not free to project just any invention onto the world. The material world imposes 
constraints on possible interpretations and understandings: 
Constrained constructivism points to the interplay between representation 
and constraints. Neither cut free from reality nor existing independent of 
human perception, the world as constrained constructivism sees it is the 
result of active and complex engagement between reality and human 
beings. (33-34) 
While insisting on the shaping role of human activity and language, constrained 
constructivist accounts limit the shaping influence of language, mind, or culture. 
But while Hayles’s “constrained constructivism” emphasizes the constructed 
nature of scientific knowledge as a counter to overly generous accounts of scientific 
empiricism and objectivity, ecocritical theory offers a correction in the opposite direction. 
Faced with literary scholarship’s general skepticism towards notions of realism and 
reference in the 1990s, early ecocritical works such as Buell’s The Environmental 
Imagination revived realism in order to counter literature’s constructivist leanings. Buell 
describes how, at the time of ecocriticism’s emergence, “All major strains of 
                                                 
11
 As I elaborate later in the chapter, Latour replaces the idea of a “connection” between world and text or 
of a one-to-one referential correspondence, describing instead process-oriented ideas like mobilization and 
translation. Such terms reflect the active engagement required of both humans and nonhumans in order to 
generate successful representations. 
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contemporary literary theory [. . .] marginalized literature’s referential dimension by 
privileging structure, text(uality), ideology, or some other conceptual matrix that defines 
the space discourse occupies apart from factical ‘reality’” (86). Within this theoretical 
paradigm, environmental realities recorded in literature risked disappearing into pure 
textuality. To counter this risk, Buell argues that “the claims of realism merit reviving not 
in negation of these myths but in counterpoise, so as to enable one to reimagine textual 
representations as having a dual accountability to matter and to discursive mentation” 
(92). This turn towards realism also countered the way overly constructivist positions 
“play [. . .] into the enemy's hands by obfuscating the material reality of environmental 
degradation” (Heise 512). 
Positioned within this ecocritical return to realism, this chapter argues for a 
constructive vision of material representation that I call “constrained realism.” Derived 
from the science studies work of Latour and Hayles, this model directs attention to the 
processes producing literary texts, insisting that we need not imagine text and world as 
opposite poles in a dichotomy when we pay attention to the “active and complex 
engagement between reality and human beings” (Hayles 34). Like constrained 
constructivism, then, constrained realism offers a viable alternative to the ontological 
dualism of text and world. However, conversely to Hayles’s “constrained 
constructivism,” I assert that literary texts face a more pronounced emphasis on 
constructivism and a more pronounced challenge to realism than the sciences; while 
Hayles injects a limited constructivism into the overly realist discourse of the sciences, 
ecocriticism injects a limited realism into the theoretical emphasis on construction and 
discourse. But to fully understand the value of this model and to distinguish it from 
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existing ecocritical discussions of representation requires a brief survey of ecocriticism’s 
theoretical development, beginning with the field’s emergence in the midst of a series of 
vicious academic debates about reality and representational language known as the 
Science Wars. 
The Science Wars and the Shaming of Constructivism 
As Heise documents, literature and environment studies emerged in the midst of 
the Science Wars and hence in the midst of a rigidly reaffirmed, polemical opposition of 
material reality and textual construction. “Born in the shadows of [the controversy] over 
representation and reality” that emerged between science and theory in the 1990s, 
ecocriticism had disciplinary reconciliation as well as theorizing to accomplish if it was 
going to assert that real environmental problems exist outside of textual or ideological 
effects. C. P. Snow famously described the tension between science and the humanities as 
the struggle between two cultures, a formulation Latour repeats when he argues that 
science studies “are situated [. . .] in the no man’s land between the two cultures” 
(Pandora 17). Conflict between the sciences and the humanities flared up in the 1990s 
with a number of public challenges to the authority of the sciences and a number of 
responses accusing the humanities of relativism. Stephen J. Gould describes these 
Science Wars as 
a harsh conflict pitting realists engaged in the practice of science (and 
seeking an absolute external truth progressively reachable by universal 
and unbiased methods of observation and reason) against relativists 
pursuing the social analysis of science (and believing that all claims about 
external truth can only represent social constructions [. . .]). (259) 
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To some extent, these caricatures reproduce the dichotomies of Latour’s modern 
constitution, insisting that knowledge of the world is either social or real, but clearly not 
both. The caricatured humanities of this debate are lost in language games; society is 
omnipresent and everything can be reduced to a construction, thereby deprived of any 
‘realness.’ The caricatured sciences become a blunt instrument to reinforce the social 
power of existing institutions and to camouflage this ideological capacity via appeals to 
material fact. 
 The Science Wars thus illustrate the two competing theories of language and the 
world that Latour identifies as realist and constructivist (Pandora 30). The sciences are 
predicated on a realist theory of representation, assuming that language in some way 
refers to the world. In other words, there is some correspondence between a word and the 
thing it represents. An ecosystem, an atom, or a chemical compound described in a 
scientific report is not primarily an imaginative creation, but a reference back to a 
material object observed within a rigorously limited set of conditions. The material thing 
is primary; language is secondary; and reference is a transparent process. Things 
practically speak for themselves. By contrast, constructivism posits that meaning does not 
pre-exist language. Rather, meaning emerges from the interrelationship of words, and 
things have no essential relationship to the language used to describe them. Given this 
separation of language from the material world, human knowledge becomes contingent, 
constructed out of language. 
 This constructivist insistence on contingency appears to threaten scientific claims 
about the reality of the world. In this framework, science studies and humanities scholars 
become the enemies of science, a group of relativist “monster[s]” challenging scientific 
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authenticity (Pandora 2).12 During the Science Wars, scientists retaliated in kind, 
attacking the credibility of the humanities. For example, in 1996, Alan Sokal launched 
one of the most divisive shots of the Science Wars when he published “Transgressing the 
Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity” in Social 
Text. The strategy behind publishing the parody was simple: by getting a journal of 
cultural studies to publish a mixture of post-modernist imitation and shabby science, 
Sokal hoped to reveal the inherent falseness of post-structuralist critique. In 
“Transgressing the Boundaries: An Afterward,” Sokal explains that the initial article’s 
goal was “explicitly political: to combat a currently fashionable 
postmodernist/poststructuralist/social-constructivist discourse – and more generally a 
penchant for subjectivism” (339). This sally provided a damning critique specific to the 
humanities, as Sokal admits in his afterword: “Like the genre it is meant to satirize – 
myriad exemplars of which can be found in my reference list – my article is a mélange of 
truths, half-truths, quarter-truths, falsehoods, non sequiturs, and syntactically correct 
sentences that have no meaning whatsoever” (338). The so-called Sokal affair questioned 
the guidelines defining truth: was truth just relative to the individual discipline, defined 
by professional consent? Did certain disciplines have greater claims to the truth than 
others? Was there an inherent connection between relativism and social construction?  
Of course, the Sokal Affair did not single-handedly initiate this re-examination of 
the sciences and the humanities. But incidents like the Sokal Affair made it possible to 
                                                 
12
 In work as varied as Michel Foucault’s historicizing insistence on the normalizing power of scientific 
research, Donna Haraway’s attacks on the masculine biases of science, and Carolyn Merchant’s argument 
about the Western bias towards mechanistic thinking evident in science, post-structuralist and post-modern 
critiques pointed to the limits of scientific knowledge and strove to socialize science. See Foucault’s The 
Order of Things; Haraway’s Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature; and Merchant’s 
The Death of Nature. 
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dismiss critical theory’s challenges to objectivity and empiricism as lacking scientific 
understanding. Post-structuralist challenges to objectivity seemed non-sensical as well as 
easily satirized, resulting in dismissals like Richard Dawkins’s more recent challenge to 
constructivists to defend their professed skepticism with action: 
Relativism [. . .] is a pretentious cop-out. There really is something special 
about scientific evidence. Science works; planes fly. Magic carpets and 
broomsticks don’t. Gravity’s not a version of the truth. It is the truth. 
Anybody who doubts it is invited to jump out of a tenth floor window.13 
Here, Dawkins defends the validity of the sciences by appealing to the self-evident nature 
of the material world. How could one believe in social constructivism when one could 
reach out and touch the world – or plummet downward with all the force of gravity? This 
jab, like the battles of the Science Wars, demonstrates a rhetorical connection between 
material self-evidence and defensible truth. Dawkins’s challenge repeats the skepticism 
towards constructivism evident in Crichton: if something is constructed, it must be false; 
if something is observable, it must be real; therefore, to conceive of reality as constructed 
is to enter the free-fall of relativism. 
Thus, the Science Wars contributed to a rigid separation between realism and 
constructivism, pointing to a supposed incompatibility between discourse and ‘the real.’ 
This ontological dichotomy also influenced the development of ecocriticism. As Heise 
explains, 
Ecocriticism, with its triple allegiance to the scientific study of nature, the 
scholarly analysis of cultural representations, and the political struggle for 
                                                 
13
 Dawkins utters this line in Russell Barnes’s documentary The Genius of Charles Darwin. An individual 
clip entitled “Dawkins’ Take on Relativism and Science” is available on-line at 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ohYGd2sSV5w>. 
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more sustainable ways of inhabiting the natural world, was born in the 
shadows of this controversy [. . .] the underlying issues of realism and 
representation that informed the science wars continue to pose challenges 
for ecocritical theory. (506) 
When read in the context of the science wars, Lawrence Buell’s The Environmental 
Imagination’s return to realism reflects an attempt to move outside rigid disciplinary 
separation. Published the year before the Sokal affair, The Environmental Imagination 
shows ecocritical theory struggling to avoid the strong constructivism of which literary 
criticism was accused without surrendering to the idea of “absolute external truth” (Gould 
259). To avoid dismissal by more scientific counterparts, ecocriticism had to avoid 
association with strong constructivist claims; to avoid dismissal by literary colleagues, 
ecocriticism had to avoid a “brutal” realism dependent on naïve empiricism (Morton 
123). 
The Environmental Imagination and the Recovery of Realism 
Emerging from within these competing claims of realism and constructivism, The 
Environmental Imagination makes an important step towards constrained realism, re-
establishing the representational capacities of language and offering a “dual 
accountability to matter and to discursive mentation” (92). The Environmental 
Imagination’s opening claim that “environmental interpretation requires us to rethink our 
assumptions about the nature of representation, reference, metaphor, characterization, 
personae, and canonicity” sums up the way that what I am calling constrained realist 
ecocriticism necessitates reevaluation of language and textuality (2). Buell outlines the 
uneasy relationship between literary theory and ecocriticism when he argues, “an inquiry 
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into the environmental imagination forces us to question the premises of literary theory 
while using its resources to expose the limitation of literature’s representation” (5). Buell 
specifically criticizes theory’s overemphasis on ideological distortion, the primacy of 
aesthetics, and the inherent limitations of language. He also criticizes critical readings of 
texts for paralleling this world/text disjuncture, focusing solely on aesthetic concerns or 
ideological limitations. For the bulk of literary theory, the critical imperative remains to 
treat the text as a discrete object, perhaps crystallizing external realities but never to be 
trusted in its potential motives or aims. 
Buell’s environmental project responds to this skepticism about representation by 
arguing that the overemphasis on ideology, poesis, and textuality derives from a 
disciplinary focus on certain canonical types of writing. Specifically, literary criticism’s 
focus on the study of fiction leads to a fictional bias that downplays text-world 
relationships. Because criticism focuses primarily on fiction, “the capacity of literary 
writers to render a faithful mimesis of the object world is reckoned indifferent at best, and 
their interest in doing so is thought to be a secondary concern” (84). To counter this 
asymmetry, Buell proposes a “nonfictionalist” mode of reading. Whereas “fictionalist 
reading tends to presuppose that the persona is the main subject, that selectivity is 
suppression, that represented detail is symbolic, that environmental knowledge (in either 
author or reader) counts for little,” in contrast, 
nonfictionalist reading presupposes that the persona’s most distinctive trait 
is environmental proficiency—not the professional scientist’s command of 
data and theory but the working knowledge of someone more 
knowledgeable than we, who seeks to communicate what he or she knows 
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in a shareable form. It presupposes that the persona’s chief rhetorical 
resource is exposition, that the metaphorical and tonal and meditative 
complications enriching exposition cannot be distinguished as the sole or 
even chief ways in which the text becomes artful, that the text’s outer 
mimetic function is as important as its intertextual dimension, and that its 
selectivity is an instrument for promoting knowledge rather than 
suppressing it. (96-97) 
Buell’s nonfictionalist reading thus shifts emphasis to literature’s positive referential 
capacities while still acknowledging its limitations. He envisions literature not as pure 
mimesis but as a tool that “seeks to communicate” and as a “rhetorical resource” for 
environmental argument. Without dismissing the “intertextual dimension” of literary 
reference, Buell’s reading highlights the “outer mimetic function” of the text. And while 
acknowledging that “selectivity” occurs as a result of authorial perception and choice, 
nonfictional reading does not automatically associate such selectivity with an ideological 
suppression of knowledge. Buell’s argument is not that writing provides direct 
transmission of reality from the material world, but, rather, that writing’s artificial 
dimensions are not automatically antithetical to truthful expression. 
Buell is also critical of the idea that stylization automatically impedes mimesis. 
Instead, Buell argues that literary constructions like stylization can increase the reader’s 
access to the environment. For example, he cites the Peterson bird books (Imagination 
97-100). The primary purpose of this field guide is not to create aesthetically pleasing 
images or compelling narratives but to put the reader in touch with material, non-textual 
birds and increase the reader’s birding knowledge. However, the guide’s stylized 
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representations of birds prove more effective than photographs or live specimens at 
helping readers learn to identify different species. The reductive textual images that make 
classifications and identifications possible are, while built from human aesthetics and 
scientific practice, not imposed on the material birds from within human ideology. 
Species identification and identification guides only make sense as tools if we 
acknowledge the simultaneous roles of textuality and materiality at play in the 
identification of a bird species. 
The guide also reveals that representation is not necessarily a one-to-one 
correspondence with the physical world, but rather the creation of frameworks that 
facilitate connection. Buell explains this relationship between the textual and the material 
by saying, “The capacity of the stylized image to put the reader or viewer in touch with 
the environment is precisely what needs stressing as a counter to the assumption that 
stylization must somehow work against outer mimesis or take precedence over it” (97). 
Instead, Buell argues, “We need to recognize stylization’s capacity for what the poet-
critic Francis Ponge calls adequation: verbalizations that are not replicas but equivalents 
of the world of objects, such that writing in some measure bridges the abyss that 
inevitably yawns between language and the object-world” (97-98). The concept of 
adequation which Buell advocates will be one that later critics, both ecocritical and 
science studies scholars, will take as an uncertain starting point. But what Buell’s 
analysis importantly indicates is that representation (and meaningful connections between 
text and world) do not have to be replicas, imitations, or recreations. His notion of 
representations as “equivalents” suggests two things of entirely different natures 
connected by other than arbitrary means. Thus, Buell’s careful account of literary 
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representation does not suggest that the primary role of the text is to mirror the physical 
world through a mimetic, tedious reproduction of physical description.  
Questioning Environmental Realism 
But later ecocritics, while building on Buell’s commitment to the “dual 
accountability to matter and to discursive mentation,” found his recovery of realism 
insufficiently constrained (92). For instance, Dana Phillips categorizes Buell as a “realist 
ecocritic” and expresses skepticism about the role material objects play in Buell’s theory. 
Phillips responds, “I think it is obvious that trees can never be, as Buell insists they are, in 
literature, and least of all in a novel, however much they may be ‘in’ it figuratively” (9). 
Phillips’s response to The Environmental Imagination specifically disagrees with Buell’s 
emphasis on the material quality of textual representation, and he dismisses “realist 
ecocriticism” as attempting an impossible reconciliation of the material world and the 
text. Phillips identifies a connection in realist ecocriticism between ecological 
effectiveness and direct appeal to the material, reproducing the empirical facticity we 
have seen at work in the sciences: 
Realist ecocritics present themselves as telling it like it is because to do 
otherwise, to tell it according to a theory, is not only to be impractical, it is 
to obscure the truth of ecology and the truth about art, too. Ecocriticism, 
they argue, should appeal directly to the creation, both natural and literary. 
(136) 
Phillips suggests that realist ecocriticism longs for material things to become the 
foundation and arbiter of ecological disputes. He sees such a rapprochement of world and 
text as potentially dangerous, failing as it does to account for human involvement in the 
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processes of textual production, for the referential limitations of language, or for the 
potential influence of social construction and ideology. Consequently, he rejects the 
realist ecocritical turn, claiming “ecocritics have been mistaken to think literary realism is 
a fully coherent aesthetic and therefore one that we need to revive” (145). In contrast, he 
argues that developing theory should “cure ecocriticism of its fundamentalist fixation on 
literal representation, and shift its focus away from the epistemological to the pragmatic” 
(7). His critique of ecocriticism’s “fundamentalist fixation” has two parts. First, Phillips 
finds ecocritical realism implausible, due to the differences between language and the 
material world; second, he claims that ecocritical realism is undesirable because it is 
limiting and dull. 
 The latter of these claims, that realistic depiction is uninteresting, assumes that a 
return to realism prescribes certain aesthetics to the ecological writer. Phillips reveals this 
fear when he claims, “Realistic depiction of the world, of the sort that we can credit as 
reasonable and uncontroversial, is one of literature’s most pedestrian, least artful aspects” 
(8). He fears that Buell’s emphasis on nonfiction writing favors description over other 
potentially “artful” aspects of literature. Such a prescription will not help ecocriticism’s 
politics, since it will not return the focus to the nonhuman environment but will “put a 
certain kind of art, and not nature, back at the top of the docket culturally” (163-64). 
Ecocriticism’s supposedly radical fight against the limitations of theory will in turn be 
limiting, encouraging a focus on narrowly descriptive writing. Such a change can reduce 
the writer to a mere copier of the already-existing world and the critic into a referee of 
mimesis: 
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If ecocriticism were limited to reading realistic texts realistically, it would 
have to scant not only nature (ironically enough) but a lot of literature as 
well [. . .] An ecocriticism pledged to realism will be hamstrung in another 
way: its practitioners will be reduced to an umpire’s role, squinting to see 
if a given depiction of a horizon, a wildflower, or a live oak tree is itself 
well-painted and lively. Literary realism privileges description, and even 
the sharpest description seems inert if it doesn’t occur in a narrative 
context heightened by philosophical, psychological, political, or scientific 
interests [. . .]. (163-64) 
Here, Phillips resists what Buell calls “thick description” (Imagination 90). Given the 
non-fictional basis of Buell’s environmental imagination, Phillips fears that the texts 
available for ecocritical analysis and the tools available for environmental commentary 
will become unnecessarily narrow.14 
 Phillips is also skeptical about the referential capacity Buell reclaimed, finding his 
realism too generous in its connections between world and text. Phillips claims, “Realism 
of the sort that Buell advocates boils down to a desire that what we say should be related 
in something other than a circumstantial way to what we see, and is never comfortable 
with the makeshift character of our words” (170). Phillips’s second critique of Buell 
rejects literary representations of the material environment as anything other than 
aesthetic, textual functions. He claims, “Buell seems to want there to be a relationship 
between trees in literature and trees in the world closer than a relationship of a mere 
                                                 
14
 Such fears drove the second-wave ecocritical expansion: a wider variety of texts came under ecocritical 
scrutiny, and the criteria for what counted as environmental writing expanded. In The Future of 
Environmental Criticism, Buell describes this second-wave expansion, which “has tended to question 
organicist models of conceiving both environment and environmentalism” and which has expanded 
ecocritical attention to “urbanism and environmental justice” (23). 
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semblance would be, whether that semblance is descriptive, iconic, or metaphorical and 
symbolic” (6). Buell’s desire is for a “literature of presence” or what Phillips also calls 
“realism-cum-positivism” (6; 161-62). But Phillips insists that it goes against common 
sense to imagine textual trees as having this complex relationship to material objects: 
textual functions, in the form of words or phrases postulating an imaginary 
object, describing an imaginary setting, or suggesting a vaguely 
personified imaginary entity (such as the woods we encounter in fairy 
tales), is surely what trees must be, and can only be, insofar as they figure 
“in the pages of American literature.” It seems not so much naïve as occult 
to suppose otherwise. I wonder how we should regard trees that are in 
literature as something other than textual functions [. . .]. (6) 
While Phillips’s critique points to the difficulty of imagining something other than pure 
text or pure materiality, it also re-inscribes the dichotomies Buell strove to avoid. By 
postulating that literary texts are predominantly “imaginary,” he nullifies the 
representational capacity of the literary writer. While the woods of fairy tales may very 
well be “vaguely personified imaginary entit[ies],” the woods of, say, Faulkner’s 
Yoknapatawpha County or Thoreau’s Walden merit different categories. While still 
“imagined” at some level, these woods of American literature – fictive and non-fictive, 
respectively – figure differently than the woods of an entirely imagined kingdom. Part of 
ecocriticism’s task must be to chart the range of figurations possible between an “occult” 
belief in the material presence of trees on a literary page and a homogenizing dismissal of 
all trees as equally abstract entities. 
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 Rephrasing Phillips’s critique in the terms of materiality can clarify exactly where 
he disagrees with Buell. Buell claims that literature captures some aspect of the tree’s 
material reality. The goal of literary criticism, then, is to explore how this materiality 
enters the text. But Phillips questions this posited interconnection between text and 
material world, insisting that the figurative presence of trees in no way guarantees a 
connection to material trees. However, despite its differences from Buell’s theory, 
Phillips’s argument leaves us in a similar position: searching for better language and 
better theory to understand the relationship of textuality and materiality. Phillips 
acknowledges the need for such theory when he claims, “texts and trees cannot represent 
themselves; they must be represented. And in order to come to terms with that fact, one 
needs not just theory but better theory than in the past. What one doesn’t need, it seems to 
me, are better representations of trees” (139). While Phillips rejects Buell’s solutions, his 
critique points to what realist ecocriticism needs to develop in order to be more 
convincing: an account of the mysterious processes by which a material tree enters into a 
literary text, and an assessment of representation that avoids the text/world dichotomy. 
 A more recent exploration of ecocritical realism and foundational environmental 
dichotomies, Timothy Morton’s Ecology Without Nature, provides another attempt to 
develop “better theory” about environmental representation. Like Phillips, Morton argues 
that the drive to reconnect humans to their environment cannot succeed because of the 
nature of language and textuality. His rejection of the realist return has political 
overtones: he contends that too readily accepting art as reality can lead readers and critics 
to accept aesthetic, cultural constructions as identical to the “extra-discursive” 
environment (Soper 8). To challenge the notion of “nature” as something outside 
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discourse, Ecology Without Nature focuses on literary devices that enable writers to 
create a sense of the world’s presence while reproducing the ontological dualisms of 
environmental representation. 
Like Phillips, Morton identifies a desire within ecocriticism and nature writing to 
reconcile humans with their natural environments. Such reconciliation appeals to 
perceptual immediacy. Ecocriticism and nature writing start from the assumption that 
nature is external to the human and can only be regained through conscious effort, by 
both reader and writer alike, to better perceive and better represent their material 
surroundings. Paradoxically, this set-up suggests we can think and write our way out of 
an ontological difficulty. If we just think differently, we can change our fundamental 
relationship to the world of things. Ecological writing is supposed to initiate this 
transformation, reconciling humans to nature through description whose close attention to 
material detail models a way of closing the gap between text and world. As Morton says, 
Ecological writing [i.e. nonfiction nature writing and ecocriticism] wants 
to undo habitual distinctions between nature and ourselves. It is supposed 
not just to describe, but also to provide a working model for a dissolving 
of the difference between subject and object, a dualism seen as the 
fundamental philosophical reason for human beings’ destruction of the 
environment. (63-64) 
Nature writing thus engages the reader into a complicated dance with texts and with 
things. On the one hand, texts are supposed to erase themselves and erase the subjectivity 
separating humans from the world. Towards this end, environmental writing urges the 
reader to transcend the book and experience the ‘real world’ instead. But these calls to 
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escape textuality and return to a present, fully realized environment recreate the basic 
dichotomies of subject/object, nature/human, social/natural, and real/constructed that 
environmental writing set out to overcome. Morton thus diagnoses environmental writing 
as paralyzed by the very divisions that make the concept of “nature” possible. 
Indeed, Morton argues that “nature” and “environment” are at once constructed 
human concepts and legitimate more-than-human entities. The environment is constituted 
by all the material objects around a perceiving individual, but to perceive it as 
“environment” is to experience these objects as a unified set of surroundings rather than 
as material entities. “Environment” is both a list of all the concrete objects one can 
perceive and more than the total of these parts; it is a totalizing abstraction that Morton 
calls ambience. Similarly, while nature is defined as all that is outside the perceiving 
subject – all that is material and objective – this accumulation of perceptual objects 
moves asymptotically towards an abstract totality. Nature too is ambient: 
Nature, a transcendental term in a material mask, stands at the end of a 
potentially infinite series of other terms that collapse into it, otherwise 
known as a metonymic list: fish, grass, mountain air, chimpanzees, love, 
soda water, freedom of choice, heterosexuality, free markets. . . . Nature. 
(14) 
Thus, while a collection of material objects defines nature, the term also becomes a 
placeholder for an infinite list; a law or norm; and a fantasy of unified heterogeneity. As 
Morton says, “Nature wavers in between the divine and the material” (14). But despite 
nature’s hybrid identity, nature writing continually purifies nature of its ideal, subjective, 
and human components. We return to “factual brutalism,” the desire for a standard 
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beyond aesthetics or perception, a solid bedrock from which to make ecological choices 
(123). If “Empiricism is the name of the thinking that tries to be no-thinking,” then nature 
writing strives to be no-writing (123). It tries to transmit the “built-in bar code of 
truthfulness” residing in material things by forgetting its own construction (123). 
 A constrained realism that traces the processes of textual production can provide 
an alternative to this odd tendency to build separate realms and then smash them together 
in hopes of creating some new solution. Ecology Without Nature begins to move in this 
direction, seeking a rhetorical framework that evades purified dichotomies. Morton 
argues that we need to get rid of ambient concepts like “nature” and strive to better 
understand the connection between the material and the textual. He adopts the term 
“ecocritique” to describe this proposed theoretical paradigm: a set of tools to 
simultaneously explore literary representations of and critical approaches to the 
environment. As part of this set of tools, Morton seeks what I am also claiming we need: 
a way of reading that attends to the material without exaggerating the immediacy of 
human access. Thus, Morton articulates “a theory of ambient poetics, a materialist way of 
reading texts with a view to how they encode the literal space of their inscription” (3). 
His poetics identify the literary devices that create environmental ambience. Like Buell, 
Morton reconnects the material world to textual representations of environment by 
analyzing the formal and rhetorical strategies that allow nature writing to create a sense 
of material immediacy. 
Morton defines one particular tool, ecomimesis, as central to environmental 
aesthetics. As Morton defines it, “Ecomimesis is a specific rhetoric that generates a 
fantasy of nature as a surrounding atmosphere” (77). This rhetoric relies upon first-person 
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narration, concrete detail, and the simultaneity of writing and lived experience in the 
timeline of the narrative: “As I am writing, I see a beech tree's leaves. I smell the river.” 
The “As I write” tagline, in conjunction with the description of sensory detail, gives a 
sense of the setting’s reality. The narrator figures him or herself as identical to the writer 
with the phrase “As I write,” establishing the author as an observing, writing, embodied 
human being. This multidimensional presence of the human figure in both the text and 
the world grounds the text in the described environment. The phrases following the 
ecomimetic tag establish the material realness of the writer/narrator’s environment, 
giving the reader the sense that there is a concrete, material world surrounding the 
produced text. Hence, an ecomimetic ambience envelops text, writer, and reader. At the 
same time, ecomimesis strives to break through the aesthetic distance of ambience, 
pushing the reader away from a book and out into nature. 
But while creating an ambient illusion of nature’s immanent reality, ecomimesis 
still differentiates between text and world. As Morton explains, “the very processes that 
try to convey the illusion of immediacy and naturalness keep dispelling it from within” 
(77). One of the paradoxes of ecomimesis is that textual illusions of reality are language; 
the writer who paints reality can only multiply words on a page: 
The more I try to evoke where I am – the ‘I’ who is writing this text – the 
more phrases and figures of speech I must employ. I must get involved in 
a process of writing, the very process that I am not describing when I 
evoke the environment in which writing is taking place. The more 
convincingly I render my surroundings, the more figurative language I end 
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up with. The more I try to show you what lies beyond the page, the more 
of a page I have. (30) 
The more that a writer pushes the reader towards the outside world, the more the writer 
gets enmeshed in an entirely written world. Whether the author is creating an imaginary 
world or trying to describe a real world, a literary text only multiplies language, and 
rhetorical strategies of immediacy are all figurative. To generate immediacy requires an 
abundance of thick description and hence more writing. As Morton explains, “The more 
nature we have, and therefore the more ‘lively expression,’ the more writing we have. 
The paradox is present in the very phrase ‘nature writing.’ Is nature to be thought of as 
writing?” (70). Ecomimesis, then, is a “weird combination of vividness and distancing, 
naturalness and artifice, remembering and recording, attuning and hallucinating” (128). 
The urgency to reconcile the alienated human self with the surrounding environment and 
escape these paradoxes creates a “form of ideological fantasy” (67). Morton’s 
paradoxical assessment of nature writing thus makes a non-textual, non-aesthetic 
encounter with the environment extremely unlikely. Is there a way out of the textual 
maze Morton sketches? 
Morton’s analysis provides no explanation for how literature does anything other 
than perpetuate “the aesthetic screen of words” and gives no mechanism by which 
language meaningfully translates reality (35). The inescapability of ecomimesis 
condemns all writing. Texts that are unconscious of their participation in ecomimetic 
practice are described as “minimiz[ing]” the “signals that we are in a constructed realm” 
and thus contributing to the “ideological fantasy” of immediate nature (35; 67). On the 
other hand, texts that foreground their desire to escape ecomimesis are no less 
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ideological: “This conscious, reflexive, postmodern version is all the more ecomimetic 
for that” (31). Ecology Without Nature leaves ecocriticism with writing barred from the 
world, saturated in ideology. Morton does not think this dualism is real, but he also does 
not think it can be transcended: 
The problem comes when we start to think that there is something behind 
or beyond or above (in other words, outside!) the inside-outside 
distinction. Not that the distinction is real [. . .] it is wrong to claim that 
there is something more real beyond inside and outside [ . . .] There is not 
even nothing beyond inside and outside. (70) 
This paradoxical position leaves ecocriticism with tangled terms inherited from theory 
and no concrete sense of how the material world relates to aesthetic representations. 
Ecology Without Nature only leaves the reader to “hang out in what feels like dualism” 
(205). 
 The only way to avoid Morton’s concluding paradoxes will be to reimagine 
writing’s goal. Morton shows us that as long as we start with a world and a text, a subject 
and an object, and then try to work our way towards some reconciliation or connection 
(reference; adequation), we will end up wallowing in “what feels like dualism” and 
attempting to work sleight-of-hand magic with unhelpful terms (205). A more satisfying 
solution will need to establish a new way of understanding what texts do when they 
engage the material world: as Buell claims, they point us to something. To use William 
Howarth’s words, “Ecocriticism, instead of taxing science for its use of language to 
represent (mimesis), examines its ability to point (deixis)” (80). But if we accept 
Morton’s analysis, such a pointing cannot be the “inside” of a text pointing us to 
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something truer “outside the text.” Fortunately, the work of science studies provides a 
slightly different assessment of how this pointing actually works, directing readers to a 
complex chain of reference moving between the material world and texts. 
Reference and Representation in the Work of Bruno Latour 
Latour attempts to articulate just such an alternative to the classical understanding 
of reference without simply leaping across an inherited divide. Latour’s first step in 
rebuilding our understanding of reference is to reveal the constructivist/realist divide as 
itself a historical and social construction, the result of the specific rhetorical processes he 
names the “modern constitution.” As a result of this constitution, “Philosophers of 
science like to remind us, as if this were the epitome of good common sense, that we 
should never confuse epistemological questions (what our representation of the world is) 
and ontological questions (what the world is really like)” (Pandora 93). But while such a 
distinction makes for tidy, logically consistent analysis, this separation does not 
adequately reflect the way scientific knowledge or lived-in environments function: 
“Unfortunately, if we followed the philosophers’ advice we would not understand any 
scientific activity, since confusing those two supposedly separate domains is precisely 
what scientists spend much of their time doing” (Pandora 93). 
The mistake, Latour claims, is in assuming that truth exists in some independent 
material concretization outside of human practice, simply waiting to be “discovered” by 
human observation. Instead of this formulation, which locates all agency with humans 
and none with the material world, Latour contends that we need to recognize scientific 
truth as a process of encounter that actively changes both observer and observed. Such a 
recognition takes us back to a messy world of competing truth claims and competing 
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politics. Politics, as Latour uses the term in Pandora’s Hope and The Politics of Nature, 
is the arduous process of argument by which “the collective” decides on its actions; it is 
by necessity a process full of disagreement, where individuals struggle together to find 
collective solutions that safeguard the greatest number of interests. The appeal to pure 
facts is an attempt to circumvent this contingent and tenuous world. If we could access 
“facts themselves,” we would avoid what Latour calls “the threat of mob rule,” the 
danger that political decisions are not made because they are “true” or “right” but because 
they have the support of the largest number of people. As he explains, 
To avoid the threat of a mob rule that would make everything lowly, 
monstrous, and inhuman, we have to depend on something that has no 
human origin, no trace of humanity, something that is purely, blindly, and 
coldly outside of the City. The idea of a completely outside world 
dreamed up by epistemologists is the only way, in the eyes of moralists, to 
avoid falling prey to mob rule. Only inhumanity will quash inhumanity. 
(Pandora 13) 
Factual brutalism or the world of pure objects: these dreams of the modern constitution 
emerge as an easy way out of the fraught political struggle to decide how humans and 
nonhumans can best coexist in the world they constitute. 
Latour’s analysis rejects this conceptual framework. He argues that “Instead of a 
science of objects and a politics of subjects [. . .] we should have at our disposal a 
political ecology of collectives consisting of humans and nonhumans” (Politics 61). 
Instead of an outside world that must both remain inaccessible and be mobilized in 
defense of truth, Latour imagines a realm of actants that all equally contribute to 
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knowledge and to consequent political decisions. He argues, “When we say there is no 
outside world, this does not mean that we deny its existence, but, on the contrary, that we 
refuse to grant it the ahistorical, isolated, inhuman, cold, objective existence that was 
given only to combat the crowd” (15). Latour thus draws attention to the ignored role of 
subjectivity and politics in the creation of scientific knowledge, showing how scientific 
representation involves a complex interaction between humans and the material 
environment rather than a straightforward transmission of factual information. Scientific 
practice does not purify the “real” objects of the “natural” world from the “constructed” 
discourse of politics and human society; it functions by creating “imbroglios” or 
“hybrids,” weird mixtures of materiality and discourse. True knowledge of the world is 
thus constructed, though not from imagination or language alone. Latour admits, “All too 
often the implication is that if something is fabricated it is false; likewise, if it is 
constructed it must also be deconstructible” (114-15). But Latour challenges this 
association of fabrication with falseness. 
This reconnection of language and the world begins with Latour’s re-examination 
of scientific reference. In Pandora’s Hope, Latour describes how traditional philosophy 
of language talked about reference in terms of correspondence or adequatio, trying to 
project meaning across the abyssal divide between the incompatible domains of words 
and things. But Latour dismisses this epistemological divide: 
The old settlement started from a gap between words and the world, and 
then tried to construct a tiny footbridge over this chasm through a risky 
correspondence between what we understand as totally different 
ontological domains - language and nature. I want to show that there is 
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neither correspondence, nor gaps, nor even two distinct ontological 
domains, but an entirely different phenomenon: circulating reference. (24) 
For Latour, there is never a moment when knowledge lurches across a gap between 
subject and world. While this reformulation is difficult to grasp in the abstract, it makes 
perfect sense when applied to an example of scientific experimentation. Latour takes up 
the methodologies of the sciences: he goes out into the field with scientists to watch the 
production of knowledge from the material world. He discovers that the creation of 
scientific knowledge takes place through a series of material transformations; in each step 
of the process, the material world is newly represented and engaged in a way that changes 
both the knower and the known. This series of transformations results in a set of hybrid 
object-signs. Latour follows these transformations carefully in order to argue that we do 
not have to choose between constructed relativism and realism; there is a real world that 
is not just the text, the text does talk about this world, and we can see the processes by 
which the world becomes a text. 
 Latour's name for these processes is “circulating reference.” Instead of a leap 
from object to sign, from world to text, “circulating reference” suggests a “chain of 
transformation” where the world itself is changed by human attempts to understand and 
talk about it (310). Latour contends that “one never travels directly from objects to words, 
from the referent to the sign, but always through a risky intermediary pathway” (Pandora 
40). Language’s ability to talk about the world is in no way guaranteed by the 
transformations of material practice; it is merely made possible. Furthermore, he argues, 
We never detect the rupture between things and signs and we never face 
the imposition of arbitrary and discrete signs on shapeless and continuous 
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matter. We see only an unbroken series of well-nested elements, each of 
which plays the role of sign for the previous one and of thing for the 
succeeding one. (Pandora 56) 
Instead of a giant gap between the real world and the human text, Latour sees a process of 
translation where knowledge emerges from a series of relationships between hybrids, 
strange double beings that function as both signs and objects, both meaning and material. 
This pathway of transformations from object to sign and back again is easy to 
follow in scientific field research. For example, Latour observes the material 
transformations involved in creating knowledge about the soil in the Boa Vista rainforest. 
He traces the development of knowledge from the forest itself to a final lab report, 
showing that there is process rather than rupture between Boa Vista in the world and Boa 
Vista on paper. To create knowledge of the world requires a transformation or 
“translation” of both words and of the literal world. In his example, scientists core the 
soil, making it into a sample which is both an object and a sign. The sample is then 
arranged in a tool called a pedocomparator that makes a grid out of samples based on 
their color and texture; this rearranging is another literal reorganization of the material 
world that makes soil samples into a new sign. The scientists then represent the grid of 
samples as a table, thereby translating a material object-sign hybrid into a textual object-
sign hybrid that fits neatly on a page. Finally, the scientists describe both table and 
conclusions in a laboratory report that elaborates and analyzes, turning what was learned 
of the soil through encounter, collection, observation, and rearrangement into language 
(51-61). What results is undeniably a text, but it is a text that grew out of literal 
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rearrangements of the material world. Latour calls it a text that “has plants for footnotes” 
(34). 
In this model, world and text do not exist on opposite sides of a dichotomous 
chasm but at opposite ends of a transforming process. Furthermore, Latour’s conceptual 
reimagination of plants as footnotes points to a different relationship between text and 
world than the strange connection of reference. Texts do not try to imitate, copy, or point 
to a single material item. Instead, they constitute entirely new things whose relationship 
to the world is guaranteed by process. Textual representations are historical and 
contingent: their production takes place over time and relies upon the fidelity of 
individual acts of translation, suggesting a chain of events rather than a one-to-one 
correspondence between a word and a thing. 
Thus, knowledge is not imposed but grows out of this series of transformations. 
Latour argues, “to achieve certainty the world needs to stir and transform itself much 
more than words” (Pandora 48-9). Scientific texts never encounter “The immense abyss 
separating things and words [since this gap] can be found everywhere, distributed to 
many smaller gaps” which are each overcome by a small transformation that can be 
recorded and analyzed (51). The limiting dichotomy of words and things becomes 
plausible only when we ignore the many steps occurring between a thing itself and a 
representation of the thing. Attending to these chains of transformation reveals that 
language is neither an imposition nor a mimetic replacement but the end result of a 
process. The pedocomparator exemplifies this non-imposed process; the tool is material 
and representative at the same time. But it is not imposed by humans. It is explicable only 
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as a meeting point of the “social” and the “natural,” as both language and materiality. 
With the pedocomparator, 
[w]e are not jumping from soil to the Idea of soil, but from continuous and 
multiple clumps of earth to a discrete color in a geometric cube coded in 
x- and y-coordinates. And yet René [one of the soil scientists] does not 
impose predetermined categories on a shapeless horizon: he loads his 
pedocomparator with the meaning of the piece of earth—he educes it, he 
articulates it [. . .]. (Pandora 49-51) 
The soil-filled pedocomparator is an example of a hybrid or nonhuman: it is constructed, 
but it is constructed from material things; it is representational, but its meaning derives 
from material qualities and material rearrangements. Representation involves encounter 
with and creation of such hybrids. 
This reconceptualization also changes the roles humans and nonhumans play in 
representation. In classical notions of representation, agency lies with the subject to 
record and observe, but this agency must be ignored when empirical claims are made 
about the self-evident nature of material truth. Latour’s model recasts things, writers, and 
scientists as active agents within a network. Later in the book, speaking of Pasteur’s 
experiments with lactic acid ferment, Latour explains the function of experiment thus: 
“The experiment creates two planes: one in which the narrator is active, and a second in 
which the action is delegated to another character, a nonhuman one” (129). Both must be 
active for material transformations and the creation of meaning to take place. Science, 
then, is neither the imposition of human meaning on the nonhuman world nor the self-
evident standing-forth of the nonhuman outside of discourse. Instead, circulating 
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reference is one example of articulation, the representational concept Latour substitutes 
for correspondence or reference. 
While correspondence and reference involve static, one-to-one correlations 
between language and things, articulation is a fluid process. The central differences 
between Latour’s understanding of reference and the traditional philosophy of language 
to which he refers include his emphasis on process and the contingent nature of reference. 
Successful reference cannot exist outside of a series of processes, and the relationship 
between language and the world is never automatic and guaranteed. Texts always move 
through a “risky, intermediary pathway” when attempting to speak of the world, and no 
ontology or epistemology can either automatically guarantee or preclude the possibility 
of truthful statements. This contingency differentiates what Latour calls “constructivist 
realism” from the relativism expected of constructivist models (135). In a dualistic 
reality, statements are imposed on the world, haphazardly tossed at pre-existing facts like 
darts; truth is a lucky strike. But in the world of constructed reality, “propositions” are 
built out of existing material items (141). To “articulate a proposition” of fact is not to 
copy the external world’s pre-existing truth but to interact with the material objects of 
this world so that new information emerges (142). A pedocomparator articulates and 
produces propositions; it rearranges the material world and makes new information 
evident. The pedocomparator’s analysis of the soil is not imposed; neither could a true 
knowledge of this soil pre-exist the tool’s rearrangement. The fact of the soil’s 
composition becomes fact only through a process that engages the material and carefully 
tracks its transformations. 
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This new vision of representation challenges the conventional understanding of 
what science – and, I would add – other forms of realist representation do. Representation 
occurs through a series of translations between materiality and language. Latour argues, 
This whole tired question of the correspondence between words and the 
world stems from a simple confusion between epistemology and the 
history of art. We have taken science for realist painting, imagining that it 
made an exact copy of the world. The sciences do something else 
entirely—paintings too, for that matter. Through successive stages they 
link us to an aligned, transformed, constructed world. We forfeit 
resemblance, in this model, but there is compensation: by pointing with 
our index fingers to features of an entry printed in an atlas, we can, 
through a series of uniformly discontinuous transformations, link 
ourselves to Boa Vista [. . .] I can never verify the resemblance between 
my mind and the world, but I can, if I pay the price, extend the chain of 
transformations wherever verified reference circulates through constant 
substitutions. (Pandora 79) 
In this model, the material world is not merely observed, described, or understood; it is 
mobilized. The reality of knowledge, both scientific and otherwise, is always contingent; 
it can never be definitely proven by comparing it to some non-subjective, nonhuman 
standard. Rather, we must examine the processes which produce this knowledge to verify 
or challenge the truth of a representation, for knowledge can become untrue if the chain 
of transformation fails at any point along the way. 
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Latour recognizes that this change in how we understand reference is initially 
uncomfortable, but this is only because “we still imagine the thing to be somehow at one 
extremity waiting out there to serve as the bedrock for the reference” (150). On the 
contrary, he claims, “in practice, it is never the case that we utter statements by using 
only the resources of language and then check to see if there is a corresponding thing that 
will verify or falsify our utterances” (144). Rather, he says, we make statements that gain 
truthfulness – or, in his language, that “are endowed with a new competence” – as 
repeated encounters with and transformations of the material world change our thinking 
(124). We do an experiment, make a claim about the world, repeat the experiment, and 
through repetitions of this cycle, gradually transform tentative claims into accepted 
scientific facts. 
Latour’s provocative allusion to the way realist painting functions and his 
insistence that facts are not material entities existing outside texts inspire this project to 
investigate the transformations and mobilizations that literary texts make when 
attempting to convey material reality. While a descriptive passage from a nature essay 
hardly resembles the charts of a scientific report, literary writing can still be analyzed in 
terms of the strategies it uses to mobilize or trace back to the material world. While 
scientific and literary representation have different aims and different ways of engaging 
the world, both forms of representation must traverse an equally “risky pathway” 
between world and text. Through processes of observation and experience, the literary no 
less than the scientific observer transforms a temporal experience of contact with the 
world into ideas that can be reformulated as text. Certainly, the literary writer may edit, 
invent, rearrange, and expand on experience, but even scientific documents do this. 
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Literary as well as scientific writing is produced through transformations, and re-reading 
literary texts as pointing to a chain of “uniformly discontinuous transformations” may 
help us evade nature writing’s ambience and re-approach literary texts, seeing their 
engagements with the environment as more than ideological delusion. 
But literary transformations do not take place through the use of physical tools or 
scientific procedures; the bulk of realistic or non-fictional literary accounts deal with the 
more quotidian material encounters of observation, perception, and experience. Rather 
than charts or tables that correlate back to material samples, literary texts use rhetorical 
tools like ecomimesis and thick description to record sensory perceptions and experiences 
of the world. The difference between scientific and literary writing, then, is 
methodological. Latour argues that scientific methodology rigorously documents 
experimental mobilizations of the material world. Such documentation can retrace the 
transformations that turned undifferentiated material substance into the subjects of human 
knowledge. Literary writing does not work so hard to maintain traces back to reality. At 
the same time, however, literature has its own way of pointing to material 
transformations. Whereas scientific writing minimizes the presence of the experimenting 
subject, literary writing explicitly or implicitly registers the experience of encountering 
the material world, and hence draws attention to the situated subjectivity of the non-
fictional narrator.15 Instead of tracing soil from the forest floor through a pedocomparator 
                                                 
15
 Latour’s work foregrounds the role of the scientific subject, too. While scientific experimental design 
specifically negotiates conditions so that this subject occasionally fades to the background, allowing 
nonhumans to speak as key players in an experiment, Latour returns attention to the individual subject in 
his or her multiple roles as perceiver, writer, speaker, and character. For example, when describing 
Pasteur’s experiments with lactic acid ferment, Latour explains that Pasteur “distributes activity between 
himself, as the experimenter, and the would-be ferment. An experiment, as we just saw, is an action 
performed by the scientist so that the nonhuman can be made to appear on its own. [. . .] Pasteur acts so 
that the yeast acts alone” (129). Later, Latour explains, “Pasteur authorizes the yeast to authorize him to 
speak in its name” (132). 
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to a textual table, literature traces a forest like Boa Vista to a moment of perceptual 
encounter. We still do not face a divided world and text; the processes connecting world 
and text still involve a central subject coming into bodily contact with a material world 
and developing descriptions of the world via engaged, active processes that are both 
material and textual. 
But in addressing the embodied writer in contact with an environment, we need 
not return focus to the author’s intentions or return to a reading model that prioritizes 
biographical or historical context. Instead, recognizing the embodied writer as a 
component in textual production foregrounds the process by which material observation 
translates into textual description. A material theory of literary representation can build 
on this perceiving subject as the point of encounter between materiality and language. 
Like the pedocomparator, the observing individual becomes the locus of transformations 
that make it possible to load the material world into a text. For this analogy to work, 
however, there must be a way of explaining human perception that materializes it in the 
way that Latour materializes scientific experimentation. If literary writing is to be traced 
back to the material world, such tracing will require human perception to provide a 
potentially reliable connection to the material. 
Thus, the ecocritical question about the relationship between the environment and 
the text opens into phenomenological questions about the nature of perception: is the 
perceiving human individual fundamentally divided from the object world, or does 
perception provide accurate knowledge? In trying to understand human perception, we 
encounter a familiar dichotomy between subjects and objects; how can I, as a subject who 
experiences my own perceiving, ever know that the things I perceive truly exist? Like 
 63 
 
language, perception appears to leave humans on the other side of an ontological abyss, 
separated from the world of material things. And, as Latour’s recovery of scientific 
representation demonstrates, to understand the way that language and perception allow us 
to relate to our world requires us not just to overcome but to rethink this abyss. To do so 
requires a thoughtful account of how the material world is both present to perception and 
not identical with it, just as Latour’s account of language lays out how the material world 
is present in the construction of text without being identical to text or merely a projection 
of textual definitions out onto the material world. 
Literary Representation and Perceiving the Real World 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a philosopher who has had much recent favor in 
ecocriticism, provides exactly this kind of account of perception. In the preface to his 
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty argues, “Probably the chief gain of 
phenomenology is to have united extreme subjectivism and extreme objectivism in the 
notion of the world or of rationality” (xii). Merleau-Ponty’s account of perception is 
“subjective” because it focuses on the experience of the individual. Unlike science, 
phenomenology attempts to explain individual experience rather than minimize it. But 
this account is also “objective” because it insists that the experience of perception 
encounters a world of real objects. We discover in perception that the body and 
experience serve as mediating lenses between the material world and our ideas about or 
representations of the world. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology emphasizes the bodily 
nature of human thought and perception. He argues that perception does not leap from 
object to mind but instead functions across a series of physical encounters between the 
sensing, sensible body and the sensible, material world. Like Latour, Merleau-Ponty 
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focuses on processes and history. When we focus on our perception of the world as a 
process that gains in connection to the material world as it unfolds over time, we discover 
that a perception (like Latour’s scientific knowledge) provides a contingent but 
potentially accurate account of the material world. 
Thus, like Latour, Merleau-Ponty argues that it is easy, even common-sensical, to 
see the connections between material things, how we see those things, and what we say 
about those things (between materiality, perception, and language) if we remember that 
perception is a process which takes place over time. In Phenomenology of Perception, 
Merleau-Ponty claims, “Consciousness must be faced with its own unreflective life in 
things and awakened to its own history which it was forgetting: such is the true part that 
philosophical reflection has to play and thus do we arrive at a true theory of attention” 
(36). To use Latourian language, each perception is an event and knowledge of the world 
is a construction resulting from this event, not a pre-existing entity or a mental projection. 
Merleau-Ponty says, 
reflection never holds, arrayed and objectified before its gaze, the whole 
world and the plurality of monads, and [. . .] its view is never other than 
partial and of limited power. It is also why phenomenology is 
phenomenology, that is, a study of the advent of being to consciousness, 
instead of presuming its possibility as given in advance. (71) 
A true knowledge of the world emerges over time, but it is never a foregone conclusion. 
Just as Latour stresses the contingency of scientific knowledge, Merleau-Ponty 
emphasizes the tentative nature of perception, claiming, “The fusion of soul and body in 
the act, the sublimation of biological into personal existence, and of the natural into the 
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cultural world is made both possible and precarious by the temporal structure of our 
experience” (96-7, emphasis mine). Along with perception’s contingency, Merleau-Ponty 
also emphasizes perception’s reliance on process and motion, explaining, “The union of 
soul and body is not an amalgamation between two mutually external terms, subject and 
object, brought about by arbitrary decree. It is enacted at every instant in the movement 
of existence” (102). Thus, the truth is not static but actively created. This creation is not a 
false projection, nor is it a pre-existing thing reproduced within the mind. Instead, it is a 
new thing born out of the sensing body’s encounter with a sensible world. 
Merleau-Ponty insists that we do not impose meaning on the world from within 
our minds; after all, there are true and false perceptions, and we can readily distinguish 
between, say, a genuine perception of another person in the room with us and our 
mistaking a shadow for another person. There is, he argues, a “decisive moment in 
perception: the upsurge of a true and exact world” – that moment when a perceiving 
human can recognize that a branch is not a bird, that a shadow is not a puddle, that a 
cloud is not a hill (62). Such distinctions between true and false perceptions are not 
imposed by the mind, since such distinctions can be made without conscious thought. At 
the level of experience, humans can make truth claims about the world that are not 
imposed. At the same time, however, such truth claims are limited and defined by 
perception; they are what we might call, with Latour, “aligned, transformed, constructed” 
claims. Merleau-Ponty elaborates, “What is given is not the thing on its own, but the 
experience of the thing, or something transcendent standing in the wake of one's 
subjectivity, some kind of natural entity of which a glimpse is afforded through a 
personal history” (379-80). 
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 To further explain the processes of perception, Merleau-Ponty distinguishes 
between two levels of experience. The first level is what Merleau-Ponty calls the pre-
reflective, “‘lived-through’ world which is prior to the objective one” (69). This is the 
world-as-experienced that the subject has not yet consciously explained or explored. But 
within this level the perceiver can still react to and interact with the world. Merleau-
Ponty argues that one need not verbalize or analyze to correct mistaken impressions 
about the world and move towards a “truer” relationship with the material; I can flinch 
away from a branch and relax upon realizing it is actually a shadow without having to 
think through or analyze my body’s responses. Built up on these non-analytical 
experiences are reflections about the world. The combination of the “pre-reflective” and 
the “reflective” levels constitutes what we call consciousness. The rational judgments and 
conscious impressions I have of the world are not necessarily less true than pre-reflective, 
immediate experience but they are secondary, based on my unfolding experiences as an 
embodied subject. Ignoring this pre-reflective, embodied state of encounter makes it 
possible to postulate human consciousness as isolated from the material world; 
recognizing the mediating role of the pre-reflective state can neutralize this ontological 
divide. 
 Thus, when faced with its “own unreflective life in things and awakened to its 
own history,” consciousness ceases to be a non-material thing (36). Merleau-Ponty insists 
that the human is not a transcendent form of consciousness with the ability to re-imagine 
the world at will. Instead, he speaks of the perceiving human as a “body-subject,” an 
individual whose consciousness, perception, and subjectivity are indivisible from the 
body as a collection of sensing, perceiving, and synthesizing organs. There is thus no 
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radical break between the human subject and the material world, nor is the body reduced 
to being another object in a world of objects, trailing a disembodied consciousness behind 
it. Instead, “the body is a natural self and, as it were, the subject, but it is also discernible 
of perception” (239). Even while the body is identified as the subject and self of the pre-
reflective state, there are dimensions of the body that escape conscious thought and 
control. Body and thought are not identical; neither are they separate. My body interacts 
with the surrounding world, but my reactions are not caused in any mechanistic fashion. 
Neither are these reactions self-consciously mine the way that conscious thought or 
willed actions are. I can theoretically will not to dodge a tree branch near my face if I 
anticipate my reaction. But if my reaction to the tree branch is not the mechanistic 
outcome of material data, neither is it my will that causes me to dodge when I catch the 
tree branch's motion in my peripheral vision and then flinch. Merleau-Ponty replaces the 
words cause and choice with motivation to describe the external world's influence on my 
body-self. Even if I do not direct my conscious attention to the world around me, I can 
react and respond to it; there is a meaning in a swinging tree branch that my body can and 
will respond to without any conscious will on my part. 
 Thus, the world motivates my perception, and my interaction with the world can 
become conscious attention. These examples reveal how I am my body, yet the ‘me’ that 
remembers and describes the tree branch I narrowly escaped differs from the ‘me’ that 
dodges around a tree branch without thinking. There is both unity and separation within 
me as a being; I could not think of the tree without a bodily, perceptual interaction with 
it, yet my body is not just a tool of my thinking self: if I stumble against the tree, I learn 
of its roughness, but cannot think this roughness away. 
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 Thus, Merleau-Ponty offers a hybrid and process-oriented vision of perception. 
The result is not guaranteed access to the world in its totality, but a constrained potential 
for accurate perception that puts the human into contact with a real and knowable world. 
Thus, Merleau-Ponty describes human perception as both direct and incomplete; sensory 
experiences give humans real knowledge of a real world, but there are always qualities of 
the world that resist human perception. Merleau-Ponty claims, 
the perception of our own body and the perception of external things 
provide an example of non-positing consciousness not in possession of 
fully determinate objects, that of a logic lived through which cannot 
account for itself, and that of an immanent meaning which is not clear to 
itself and becomes fully aware of itself only through experiencing certain 
natural signs. (57) 
Much later in the work, Merleau-Ponty explains, “I have the world as an incomplete 
individual, through the agency of my body as the potentiality of this world [. . .] because 
my body is a movement towards the world, and the world my body’s point of support” 
(408). Thus, in a way similar to the scientist entering into material relationship with the 
world via the interactive process of experimentation, the perceiving individual enters into 
a perceptual, material encounter with the world that is limited but potentially significant: 
To live a thing is not to coincide with it, nor fully to embrace it in thought 
[. . .] The perceiving subject must, without relinquishing his place and his 
point of view, and in the opacity of sensation, reach out towards things to 
which he has, in advance, no key, and for which he nevertheless carries 
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within himself the project, and open himself to an absolute Other [. . .]. 
(380) 
Here, Merleau-Ponty’s account of temporality and process parallels Latour’s account of 
representation, positing a world available but never fully accessible to human perception. 
The relationship between perception and world does not work as a one-to-one 
connection, a “coincid[ing],” but as a historical sedimentation of events and projects. 
Like the loading of soil into discourse, perception is a transformation created when a 
material body encounters material things. 
 Merleau-Ponty’s account shows how perception relies on encounter, and he 
argues that there is a truth to perception that engages both body and mind. Thus, 
understanding an object is neither a purely physical nor a purely conceptual process; 
there is a unifying reality to this encounter that predates reflection and, consequently, 
predates language. An encounter with a tree is not primarily an encounter with a concept 
‘tree’ nor is it an encounter with a set of discrete physical sensations that are later 
synthesized by the mind into a false unity called ‘tree.’ ‘Tree’ is not imposed by the mind 
(though the word may be), nor is it a self-contained truth that could be grasped outside of 
the physical meeting of body and tree. Rather, it is a total experience, where thought and 
sensation are not readily separated, where there is a real meaning synthesized by mind 
and body. While the word ‘tree’ has no essential connection to the material tree itself or 
my experience of it, the concept of ‘tree’ is not just a human imposition I have made to 
hold together my disconnected sensations of roughness and green and pine scent. As 
Merleau-Ponty says, 
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When we come back to phenomena we find, as a basic layer of 
experience, a whole already pregnant with an irreducible meaning: not 
sensations with gaps between them, into which memories may be 
supposed to slip, but the features, the layout of a landscape or a word [sic], 
in spontaneous accord with the intentions of the moment, as with earlier 
experience. (25) 
There is a totality to my experience of the tree that preexists my naming of it and that 
points to a tree as a real entity with its own meaningful unity. 
Conclusion: Towards a Constrained Realism in Ecocriticism 
We finally discover, then, the framework for a constrained realist understanding 
of perception, language, and textual representation. We are not left with human language 
attempting to cross a philosophical chasm to a world, nor language attempting to corral 
the dispersive sensations of the world into an imposed conceptual unity. Instead, 
language attempts to parallel an already existing and meaningful unity as experienced. To 
gain a descriptive knowledge of a tree, I may not have to physically manipulate it as I 
would to gain a scientific knowledge of it. But I have to encounter its materiality through 
the material medium of my own body. I am free to write about imaginary trees or to write 
about a tree without any specific referent in mind; but when I describe my narrow escape 
from this tree branch, such a description grows from perceptual moments and thus bodily 
encounters with material objects – encounters where language, discourse, and textuality 
are not readily separable from sensible materiality. 
 If we take Merleau-Ponty’s account of perception seriously, then descriptions of 
ecological involvement must recognize that the entire natural world is both given to 
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human observers and resistant to them. Subjectivity, perception, language – these need to 
be reconsidered as the conditions of understanding the material, not impediments 
separating humans from the material world. As Merleau-Ponty suggests, the material 
body is not a confine placed on transcendent, all-encompassing perception, nor is it the 
limit to an infinite play of textuality. Instead, the constraints imposed by the body are the 
very conditions which make perception possible: 
the system of experience is not arrayed before me as if I were God, it is lived by 
me from a certain point of view; I am not the spectator, I am involved, and it is 
my involvement in a point of view which makes possible both the finiteness of 
my perception and its opening out upon the complete world as a horizon of every 
perception (354). 
Similarly, the state of ‘being human’ is not some limitation on an otherwise uninhibited 
union with the natural but is itself the very condition that makes engagement with the 
material world possible. Language also must be recognized as a pre-condition rather than 
a limitation. While language does not correspond exactly to the material world, words are 
the pre-condition for the expression of constructed truth, not an impediment to the 
otherwise unimpeded flow of truth between the material and the ideal. 
Given that all knowledge moves through this series of “risky, intermediate 
pathways” – through the perceiving body, through material mobilizations, and through 
language – we are set up for a nuanced explanation of the relationship between writing 
and the material world. If I write of the tree that I previously dodged, I can only write 
about what I experienced through the medium of my body if I want to write fact. I can 
exaggerate, invent, or elaborate, but such changes are clearly deviations from what I 
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experienced, not a constructed truth I impose on my experience that consequently 
invalidates my experiences as a whole. But, if I carefully describe my experience, I can 
provide a pointing finger back towards my encounter with the tree. The tree itself is not 
in the text, true. But the tree is not mythical; it is not a rhetorical effect. I point to it, 
tracing back through the risky pathway of textual description, conscious reflection, and 
pre-reflexive sensory encounter to a material thing, open to yet exceeding my ability to 
perceive. Bodily perception becomes one of the necessary, contingent, incomplete steps 
connecting the material world to the text. 
 
My movement through science studies and phenomenology has been intended to 
justify a return to some kind of ecocritical realism, balancing a sophisticated concept of 
reference with accountability to both the textual and the material. What I hope to have 
shown is that human experience and perception, as well as human texts, have the 
potential to express truth, translated through mobilizations of the world, whether via 
experimentation, collection, observation, description, or other processes of writing. But 
even if texts and the material world are connected, what value can such a recovery have 
for literary scholarship, aside from rehashing tired debates about the nature of 
representation? In the following chapters, I examine a number of environmental texts to 
explore two ways that issues of representation can influence literary analysis. First, a 
“constrained realist” position can re-shape the terms we use to talk about the relationship 
between authors, texts, and the material world. We can re-examine nonfiction writing and 
historically based fiction as well as realistic fiction. When we see textual articulation of 
material reality as a possibility achievable through careful mobilization, we can 
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investigate the level to which various texts achieve such mobilization and ask how an 
effort to depict and mobilize a real, perceivable material world shapes certain literary 
texts. 
Second, issues of representation are themselves items of concern in environmental 
texts. Texts that express an interest in representing the real world, usually in pursuit of 
some political end, often contemplate the difficulties of such representation, drawing 
attention to the limits imposed by perspective, language, and referentiality. Such texts 
integrate theoretical questions about language’s success or failure with political questions 
about how best to represent the material world in order to change existing social as well 
as ecological conditions. While Morton dismisses such self-reflexive contemplation as 
equally enmeshed in the paradoxes of ecomimesis, I believe that such self-awareness can 
provide an environmental literary ethics as important or effective as realistic depiction. 
Self-reflexive texts can push us towards the kind of multi-vocal political ecology Latour 
advocates: a politics which accounts for scientific facts, cultural attitudes, and political 
motivations, all competing at once as we make decisions. While self-reflexive literary 
texts may not all have a fully developed, non-dualistic theory of representation akin to 
Latour’s, all of them look at the relationship between world and text with thoughtful 
analysis. Their responses, ranging from playfully hopeful to despairing, can help 
ecocriticism keep thinking through the complicated rhetoric underlying our developing 
ecological commitments.  
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CHAPTER III 
“A GOOD WORD FOR THE TRUTH:” HENRY DAVID THOREAU AND THE 
LITERARY CONSTRUCTION OF THE REAL WORLD 
If I seem to boast more than is becoming, my excuse is that I brag for 
humanity rather than for myself; and my shortcomings and inconsistencies 
do not affect the truth of my statement. Notwithstanding much cant and 
hypocrisy, – which I find it difficult to separate from my wheat, but for 
which I am as sorry as any man, – I will breathe freely and stretch myself 
in this respect, it is such a relief to both the moral and physical system; 
and I am resolved that I will not through humility become the devil’s 
attorney. I will endeavor to speak a good word for the truth. 
 Henry David Thoreau, Walden 
 
In the passage from the opening chapter of Walden cited above, Henry David 
Thoreau voices both a problem and a goal: he wants to share what he learned and 
observed during his two years living at Walden Pond, but he finds himself limited by his 
personal perspective and by written language.16 The narrator Thoreau, writing against the 
deforestation and industrialization of the Concord area by describing his own experiment 
in an alternative lifestyle, fears that the ethical impact and truthfulness of his text will be 
limited by his personal “cant and hypocrisy,” for which he admits that he is “as sorry as 
                                                 
16
 Building on the embodied theories of perception and representation articulated in Chapter II, this chapter 
argues against strict distinctions between Thoreau as a biographical figure and Thoreau as a presence 
within the text. There is, as Lawrence Buell explains in The Environmental Imagination, “an important 
theoretical difference between imagining Walden as about ‘the Thoreauvian persona’ and imagining it to be 
about ‘Thoreau’ the person. Yet the difference, on second thought, is not so great as it might seem. 
Ecocritically speaking, these positions have a certain interchangeability as human subject-centered 
approaches to literary texts. The persona, at least in the case of documentary nonfiction, remains in such 
close dialogue with the biographical person that the insistence on disjoining them, from an ecocritical 
standpoint anyhow, signifies little more than a literary-critical incest taboo anxiety. The Thoreauvian 
persona is not coexistensive with the historical Thoreau, but it can legitimately be thought of as a 
provisional identity that the author has imagined for himself” (385-86). While some of my analysis will 
blur distinctions between textual and  historical Thoreau as it traces his processes of mobilization, I will 
refer to the textual narrator as “Thoreau” or “the narrator Thoreau” and the biographical personage as “the 
historical Thoreau” when such distinctions are clear. 
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any man” but which he cannot, nevertheless, avoid (37).17 While this apology asks 
pardon for the narrator’s bragging persona, it also expresses concern about whether 
“shortcomings and inconsistencies” might actually “affect the truth of my statement” 
(37). By thus gesturing to the constraining perspective of the individual subject and the 
questionable referentiality of written language, his apology exhibits a fundamental 
skepticism about language and subjective perception that appears repeatedly in Walden. 
Indeed, towards the book’s end, the narrator dismisses words outright as the “inadequacy 
of the residual statement,” only an aftermath of the fullness of the thing or event he seeks 
to describe (218). Words, in Thoreau’s assessment, can never entirely capture the world. 
Yet words are the poet’s, philosopher’s, or naturalist observer’s only means for sharing 
information. Sharing information is essential to Thoreau’s vision of Walden as a call to 
“wake my neighbors up” to the “lives of quiet desperation” created within a system 
driven by profit and constant labor (61). To not speak is to risk perpetuating these 
systems and to risk “through humility becom[ing] the devil’s attorney.” Walden thus 
connects an ethical conundrum and an individual political challenge to issues of language 
and representation. Not speaking out of deference to one’s limited position can be as 
ethically suspect as speaking, since not speaking will only permit unethical situations to 
go unchallenged. 
The response that the narrator Thoreau offers to this conundrum is to imagine his 
text as an “endeavor” at effective, truthful representation. Walden constructs truth in a 
                                                 
17
 Gordon Whitney and William Davis describe the extent of Concord’s deforestation, claiming that, 
“During Thoreau’s lifetime, the percentage of the town in woodlands dropped to its lowest level (10.5 in 
1850) [. . .] The remaining woods in the nineteenth century were exploited extensively for timber, fuel, and 
pasturage. Many were carelessly managed” (75). In his essay “Thoreau and the Natural Environment,” 
Lawrence Buell reiterates this description, claiming, “the percentage of woodland in the town of Concord 
had been steadily declining during Thoreau’s lifetime, reaching an all-time low of 10 percent almost at the 
moment Thoreau penned” the chapter “The Ponds” (529-30). 
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complicated way, however, seeing it as the result of an effort made in spite of inseparable 
cant, hypocrisy, and inconsistencies. Walden imagines that it might still be possible to 
“speak a good word for the truth” from within these limitations: the very bragging that 
reveals the narrator to be a flawed human speaking from a situated perspective also gives 
this narrator the power to “brag for humanity” and to defy language’s limits in pursuit of 
a political goal. This emphasis on expression as endeavor sets up Walden as an 
experiment, not only in creating an alternative to unethical forms of social life, but also in 
finding ways to mediate truth through the contingencies of personal experience, 
perspective, and language.  
We can thus read Walden’s struggle with language as similar to the tension 
between realist and constructivist theories of language existing in ecocriticism and 
science studies.18 On the one hand, the text’s potential to awaken its readers depends 
upon some relationship between material reality and textual representation. To simply 
imagine a fictional alternative to contemporary society will not provide readers with a 
genuine possibility of change. The rhetorical power of Walden, evident in its long reign 
of favor among political activists as well as literary scholars, comes from the text’s 
documentation of an actual experiment in the world.19 Like the scientific experiments 
Latour describes, the Walden experience is an experiment whose results are translated 
                                                 
18 As I argued in Chapter II, we can define realism as the basic assumption that language in some way refers 
to the world, providing correspondence between a word and the thing it represents. Constructivism, by 
contrast, argues that meaning does not pre-exist language but is created through individual acts of writing. 
 
19
 Buell traces Thoreau’s popular canonization as “as natural historian, pioneer ecologist and 
environmentalist, social activist, anarchistic political theorist, creative artist” (Imagination 315). He argues 
that the appeal of these personas rests on connections between Thoreau’s supposedly earnest 
experimentation and his text: “Admittedly, these are popular simplifications; but instead of dismissing them 
on that account we need to take them seriously as pointing to how literary greatness becomes transmuted 
into an active ingredient in the minds of its audience. I suspect that most people would be more likely to 
respond at an emotional level to an unknown work if they approached it taking for granted that it was a 
deliberate, or at least a heartfelt, act than as if they approached it predetermined to conceive of it as a 
textual construct” (315). 
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into textual form. And like the scientific reports Latour analyzes, Walden speaks 
truthfully of the world only by maintaining traces back to specific events of material 
encounter. Thus, like scientific knowledge, Walden requires an understanding of 
language that does not separate the text from the material. 
But this need to connect a historical experience of the material world to a textual 
representation pushes Walden into some of the same philosophical difficulties that face 
scientific knowledge in an epistemological world defined by the poles of Latour’s 
modern constitution. Struggling to defend its connection to the material world from the 
slipperiness of language, Walden voices a desire for the writer and the reader alike to 
seek objective, empirical truth. Thus, at times, Walden falls back into the “factual 
brutalism” of the material object that Morton diagnoses (123). We hear echoes of this 
desire for self-evident and materially objective truth in Thoreau’s call that we  
settle ourselves, and work and wedge our feet downward through the mud 
and slush of opinion, and prejudice, and tradition, and delusion, and 
appearance, that alluvion which covers the globe [. . .] till we come to a 
hard bottom and rocks in place, which we can call reality, and say, This is, 
and no mistake; and then begin, having a point d’appui, below freshet and 
frost and fire, a place where you might found a wall or a state, or set a 
lamp-post safely, or perhaps a gauge, not a Nilometer, but a Realometer, 
that future ages might know how deep a freshet of shams and appearances 
had gathered from time to time. (70) 
This figuration of reality as a firm material bottom appeals to empirical evidence as the 
point d’appui from which to begin developing a politics or an ethics. More specifically, 
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this vision of reality as a “hard bottom” beneath a “freshet of shams and appearances” 
reproduces the stratified notions of truth and reference that Latour’s work debunks. This 
passage imagines truth in material terms, as something that can be uncovered by patient 
human work. Meanwhile, the passage dismisses “opinion, and prejudice, and tradition, 
and delusion, and appearance” – the products of human language and culture – as less 
definitively solid things. Reality is a tangible, solid entity that exists outside of the human 
mind while appearances are fluid and unstable projections of the mind. Thoreau invokes 
this formula when he urges his readers to abandon transcendence and to instead begin 
searching for the truth in their quotidian surroundings. He claims, 
Men esteem truth remote, in the outskirts of the system, behind the farthest 
star, before Adam and after the last man. In eternity there is indeed 
something true and sublime. But all these times and places and occasions 
are now and here. God himself culminates in the present moment [. . .] 
And we are enabled to apprehend at all what is sublime and noble only by 
the perpetual instilling and drenching of the reality that surrounds us. (69) 
The alternative definitions presented here posit truth as either a transcendent thing 
removed from the human or as a material thing close at hand. Identifying truth with 
materiality is supposed to bring truth closer, though Morton and Latour’s analyses show 
us that a material truth too remains “remote” from humans. 
However, on the other hand, Walden repeatedly recognizes the role of human 
perception and language in creating truth. At times, Walden questions its bragging 
certainty about the solidity of truth (and about the truth of the statements so assertively 
championed in this chapter’s epigraph). The same text that calls for a bedrock truth to be 
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measured scientifically also questions the possibility of an objective truth about which 
there can be “no mistake.” “Nature and human life are as various as our several 
constitutions,” Thoreau claims. “Who shall say what prospect life offers to another?” 
(10). Consequently, truth in Walden can be as concrete as Walden Pond and as elusive as 
personal perception. This play of contradiction permits the text to function as a form of 
constrained realism, strategically mobilizing the world via personal perception and 
observation while at the same time self-consciously foregrounding the textual nature of 
such mobilization. Walden as a whole can be understood as reproducing the contradictory 
strategies of the epigraph, making bold claims about the world and reality specifically to 
counter its own skepticism about the narrator’s ability to observe or communicate truth.  
Take, for instance, the false, bragging bravado of Thoreau-as-narrator in the 
epigraph. This bravado allows the text to acknowledge the limits of perspective while still 
making large claims about the truth of experience. The contradiction allows the passage 
to account for language’s inevitable failure to duplicate the material world and account 
for the shaping influence of personal perspective. However, the self-consciously arrogant 
claims also use language’s expressive ability to challenge human relationships to the 
larger world. Foregrounding the limitations of language becomes an effective rhetorical 
device, forestalling dismissal but also offering new, bold possibilities for the reader to 
consider. The persona embodies this strategy. While apologizing for the inevitable 
conditions of expression, Thoreau-the-narrator still points towards the truths he hopes to 
communicate. Despite – indeed, because of – language’s limits, communication can 
occur if we make these kinds of bold and extravagant claims: 
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The volatile truth of our words should continually betray the inadequacy 
of the residual statement. The truth is instantly translated; its literal 
monument alone remains. The words which express our faith and piety are 
not definite; yet they are significant and fragrant like frankincense to 
superior natures. (218) 
Notably, Thoreau does not stop at language’s inadequacy. He pushes on – not to a final or 
definite truth, but to a “volatile” and “significant” one. This hopeful vision of how truth 
and meaning function emphasizes the process behind the transmission of truth and hence 
foregrounds writing’s contingency. Thoreau’s meaning-making is active and driven by 
process – it is “volatile,” happening “continually,” and actively being “translated” 
through acts of representation. Despite its “inadequacy,” language serves as the vehicle 
for translation between the material (the “literal monument”) and the more ephemeral 
“significant and fragrant” truth of language. Like an aroma that is undeniably physical 
and yet intangible, truth envelops the material and the conceptual. While such an 
epistemological model could imply a dualistic ontology, positing a spiritual realm of truth 
above and superior to the world of things, it also forges a quasi-material connection 
between these two realms, imagining truth and language as deriving from the material 
without being reducible to it. In line with the trajectories of ecocriticism and science 
studies introduced in Chapter II, Thoreau thus provides another sophisticated way of 
understanding writing’s relationship to the material world as both real and constructed. 
But the “volatile truth” of Walden depends on bold and extravagant actions as 
well as bold and extravagant claims. To understand Walden’s complicated theory of 
materiality and language requires us to acknowledge the relationship between these 
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actions and claims, just as Latour needed to follow scientists into the forests and the 
laboratories in order to adequately theorize the scientific texts their research produced. 
The exact nature of the relationship between materiality and language, subject and object 
in Walden has been a matter of critical debate ever since “in his biography of 1873 
William Ellery Channing used the phrase ‘poet-naturalist’ to resolve the dichotomy in 
Thoreau’s work between subjective interpretation and objective reporting” (Baym 221). 
As Channing’s formula suggests, Thoreau’s burgeoning interest in natural history and 
other forms of “objective reporting” about the natural world make him a particularly 
interesting subject for a re-assessing the dichotomies of the modern constitution. His 
work not only challenges separations between language and the world but also those 
between science and poetry, as Laura Dassow Walls notes when she describes his work 
as “literary science” (Worlds 178). Critical responses to Thoreau highlight the way his 
work demands a rethinking, not only of the relationship between science and poetry but 
also of the conceptual dualisms and theories of representation implied by these 
disciplinary divisions. 
In this chapter, I examine Walden’s contradictory relationship to the conceptual 
dichotomies Latour describes. At times, Walden capitulates to these dichotomies, but at 
others it attempts to rethink these divides. I also examine the complicated relationships to 
language and materiality that result from Walden’s attempt to rethink the division 
between human and nature, text and world. While Walden imagines the natural environs 
of the pond as a pure material realm outside of human culture’s contaminating influence, 
the work also recognizes the constructed quality of its pastoral fantasy as well as the 
construction of the historical Thoreau’s material surroundings. I explore a number of 
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devices that Thoreau employs to simultaneously draw attention to the inadequacy of his 
words and to spur the reader beyond language’s inadequacy. The goal of such movement 
through and beyond language is both individual and social. Part of Walden’s objective is 
to challenge individuals’ economic relationships and daily living choices, thereby 
encouraging them to stretch themselves just as writing stretches Thoreau. But this 
challenge to individual thinking and lifestyle hints at a larger challenge to predominant 
social systems. While Walden at large focuses on individual acts of transformation and 
exploration, “Economy” pairs its call for individual change with a critique of the 
economic system in Concord. The solution Thoreau proposes is thus an intertwined 
transformation of our thinking and of our situation in the world. As Thoreau says, “I 
perceive that we inhabitants of New England live this mean life that we do because our 
vision does not penetrate the surface of things. We think that that is which appears to be” 
(69). Like the ecological subjects of present-day discourse, the readers to whom Thoreau 
appeals will escape their meaningless lives only by transforming the way they think about 
things. 
While such ethical calls are arguably anthropocentric, focusing on human self-
realization and fulfillment, they occur in the context of a fundamental shift in human 
relationships to the nonhuman world. In pursuit of truth, Thoreau participates in what 
Latour calls the “progressive loading” of nonhumans into discourse (Pandora 96). Rather 
than appeal only to human tradition as a means of combating the economy and society of 
Concord, Thoreau increasingly appeals to animals, plants, and environments as sources of 
more truthful relationships to the earth. Walden argues that material observation and the 
nonhuman world influence and are influenced by human perception; such a mutual 
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constitution of the empirical and the ideal contradicts critical readings of Thoreau either 
as a Transcendentalist disdainful of material environment or as a proto-scientist more 
interested in ecology than inner self.20 Despite Thoreau’s popular reputation as an 
environmental saint, the natural, material world to which he appeals is in no way a deep 
ecological one; he does not immerse the human subject into a purely natural realm 
outside of society.21 Instead, the environment imagined in Walden is an increasingly 
hybrid world, where human writing transforms the material environment and where the 
nonhuman, conversely, becomes an increasingly important contributor to human 
achievement and understanding. 
Critical Responses to Walden and the Problems of Dualism 
To imagine Walden as this kind of hybrid, highly acculturated text can be strange, 
given the work’s popular status as an environmental opus and manifesto of personal 
freedom. Both criticism and popular culture imagine Thoreau’s developing 
environmental prowess in terms of increasing contact with the nonhuman environment 
and growing distance from human society.22 That is, Thoreau’s environmental authority 
                                                 
20
 Critics who claim Thoreau for science include, according to William Rossi in “Thoreau’s Transcendental 
Ecocriticism,” Robert Kuhn McGregor in A Wider View of the Universe and Robert Milder in Reimagining 
Thoreau. Both argue that Thoreau eventually outgrows his Transcendentalist, Emersonian, bent (29). Kurt 
Kehr attributes this notion of a development from Transcendentalist poet to scientist to Bradley Torrey, 
who “first drew attention to the young man’s [Thoreau’s] development from poet to scientist and ecologist” 
(32). Nina Baym describes the opposing preference for Thoreau’s poetic as contrasted with scientific 
propensities as a “humanist” tradition in Thoreauvian criticism. Examples she cites include Brooks 
Atkinson Henry, Thoreau, the Cosmic Yankee (New York, 1972); Henry Seidel Canby, Thoreau (Boston, 
1939); Joseph Wood Krutch, Thoreau (New York, 1948); and Mark Van Doren, Thoreau, A Critical Study 
(Boston, 1916) (Baym 221). 
 
21
 As Buell claims, popular imagination frequently paints Thoreau as “the first major interpreter of nature in 
American literary history, and the first American environmentalist saint” (“Natural” 527). 
 
22
 Buell argues that Walden models the kind of transformation individuals, and literary thinkers in 
particular, have to undergo in order to become more ecological; it traces an individual’s developing interest 
in the material environment and shows the writer leaving behind initially abstract and literary modes of 
representation in favor of “representational density” derived from observation of the natural world 
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reinforces a number of dichotomies central to the nature writing tradition and to 
ecocritical analysis. Whether trying to locate Thoreau’s Walden project between the poles 
of wilderness and civilization, his environmental affect between the poles of 
anthropocentrism and ecocentrism, or his observations of the natural world between the 
poles of scientific empiricism and philosophical transcendentalism, literary criticism 
returns to the central dichotomy Latour uncovers: the tension between the human and the 
natural, and the deep need to purify these realms.23 
The Walden project itself appears to be about movement between these realms: 
the “natural” space of the ponds and the “cultural” space of Concord. Walden centers 
around a tension between solitude and sociality, evident from the book’s opening lines, 
where Thoreau’s epigraphic assertion that he plans “to wake my neighbors up” is 
countered by his next sentence’s claim that “When I wrote the following pages [. . .] I 
lived alone, in the woods, a mile from any neighbor” (5). This contradiction poses a 
number of problems for environmental thinkers bound by the terms of the modern 
constitution and shaped by a history of purified wilderness myths. To them, Thoreau’s 
rhetorical appeal to a pure wildness outside of human society merely rehashes old 
pastoral literary structures and return-and-retreat conventions. It does not encourage a 
new relationship to the nonhuman world but presents merely a strategic change of 
scenery and a temporary escape. As Buell argues, Thoreau can be read as 
reinforcing for example the notion of androcentric pastoral escape as the 
great tradition within American literary naturism. To align the ‘plot’ of 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Imagination 116). What Walden can model, on the aesthetic and the practical level, are gradual 
transformations from “environmental naïveté to comparative enlightenment” (Imagination 115). 
 
23
 Schneider summarizes the critical importance of these dualisms in his introduction to Thoreau’s Sense of 
Place: Essays in American Environmental Writing. 
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Walden in terms of this motif with those of the Leatherstocking Tales, 
Moby-Dick, and Huckleberry Finn is child’s play for seasoned 
Americanists. (Imagination 25) 
One way critics including Buell challenge this formulaic reading of Walden is by drawing 
attention to the complicated relationship with the material world depicted. As Thoreau 
describes himself measuring ponds and counting seeds, the natural environs of Walden 
stop being a homogeneous, symbolic landscape of escapism and become a specific 
environment constituted by nonhuman beings. In this vein, some critics frame his works’ 
importance to ecology and natural history as an early anticipation of more scientific 
approaches to biology and ecology. Walden, to some extent, and later works like “The 
Succession of Forest Trees,” to a greater extent, indicate interest in empirical observation 
of the natural environment, and this empirical focus is used to justify Thoreau’s inclusion 
in an early lineage of conservation biology and ecological science.24 But this move to 
save Thoreau from pastoral ideology merely leads critics into more unsolved dichotomies 
and contradictions. Particularly, Thoreau’s non-linear prose, literary allusions, and 
philosophical reflection complicate the apparent relationship of his work to the nascent 
biological and ecological sciences of his time. 
Thus, my interest in Walden’s hybrid visions of environment fits into a critical 
tradition trying to come to terms with philosophical dichotomies that seem to split 
Walden into a series of contradictions. To frame my own discussion, I will briefly 
introduce one of the most critically discussed dichotomies: the tension between science 
                                                 
24
 For an early example of this kind of pro-science recovery, see Phillip and Kathryn Whitford’s “Thoreau: 
Pioneer Ecologist and Conservationist,” where they argue that “modern scientists have gradually come to 
claim Thoreau as one of themselves” (291). More recent examples include Laura Dassow Walls’s Seeing 
New Worlds, described in more detail later in this chapter. 
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and poetry, philosophy, or transcendentalism. This specific dichotomy can be traced back 
to the terms of Latour’s modern constitution. Indeed, in his introduction to Thoreau’s 
Sense of Place: Essays in American Environmental Writing, Richard Schneider argues 
that debates about Thoreau’s environmental perspective rehash the basic 
“epistemological split between subject and object that scholars have long made a central 
issue and that Thoreau himself emphatically recognizes” (1-2). Schneider claims, “the 
ecocritical emphasis on a green Thoreau in some ways simply recasts the old 
epistemological split into a new split between anthropocentric (or homocentric) and 
ecocentric (or biocentric) views of nature and Thoreau ends up on both sides of this 
newly defined split” (3). 
Lawrence Buell and Rochelle Johnson each repeat Schneider’s claim that we can 
examine Thoreau’s work in terms of a split between ecocentric and anthropocentric 
allegiances. And Buell traces these dualisms to tensions between transcendentalism and 
natural history. Some Thoreau criticism tries to negotiate the need to purify Thoreau’s 
poetry from his science by identifying his work either as science muddied by 
philosophical, subjective interests or as literary writing marred by a distracting focus on 
empirical observation. As Walls describes, criticism argues that Thoreau is either “an 
Emersonian transcendental poet” or a “fragmented empirical scientist” (Worlds 5). Baym 
divides Thoreau criticism into three separate categories: ecological, symbolist, and 
humanist. According to Baym, “ecological” criticism argues that Thoreau was “a true 
scientist ahead of his time,” identifying Thoreau with the material pole of our 
foundational dualism. By contrast, “symbolist” criticism argues that Thoreau was only a 
poet and never a scientist. “Humanist” criticism acknowledges both Thoreau’s empirical 
 87 
 
tendencies and his poetic sensibilities, but it dismisses his scientific moments as lapses 
from a purer vision, framing “Thoreau as unalterably opposed to science but lapsing into 
it through loss of inspiration” (221). These debates can align with environmental 
arguments: whether Thoreau was truly more committed to science or philosophy reveals, 
in turn, whether he was more committed to words or to the material world and 
consequently whether his work anticipates a more ecocentric turn or exemplifies an 
enduring propensity towards anthropocentrism left over from his Transcendental roots. 
But other criticism asks whether Thoreau’s dissimilar interests are necessarily at 
odds. Many thoughtful discussions of Thoreau acknowledge his work’s deep 
ambivalence about such dualisms and try to find ways to escape, avoid, or rethink strict 
dichotomies. Trying to combine Thoreau’s scientific interests with his transcendentalism 
leads to a number of questions: “Was transcendentalism a roadblock to Thoreau’s natural 
history interests, or did it inspire them? What did Thoreau know of nineteenth-century 
life science [. . .] Did Thoreau’s commitment to nature, existentially and as an object of 
study, interfere with his development as a writer or quicken it?” (Buell Foreword ix). 
William Rossi claims that the tension between scientist-Thoreau and poet-Thoreau 
significantly diminishes with the work of Laura Dassow Walls, who argues that Thoreau 
becomes “‘something new which combined transcendentalism with empiricism,’ a 
methodology Walls refers to as ‘empirical holism,’ Thoreau derived from Alexander von 
Humboldt” (Rossi 29). In this reading, Thoreau combines natural history and philosophy 
in innovative ways that challenge reductive dichotomies. Walls, for instance, argues that 
Thoreau avoids Baconian science and romantic ecology, combining the strengths of both 
by drawing on Humboldt’s new visions of dynamic nature to develop a unique form of 
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literary science (qtd. in Rossi 29). Rossi argues that Thoreau combines transcendental and 
empirical goals, mixing “the ‘centrifugal,’ aspiring tendency of his transcendentalism and 
the centripetal, rooting tendency of his incipient ecocentrism as opposite yet dual 
manifestations of one ontology” (38). 
These re-imaginations do not just smash science and poetry together, nor do they 
assert that Thoreau establishes some middle ground between the claims of empiricism 
and transcendentalism. Instead, Walls imagines Thoreau’s combination of scientific and 
literary pursuits in terms that resemble Latourian representation, emphasizing literary 
texts as constructed but meaningful participants in natural discourse. In Seeing New 
Worlds, Walls calls Thoreau’s work “literary science, perhaps; not literature-and-science 
but science seen as literature, in its fictive constructions of the world, and literature seen 
as science, in its operational effectiveness in the world” (178-9). Walls’s description of 
Thoreau’s work suggests that factual discourse is itself, at some level, an aesthetic and 
textual construction; that textual constructions do have impacts on and relationships to 
the material world; that literature can be considered both constructed and real; and that 
there can be correspondence between the constructed and the real. She, like myself, 
arrives at this reading of environmental reference by “read[ing] Thoreau's endeavors 
through Bruno Latour’s account of the process of science” (177). Walls uses Latour’s 
formal analysis of scientific construction to examine how Thoreau’s later natural history 
writing might effectively construct knowledge of the world while making use of more 
traditionally “literary” techniques such as metaphor, allusion, and imagery. Such literary 
science not only challenges a dichotomy between science and poetry, but also challenges 
realist/constructivist and text/world divisions. 
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Adopting a less dichotomous vision of representation and language pushes 
Thoreau criticism to develop alternative theories of Thoreauvian perception and 
observation. Rick Anthony Furtak, for example, looks at passages from the Journal 
where Thoreau explores the nature of perception and asserts the realness of the perceived 
world. Furtak uses the work of Stanley Cavell to articulate an idea of “perceptual faith,” 
an orientation of openness towards the material world. Furtak claims that Thoreau 
“shares the Cartesian aspiration to find a solid grounding for knowledge, and to recover a 
connection to the world that is lost to us when we doubt its existence” (543). He insists 
that such a recovery of the real world depends upon developing a belief in the 
relationship between the material world and human perception. Thus, Furtak says that 
Thoreau wants to recover the “connection to things” (Cavell qtd. 543). In this case, the 
risks of human perception are an inevitable part of understanding reality: of Thoreau’s 
journal, Furtak says, “Truthfulness does not consist in the accumulation of neutral data, 
but in the perception of facts that can flower into meaningful knowledge” (548). Rather 
than being trapped within an individual consciousness and within fabricated reality, 
humans are only able to access meaningful knowledge through the lens of subjectivity. In 
a way akin to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, then, Thoreau imagines perception, like 
language, as a genuine encounter between human and material, mediated through the 
body of the observing writer. 
The recent critical emphasis on Thoreau’s complex visions of representation and 
perception suggests that, far from a simple escape into nature, Walden presents an 
interrogation of the situated, embodied observer-writer and of the processes by which 
such an observer-writer can come to know and represent the world. As Walls points out, 
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Thoreau sets up his experiment in an alternative mode of life as one that foregrounds 
rather than diminishes the role of the central observer. As he himself explains, “In most 
books, the I, or first person, is omitted; in this it will be retained; that, in respect to 
egotism, is the main difference. We commonly do not remember that it is, after all, 
always the first person that is speaking” (5). For Thoreau, the solution to the egotism of 
the writer is not a disavowal of perception but rather a broadening of the narrow confines 
of experience – that is, to put himself bodily into new experiences, acknowledging the 
limits to his perspective but moving this perspective by relocating himself. In Walden, he 
literally broadens his experience by relocating himself to Walden Pond; he changes his 
conditions in order to isolate the variables necessary to the creation of a good life. 
This mobilization of himself provides the power to support his bold claims. When 
Thoreau claims that “I fear chiefly lest my expression may not be extra- vagant enough, 
may not wander far enough beyond the narrow limits of my daily experience, so as to be 
adequate to the truth of which I have been convinced,” he is not just wanting stylistic 
extravagance (Walden 218). His punning on extravagance and vagrancy shows him 
wanting to move bodily and mobilize his expression with him. That is why, as Thoreau 
proclaims in one of Walden’s most famous passages, he must move: in order “to front 
only the essential facts of life,” he must get up and go to the woods (65). Thoreau 
mobilizes his body in order to gain knowledge of the world; his experiment in living does 
not take place in the laboratory and does not require the mobilization of experimental 
items, but rather requires him to move himself and interact with his world in order to 
learn. 
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Comparing Walden to a laboratory experiment follows up on a provocative 
allusion Walls makes to Walden as “[Thoreau's] experiment in the making of life, in 
exploring just how far ‘The universe constantly and obediently answers to our 
conceptions’” (Worlds 176). Thoreau himself identifies his two year stay at Walden Pond 
as “my own experiment,” meant to provide him with insight into “life, an experiment to a 
great extent untried by me” (31; 9). “Economy” sets up Walden as a pseudo-scientific 
experiment that insists on the primacy of proof from observation and experience. Thoreau 
claims, “No way of thinking or doing, however ancient, can be trusted without proof,” 
alluding to the text’s foundation on first-hand observation. 
Such comparisons of Thoreau’s work to scientific writing has been done in other 
works, including Walls’s Seeing New Worlds. But while Walls focuses on Thoreau's so-
called ‘scientific’ writings – works such as “The Succession of Forest Trees” and The 
Dispersion of Seeds where Thoreau systematically collects and categorizes data about the 
natural world – Latour’s analysis of experimentation and scientific representation can 
also help with a re-reading of Thoreau’s more literary works. Latour’s theories seem 
particularly apt when applied to Walden since the text proclaims itself an experiment and 
evidences a semi-scientific commitment to empirical observation.25 Latour’s concepts of 
hybridity, circulating reference, mobilization, and translation can help literary critics to 
emphasize the highly constructed nature of Walden without dismissing the attempts the 
                                                 
25
 Walls does extend Latourian analysis to Walden in her 2011 article “From the Modern to the Ecological: 
Latour on Walden Pond.” She claims, “starting at Walden Pond and with increasing skill through the 
1850s, Thoreau followed the practice, not of Science, but of the sciences, weaving human and nonhumans 
together by naturalizing the social and socializing the natural [. . .] His procedure resembles the series of 
transformations traced by Latour in ‘Circulating Reference’ [. . .] Through just such a chain of 
transformations, Thoreau loaded his prose with the real” (103). While Walls argues that the rhetorical 
strategies of Walden resemble the Latourian terms of translation, mobilization, and circulating reference, 
her article does not perform the kind of close reading completed in this chapter, ending instead with a call 
for critics to consider whether “all texts [could] be read in a Latourian manner” (108). 
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text makes to find an expression “adequate to the truth of which I have been convinced” 
(218). Looking at writing through this constrained realist lens can decrease the distinction 
between world and text, reimagining writing as an active way of knowing the world. The 
result is a text that does not just see the writer as embodied or participatory; it reimagines 
writing itself as a form of encounter and as a way of reshaping the material environment. 
“Making the Earth Say Beans”: The Agri-Cultural Mobilization of the World 
Walden’s self-consciousness about the role of the observer in the experimental 
creation of knowledge leads one to consider how many and what kinds of transformations 
are necessary to arrive at an author’s presented experience of the world. While it might 
not be identical to a grid of soil that becomes a chart, literary representation can also be 
understood as mobilizing rather than reproducing or copying the world. Walden’s interest 
in experimentation and representation appears most centrally in “The Bean Field,” where 
Thoreau half-mockingly compares his agrarian experiment to grow beans with the 
“experiments of gentlemen farmers” while also insisting on the project’s ability to help 
him cultivate personal insight (112). The simultaneity of these goals is important; for 
Thoreau, the growth of beans, the growth of himself, and the growth of social critique 
will all occur through deliberate interaction with and transformation of the soil outside 
his cabin. His ideas, his self, and his environment will all be changed through their 
mutual encounter, and the result will be self-knowledge as well as a practical 
understanding of how to grow beans and of what the environs of Walden Pond are truly 
like. The question under debate, as Thoreau states early in the chapter, is “What shall I 
learn of beans or beans of me?” This question frames Thoreau’s inquiry with a 
provocative ambiguity, positioning the observing individual as an object of investigation 
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just like the beans. His question also blurs the lines of agency, suggesting that the beans 
might be learning as much about him as he learns of them. Blurring such lines helps to 
challenge the central importance of the human observer, emphasizing this observer’s 
involvement in the material world as a necessary component to the development of 
knowledge. At the chapter’s opening, the exact nature of that knowledge remains 
incomplete. Thoreau claims, “What was the meaning of this so steady and self-
respecting, this small Herculean labor, I knew not” (107). But the “small Herculean 
labor” of connecting the field to knowledge through material mobilizations and writing is 
necessary for him to “learn of beans” and to learn of himself. 
 To connect the bean field of Thoreau-the-observer’s experience with “The Bean 
Field” of Thoreau-the-writer’s text requires the establishment of a meaningful 
relationship between the text and both past experience and the material world. To develop 
this sense of immediacy and connection, “The Bean Field” uses ecomimesis as described 
by Morton. Thoreau brings the bean field experience into the time frame of the reader 
with the word “Meanwhile” that opens the chapter. This resembles the “As I am writing” 
phrase that Morton identifies as a marker of ecomimesis. Both formulations make the 
reader enter the time frame of the writer’s experience, collapsing the distinction between 
narrative voice, embodied observer, and writer. The hammering repetition of present 
tense verbs encourages the reader to experience the field right along with Thoreau, 
imagining the moment of perception: “Meanwhile,” the chapter suggests, as the reader 
reads, “I cherish [my beans], I hoe them, early and late, I have an eye to them, and this is 
my day’s work.” Simultaneously, Thoreau’s repetition of definite pronouns insists on the 
reality and presence of “this my native town,” and “these very woods and this field.” 
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Even when Thoreau drifts into memory, he uses the sensory immediacy of his experience 
to mix past and present: “And now to-night my flute has waked the echoes over that very 
water.” His paragraphs resound with echoes of what Morton calls “ambience,” the sense 
of a world around both reader and writer evoked by the art of words or the art of the 
flute’s music. Thoreau’s text suggests the ability of these art forms to connect the reader 
to actual nature as firmly as “they [the beans] attached me to the earth” (all quotes from 
107). As much as the described, physical bean field itself, then, the chapter “The Bean-
Field” anchors the material world to the text’s philosophical musings. 
 At the same time, while this chapter begins by using the techniques of 
ecomimesis, it consistently undermines the purified vision of nature such ecomimesis 
creates, emphasizing the writer’s role in rendering the landscape. Thoreau self-
consciously describes the material transformations necessary during his experiment to 
transform the field into an agricultural bean field and then into a cultivated text called 
“The Bean Field.” He is forthcoming about the role he plays in transforming the 
landscape from undergrowth to cultivated field: “This was my curious labor all summer, 
– to make this portion of the earth’s surface, which had yielded only cinquefoil, 
blackberries, johnswort, and the like, before, sweet wild fruits or pleasant flowers, 
produce instead this pulse” (107). This line has echoes later in the text that foreground 
Thoreau’s role in transforming the land into prose; Thoreau is the figure who “make[s] 
the yellow soil express its summer thought in bean leaves and blossoms rather than in 
wormwood and piper and millet grass, making the earth say beans instead of grass” 
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(108). This connection between farming and writing again reappears when he describes 
himself as “dabbling like a plastic artist in his fields” (108).26 
 In these examples, Thoreau presents a strange conflation of words and objects, 
revealing how his labor in the field, like his writing, is ultimately geared toward the 
expression of his own thoughts. This is not the kind of rhapsodic rushing of the human to 
meld into the natural that Morton decries. Rather, the chapter subtly challenges a dualistic 
division between subject and object, speaker and world. Such a challenge arises not from 
an image of reconciliation but from an image of mobilization. After all, it is the same 
speaker who transforms the world into text and who transforms and crafts the material 
world. By calling material transformations of the earth a kind of writing, and by 
comparing material plants to language (the words of the earth are “bean leaves and 
blossoms”), “The Bean Field” collapses the distinction between world and text; it figures 
the entire world as textual at the same time that it insists on its undeniable materiality. In 
this regard, the relationship between “The Bean Field” and the historical, material bean 
field Thoreau cultivates resembles the relationship Latour describes between Boa Vista 
the forest and Boa Vista on paper. It is a non-identical relationship made possible by the 
active engagement of a perceiving subject via the processes of observation and writing. 
Walden, too, is a text with plants for footnotes. The writer/farmer plays a curious role 
here, which Thoreau imagines as creative cultivation, both of plants and of the earth’s 
own thoughts: rather than presenting writing and agriculture as imposed by human hands 
                                                 
26
 Citing the work of Frederick Garber, Buell also points out the connection between planting and writing, 
but insists on greater difference between the two modes: “For Thoreau, Garber argues, writing was part of a 
larger field of ‘inscribings that might also include ploughing, cabin building, surveying, tracing Indian 
trails, and observing loggers’ marks. He wished to connect writing with deeds, from which perspective 
‘words take on an inescapable secondariness,’ for Thoreau must recognize that writing in fact never equals 
deed, only ‘the record of a deed’” (Imagination 379). 
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onto the earth, he imagines these activities as cultivated out of the earth itself, providing a 
new translation of “the summer thoughts” already existing within the summer soil. These 
thoughts are strange hybrids, like the actants of Latourian theory; the cultivated plants 
and the textual representations become possible only through the combination of a 
material object and a human actor, something different from either an untouched field or 
an entirely imagined human thought. 
The second paragraph of the chapter repeats the ecomimetic move to create an 
idyllic and ambient picture of nature, then undercuts this vision by emphasizing the way 
the author figure helps to produce both material and textual landscapes. Thoreau launches 
into perhaps the most ecomimetic description of the whole chapter when he begins to 
describe his childhood memories of the original field: 
When I was four years old, as I well remember, I was brought from 
Boston to this my native town, through these very woods and this field, to 
the pond. It is one of the oldest scenes stamped on my memory. And now 
to-night my flute has waked the echoes over that very water. The pines 
still stand here older than I [. . .] a new growth is rising all around, 
preparing another aspect for new infant eyes [. . .] even I have at length 
helped to clothe that fabulous landscape of my infant dreams, and one of 
the results of my presence and influence is seen in these bean leaves, corn 
blades, and potato vines. (107) 
Here, the evocative flute music and the nostalgia of childhood memory create a highly 
aesthetic representation of nature void of any specificity. But again, Thoreau curtails 
pastoral evocation in order to foreground the labor that contributes to a landscape, 
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effected by “my presence and influence.” Thoreau thereby resists his own “effort to 
present an original, pristine nature not ‘infected’ with the consciousness, the mentality, or 
the desire of the ‘perceiver’” (Morton 68). He questions the aesthetic vision he postulates, 
highlighting how his nostalgia contributes to this perception of the natural environment 
and pointing to his literal transformations of the earth as a challenge to any imagined 
purity of the woods and field. He has, he insists, “helped to clothe the fabulous landscape 
of my infant dreams” through both labor and writing, and thus his intervention takes the 
form of both words and plants. Buell reads this passage as “a pleasing self-indulgent 
fancy,” an overestimation of human importance that Thoreau will later move away from 
in his more ecocentric writing (Imagination 118-19). But Thoreau’s farming and his 
writing do clothe and shape the landscape he inhabits, and to acknowledge this is to 
recognize a more sophisticated notion of the interrelationship of human and environment 
– to see the environment as an actively constructed material sphere that influences the 
observer but also accepts his influence when he chooses to write or to act. 
 Andrew McMurry, in Environmental Renaissance: Emerson, Thoreau, and the 
Systems of Nature, claims that Walden is blind to the hybrids Thoreau’s text thus 
unearths. He argues that Walden actively participates in the perpetuation of Latour’s 
modern constitution, purifying the categories of human and natural while yearning for 
access to pure nature and lamenting humans’ inevitable isolation within language and 
society. Walden, McMurry claims, strives to keep “the orders of nature and culture in two 
entirely separate ontological boxes” while failing to recognize the hybrids that keep 
creeping into the narrative (145). For example, in his reading of the chapter “Spring,” 
McMurry argues that Thoreau plays with metaphorical hybrids while policing these 
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purified nature/culture categories, revealing a “discursive construction of hybrids in 
Walden and blindness to the real ones at Walden Pond” (140). But the beans of “The 
Bean Field” do not function only as metaphorical or discursive hybrids. At a material 
level, these hybrids manifest Thoreau’s work in the land, being the result of both natural 
growth processes and human agricultural labor. At a more conceptual level, these plants 
are hybrids of materiality and metaphor. They are very real hybrids of wildness and 
cultivation that function on multiple levels in the text: as real plants; as metaphorical 
symbols for personal growth; as literary tropes that allude to pastoral convention; and as 
material extensions of the larger world itself with which Thoreau seeks to enter into 
relationship. 
 The beans are very real hybrids because, like the bean field itself, they are “half-
cultivated,” both in terms of agricultural and textual cultivation. Like the field, they are 
“the connecting link between wild and cultivated [. . .] beans cheerfully returning to their 
wild and primitive state” (109). While this statement can be read in terms of literary 
pastoral convention, presenting the bean field as an ideal middle state between the 
extremes of civilization and wilderness, it may be read, as McMurry suggests elsewhere, 
as replicating a system of thought where “nature and society have remained conceptually 
distinct” (McMurry 145). Yet Thoreau specifically points out that his is not only a half-
civilized but also a half-cultivated field. The term “cultivation” implies the field’s 
constructed quality, emphasizing interaction between human and material and not just 
pointing to the field’s position on a spectrum of society and wilderness. Moreover, 
Thoreau playfully reminds the reader that the field is not just located halfway between 
Concord and the frontier; it is also a hybrid location because it mixes within itself 
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evidence of cultivation and wildness that challenges a strict separation of nature and 
culture. An ideal pastoral landscape erases the presence of labor, provides a temporary 
escape from society, and alleviates tension within the human/nature dichotomy by 
providing a place where humans can seamlessly blend with the natural environment. 
However, Thoreau’s “Bean Field” holds within itself the terms that pastoralism cancels, 
refusing to reconcile the human to the natural but instead exploring the results of their 
interaction. Hybridity is not an equivalence, a cancellation, or a middle ground, but the 
production of something entirely new. 
 Thoreau further reveals the land as a complex hybrid when he literally and 
textually unearths traces of former cultivation. There are “arrowheads which I turned up 
hoeing,” that lie beneath his nostalgic childhood visions of wildness and beneath layers of 
supposedly wild plants (107). Other humans no less than he helped to clothe the 
landscape. He sees these arrowheads as proof “that an extinct nation had anciently dwelt 
here and planted corn and beans ere white men had come to clear the land” (107). Thus, 
the wild field Thoreau begins to cultivate was once cultivated by a previous civilization; 
his cultivated beans eventually will go wild without his intervention; and the field will 
remain forever half-cultivated – a hybrid field that humans can use for agricultural 
production and also mobilize for cultural purposes. Thoreau's text foregrounds rather than 
hides this hybridity, undermining his own attempts at purification. He does not provide a 
fully articulated “chain of transformation” such as Latour traces in his analysis of 
contemporary scientific practice (Pandora 70). But Thoreau does describe how the 
process of seeking information about himself, beans, and the world causes him to 
transform the land; he does describe how the material manifestations of the land itself 
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must be understood as a historical chain of transformations, without there ever being a 
moment of pure wildness or pure civilization. Plants and humans together keep 
cultivating this hybrid place that he so badly wants to know. 
 Thoreau’s investigation of hybridity highlights the interrelationship of materiality 
and textuality. The material bean field and “The [textual] Bean Field” thus resemble each 
other, not in a mimetic way, but through their mutually created hybrid forms. Thoreau 
uses the rhythm of his text’s language to heighten this similarity between text and world, 
comparing the texture of the described bean field to his writing. There are layers of 
nostalgia and history mixed with empirical observation and aesthetic description in his 
text, just as there are layers of artifacts and wild plants on and under the soil – plants and 
artifacts which he only discovers and “knows” by beginning a process of transformation. 
Such similarities between text and material are not mimetic and yet evoke resemblance. 
What this reading gives us that an emphasis on ecomimesis alone could not is 
a nature thoroughly hybrid, limited, and post-lapserian [. . .] Nature that is 
endlessly new is also endlessly old, imbricated with past lives and ages; 
Europeans who came to the “New World” were folded into American 
nature just like the Indians they displaced, who also burned and cultivated 
the land, creating a hybrid landscape that mixes nature’s design with 
layers of human purpose. (Walls 187) 
Wild and cultivated here are shown to be processes rather than categories, and the 
concept of nature here becomes as hybrid as Thoreau’s text and landscape. The 
“American environmentalist saint” thus refuses to depict nature as a source of escape 
from human limitations – whether social or individual – but instead imagines nature as 
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always already in contact with humans (Buell “Natural” 527). There is a mutual shaping 
of individual and environment in Thoreau’s “The Bean Field” that defies escapism. If you 
go into the wilderness to discover yourself and escape society, what you will discover, 
Thoreau suggests, is a world already shot through with human presence. 
 But Thoreau’s hybrid depiction of nature in “The Bean Field” by no means 
undermines the project’s larger desire to learn of the self by learning of the material 
world. Rather, by positioning himself within a history of process as well as within a 
hybrid landscape, Thoreau emphasizes the importance of experience to his growing 
knowledge of himself and the world. He just challenges the purity of the knowledge that 
will result. Rather, his knowledge relies on transformations and contacts. There is no 
knowing the world prior to the experience of encountering the beans themselves and 
participating in their growth, just as there was no knowing the true hybridity of the land 
prior to digging in it. There is no final firm wall between text and experience because 
experience is necessary to create the text and the text can point back to past experience 
and forward to new experiences. Thoreau describes his experience in terms of action, 
showing how involvement and change create the possibility of knowledge: 
It was a singular experience that long acquaintance which I cultivated with 
beans, what with planting, and hoeing, and harvesting, and threshing, and 
picking over, and selling them, – the last was the hardest of all, – I might 
add eating, for I did taste. I was determined to know beans. (111) 
Here Thoreau makes evident what he is trying to accomplish with his descriptions of and 
labor in the field. He is determined to know through experience. Latour argues that 
“Knowledge derives from such movements, not simple contemplation” and that it is only 
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through interaction that any genuine knowledge of the world develops (Pandora 39). 
Like Latour, Thoreau recognizes that 
an experiment is an event. No event can be accounted for by a list of the 
elements that entered the situation before its conclusion [. . .] an 
experiment is an event and not a discovery, not an uncovering, not an 
imposition, not a synthetic a priori judgment, not the actualization of a 
potentiality [. . .]. (Pandora 126) 
His work in the bean field is an event that gives him knowledge not just about 
agricultural practices or about what the world is but also about how he can and should 
interact with that world. Walden’s opening cries for a newly awakened life, in concert 
with his labor, accomplish what Latour calls “the mobilization of the world [. . .] by 
which nonhumans are progressively loaded into discourse [. . .] making it available for 
arguments” (Pandora 99-100). By the end of the text, Thoreau presents the reader with 
“an unbroken series of well-nested elements,” where the text is linked back to the land 
through the beans that he cultivated – beans that, because of Thoreau’s experience with 
them and because of the changes that occur in his knowledge over time, operate as both 
sign and object (Pandora 56). 
 It is the hybrid sign-object bean that unlocks the strange conclusion of Thoreau’s 
chapter. The conclusion is startling because, after all the pages dedicated to patiently 
describing beans, Thoreau suddenly criticizes agriculture and denounces his own project: 
This further experience I also gained. I said to myself, I will not plant 
beans and corn with so much industry another summer, but such seeds, if 
the seed is not lost, as sincerity, truth, simplicity, faith, innocence, and the 
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like, and see if they will not grow in this soil [. . .] Why concern ourselves 
so much about our beans for seed and not be as concerned about a new 
generation of men? (113) 
This conclusion to “The Bean Field” could be read as a movement of abstraction, where 
Thoreau abandons the practical aspects of bean-growing in favor of supposedly higher 
aims. This excerpt could suggest that Thoreau takes advantage of the metaphors farming 
provides to focus on more ideal concerns such as self-growth and virtue. But I believe 
that the conclusion should be read as the end result of an experiment that convinces 
Thoreau of the hybrid nature of beans and art and self. Thoreau’s conclusion is not that 
one should not grow beans, but that it is not sufficient to grow beans alone. He does not 
condemn bean-raising so much as he condemns agriculture separated from the poetic and 
the philosophical. His experience in the bean field shows him that hybrid forms which 
mix the practical and the poetic will allow for the most healthy, fulfilling relationship 
between human and world. This points Thoreau towards “Ancient poetry and mythology” 
that mix agriculture and literature into “a sense of the sacredness of [the farmer's] calling” 
(114). 
The knowledge that Thoreau gains through the depicted experience of bean 
farming mirrors Walls’s description of Thoreau’s work as “literary science.” In her 
analysis of “The Succession of Forest Trees,” Walls argues that Thoreau mixes scientific 
and literary convention to “negotiate [. . .] the difficult passage between poetry and 
science,” both presenting empirical observations about the world and using 
unconventional poetic language to move these disciplinary limits to “intervene in the 
deadening discourse of science, and to demonstrate an alternative mode which 
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nevertheless would be successful as science” (Walls 200; 201-2). While Walden, an 
earlier piece, is not yet so heavily invested in legitimizing itself within the scientific 
community, this text, particularly “The Bean Field,” still explores and experiments with 
“how to make a single, hybrid text coherent to readers with double vision” (Walls 201). 
 As an experiment in written hybridity, mingling scientific and poetic writing as 
well as material beans and language, Thoreau’s strange conclusion begins to make some 
sense. His entire chapter sets up his experience raising beans as an experiment into how 
the human, its environment, and its society should interrelate. Through the process of 
farming beans and the process of writing, Thoreau mobilizes a way of intervening in the 
deadening, soulless state of modern agriculture without discarding agriculture, just as he 
intervenes in the sciences without discarding science. Thoreau’s experiment in the field 
becomes continuous with his experiment in the text, for only the two in concert can point 
to alternative lifestyles that provide truer or at least fuller knowledge of nature and of life. 
The chain of transformation in “The Bean Field” allows Thoreau to defend his 
hypothesis, set up early in “Economy,” that modern life is hollow. By growing beans, 
Thoreau mobilizes the world and literally grows metaphors and symbols to use in his 
attack on the developing capitalist economy of Concord while also growing plants that 
can feed him outside of this economy; he creates hybrids on the page as well as in the 
world. The beans become the metaphorical and literal vehicles for the translation of 
human thought to natural human earth. They feed the observing, experimenting Thoreau; 
they acquaint him with the earth, serving as a literal trace of his points of encounter; and 
they drive his text and his argument, proving that a human can live more simply than 
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social standards suggest and that a human can learn something true, both of beans and of 
himself. 
 As his chapter draws to a close, Thoreau tries one more time to thread a careful 
line not only between poetry and science but also between his perspective and the world 
he seeks to describe. Just after the text reduces beans to symbols of virtue, Thoreau 
returns the reader to the material field, discussing the ways that the bean field manages to 
exceed his observation and experience: 
We are wont to forget that our sun looks on our cultivated fields and on 
the prairies and forests without distinction [. . .] In his view the earth is all 
equally cultivated like a garden [. . .] This broad field which I have looked 
at so long looks not to me as the principal cultivator, but away from me to 
influences more genial to it, which water and make it green. These beans 
have results which are not harvested by me. (114) 
Once again, it would be possible to read this as an ecomimetic attempt to re-purify the 
category of nature and return it to a sphere separate from the human. Such purification 
could encourage the reader to see the cultural realm of human cultivation and the natural 
realm of wild plants and sun as two separate spheres, co-existing in tension. Yet I believe 
that this passage can also be read as another attempt to establish hybridity. At the end of 
his experiment, Thoreau discovers results which he can observe and quantify and these 
are linked to his acts of intervention; human work in the bean field and human acts of 
cultivation construct human knowledge. But activities and processes that the human does 
not observe or in which the human does not participate are “not harvested” by the human, 
though Thoreau's invocation to the “true husbandman” to “sacrific[e] in his mind not only 
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his first but his last fruits also” suggests that this inability of the human to know in total 
does not need to be a cause of anxiety. In the end, whether harvested or not, the truth is 
that wild and “cultivated” fields can be seen “without distinction.” They are all 
cultivated, to some extent. There is thus no rigid dichotomy between a material world and 
a constructed culture, no cultivation mapped out and then projected onto pure nature. 
There is just a “broad” environment shaped by a variety of factors. Humans cannot help 
but continue to shape this environment but a “true husbandman” will try to learn of 
beans, the earth, and himself in the process. 
The Hybrid Ponds 
 Just as “The Bean Field” mixes nostalgic, purified visions with more critical 
recognitions of the land’s historical construction, Walden’s description of the ponds 
mixes pastoral visions of purity with complicated considerations of the ponds’ hybridity. 
At times, Walden imagines the ponds as points of access to unmediated nature, only to 
undermine such purity by insisting on the ponds’ histories of material change. For 
instance, in “The Ponds,” Thoreau the narrator describes Walden Pond as a pure space, 
free from the depredations of industry ruining Concord: 
There is no rawness nor imperfection in its edge there, as where the axe 
has cleared a part, or a cultivated field abuts on it. The trees have ample 
room to expand on the water side, and each sends forth its most vigorous 
branch in that direction. There Nature has woven a natural selvage, and the 
eye rises by just gradations from the low shrubs of the shore to the highest 
trees. There are few traces of man’s hand to be seen. The water laves the 
shore as it did a thousand years ago. (128) 
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Here, Thoreau imagines Walden Pond as unchanged and ahistorical, thereby immersing 
the reader in a fantasy of purified nature. At first, the passage seems to reinforce the poles 
of the modern constitution, keeping nature distant from the observing human, minimizing 
his presence to an impersonal “eye,” and allowing him only an aesthetic appreciation of 
the environment as an abstract landscape. Nature itself has formed a boundary, a “natural 
selvage,” that surrounds the lake and ostensibly fences out human interventions like 
clearing woods and cultivating fields. Yet the very idea of a “woven selvage” hints at a 
hybrid history. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a “selvage” is also “[t]he 
edge of a piece of woven material finished in such a manner as to prevent the ravelling 
out of the weft. Also, a narrow strip or list at the edge of a web of cloth, which is not 
finished like the rest of the cloth.” The imagined seamless, static edge of the pond 
without “imperfection” competes with a different vision of the shores as raw and 
unfinished. While Thoreau insists that the water “laves at the shores as it did a thousand 
years ago,” this timelessness depends upon Nature’s constant weaving. If there are “few 
traces” of humans to be seen, that is because the natural world engages in a process of 
“continual [. . .] repairs,” weaving back together any strands disturbed by humans’ 
presence. The illusion of purity which Thoreau offers here is itself a construction, albeit a 
“natural” one. 
Thoreau more explicitly collapses the fantasy of the ponds’ purity when, in the 
same chapter, he admits that the “natural selvage” of the pond is not undisturbed, but 
instead being “laid waste” by the woodcutting industry: 
since I left those shores the woodchoppers have still further laid them 
waste, and now for many a year there will be no more rambling through 
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the aisles of the wood, with occasional vistas through which you see the 
water. My Muse may be excused if she is silent henceforth. How can you 
expect the birds to sing when their groves are cut down? (131-32) 
On the one hand, this shift from pure to troubled pond enacts a familiar ecological 
nostalgia. By replacing the pure Walden pond from his visit with a pond since ruined by 
developing industry, Thoreau creates an elegiac tone: we do not resent the ecological 
changes taking place so much as the lost fantasy of a pure retreat. But his admission that 
these woods have been “further laid waste” since his departure hints to the signs of 
human presence creeping into the pond’s surroundings even during his stay (emphasis 
mine). The deforestation of Walden also creeps into his narrative, as when Thoreau 
exclaims, “the woodcutters, and the railroad, and I myself have profaned Walden” (135). 
“The Ponds” thus enacts a troubled oscillation between recognizing and ignoring, both 
imagining Walden as a retreat from society and uncomfortably recognizing the pond’s 
constant inclusion into social networks. The co-existence of these competing descriptions 
shows Thoreau struggling between active, hybrid textual construction and a mere 
projection of cultural desires onto a passive landscape. While Thoreau wants to imagine 
the pond as a place of pure nature, the pond’s own role in the creation of his text 
challenges this fantasy, pushing material realities to the foreground in ways that perturb 
the text’s consistency. 
As “The Ponds” shifts in its depictions, it is hard to tell if Thoreau buys his 
nostalgic visions or if he rejects them. Perhaps he offers them in the tone of bragging 
confidence with which he frames the work as a whole, offering their bold visions of 
natural power in spite of the “cant and hypocrisy” surely shaping them. And just as he 
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foregrounds his own bragging without withdrawing his claims, Thoreau contradicts his 
natural visions with images of destruction but never corrects his former, rapturous 
fantasies. Thoreau concedes that such fantasies are his own cultivated constructions, a 
truth to which he alludes by calling these pond scenes “the appearance of an amphitheatre 
for some kind of sylvan spectacle”  as well “my lake country” (131;135). By imagining 
the ponds as an amphitheatre, Thoreau recognizes the ponds’ alleged purity as 
performative, an enactment of a cultural construction. And by imagining the ponds as his 
own version of the English Romantic poets’ lake country, he recognizes that his 
experiences of the ponds are influenced by a cultural and literary tradition. His text thus 
reveals a pond of two natures, at once pure and defined by human modes. As McMurry 
argues, Thoreau does seem blind to the hybrids of Walden Pond: he proliferates hybrids 
as he wanders the landscape, seeing the environment through the lenses of literature and 
art. But he also denies these hybrids by weaving together a fantasy of nature’s permanent 
purity and placing a firm boundary between the pond and the effects of human action. 
 However, Thoreau also playfully describes the ponds in hybrid terms that 
challenge their imagined purity. The first such challenge comes in Thoreau’s description 
of Walden Pond as “intermediate in its nature between land and sky” (129-30). This 
description stems from a simple observation of the pond as a material entity: its shifting 
colors resemble a mixture of green water and blue sky. As Thoreau explains, “All our 
Concord waters have two colors at least, one when viewed at a distance, and another, 
more proper, close at hand [. . .] Walden is blue at one time and green at another, even 
from the same point of view. Lying between the earth and the heavens, it partakes of the 
color of both” (121). But within the narrative development of the chapter, this hybridity 
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quickly becomes symbolic. The pond is not just a mixture of green and blue, or the 
appearance of water meeting sky; it is also a symbol of the material (earth) meeting the 
seemingly immaterial or transcendent (sky), providing a space where the historically 
embodied and textual author can float and fish, for both empirical observations and 
metaphors for his text.  
His hybrid immersion in the pond becomes complete when, floating on the pond 
at night, he feels “as if I might next cast my line upward into the air, as well as downward 
into this element which was scarcely more dense. Thus I caught two fishes as it were with 
one hook” (120-21). Fishing on the pond reproduces the complex collapsing of 
materiality and language evident in “The Bean Field.” The historical Thoreau may well 
have floated on a night pond, unable to distinguish earth from sky. But this experience 
provides an apt metaphor for the process of nature writing, where the human deliberately 
immerses him or herself in a space that will blur rigid boundaries. By floating out on 
Walden Pond at night, Thoreau can cast his line into textual as well as literal waters, 
catching two fish – a textual symbol and an actual experience – with one line. And again, 
it is embodied participation in an experience of encounter that separates this complexly 
imagined relationship between the narrator and the world from the aesthetic fantasy 
described previously. While standing on the shore, Thoreau can imagine the pond as 
untouched by human presence, as a purely natural entity that gives humans only aesthetic 
pleasure. But once he sets out fishing for knowledge, metaphors, and fish, he will “feel 
this faint jerk, which [comes] to interrupt your dreams and link you to Nature again” 
(120). 
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 Thoreau’s shifting understanding of the pond as either hybrid or purified re-
emphasizes how process and mutual participation challenge the poles of the modern 
constitution. Latour insists, “the notion of a yawning gap between words and world was 
obtained by erasing all the mediations and interrogating only the two extremes facing 
each other like two distant bookends” (109). In a parallel manner, Thoreau can imagine 
the ponds as pure only when he erases the mediations connecting himself to the pond; 
indeed, his purified visions of the pond imagine Nature as erasing such traces itself, 
“retain[ing] no breath that is breathed on it” (129). But when he becomes active in the 
environment, whether through growing beans, catching fish, or simply floating on the 
water, it becomes more difficult to maintain purifications. 
 Thoreau recognizes the way active involvement places the observer into a more 
truthful relationship with the material world when, in a rage about the names of many of 
the ponds, he insists that the ability to name the ponds well only comes via elaborate 
processes of interaction and the resulting accumulation of knowledge. He scoffs at the 
names given to the ponds by local farmers, seeing them as impositions of both human 
language and corrupt human economies: 
Flint’s Pond! Such is the poverty of our nomenclature. What right did the 
unclean and stupid farmer, whose farm abutted on this sky water, whose 
shores he has ruthlessly laid bare, to give his name to it? Some skin-flint, 
who loved better the reflecting surface of a dollar, or a bright cent, in 
which he could see his own brazen face; who regarded even the wild 
ducks which settled in it as trespassers; [. . .] I go not there to see him nor 
to hear of him; who never saw it, who never bathed in it, who never loved 
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it, who never protected it, who never spoke a good word for it, nor 
thanked God that he had made it. (134) 
On the one hand, this passage merely repeats Thoreau’s desire for purified nature, 
demanding an eradication of the human farmer. On the other hand, Thoreau’s 
condemnation does not fall equally on all human acts of perception and naming. 
Thoreau’s accusation leaves space for genuine human knowledge, but such knowledge 
depends upon processes of involvement. Without seeing, bathing in, loving, protecting, 
and speaking for the pond, one’s language cannot be anything other than a projection of 
the self. Indeed, this list provides a compelling chain of transformations, mobilizing the 
pond’s identity into something knowable by the individual. Such a process actively 
involves language – the speaking a good word for the pond. This passage thus repeats 
Thoreau’s language of endeavor, imagining such endeavor as an involvement 
independent of utilitarian purposes. The poverty of nomenclature that Thoreau laments 
specifically comes from an economic system that substitutes monetary value for complex 
chains of transformation, preferring “the reflecting surface of a dollar, or a bright cent” to 
a pond’s mixture of blues and greens. Names derived from this kind of knowing will be 
cultural projections imposed upon a distinct natural world. 
Again, as in “The Bean Field,” a genuine Thoreauvian knowledge of nature 
cannot occur via passive, distanced observation. One must move one’s body into closer 
contact with the ponds, simultaneously immersing oneself in and speaking for them. 
Thoreau’s prescription for acceptable nomenclature thus repeats the overall process he 
attempts in his Walden experiment, using a mixture of observation and speaking as a 
form of testament and advocacy. Knowledge of the material world thus emerges 
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simultaneously with the emergence of symbols and language sufficient for rhetorical 
purposes. This pairing drives “The Bean Field” and repeats when Thoreau measures the 
ponds in “The Ponds in Winter.” He not only measures them for scientific reasons; he 
also sees them as potential symbols. But these goals are not at odds: empirical 
measurement of the ponds constructs them as valuable symbols, mobilizing their material 
qualities. Thoreau admits, “I am thankful that this pond was made deep and pure for a 
symbol” but he uses this symbol only after determining the pond’s exact depth (192): 
As I was desirous to recover the long lost bottom of Walden Pond, I 
surveyed it carefully, before the ice broke up, early in ’46, with compass 
and chain and sounding line. There have been many stories told about the 
bottom, or rather no bottom, of this pond, which certainly had no 
foundation for themselves. It is remarkable how long men will believe in 
the bottomlessness of a pond without taking the trouble to sound it. (191-
92) 
Here processes and movement make symbolic meaning valuable. This passage repeats 
Thoreau’s earlier search for a bottom, a sense of reality from which to make political and 
ethical decisions, and insists that it is easy to replace false stories with symbolic yet true 
facts. While many men imposed a myth of the pond’s bottomlessness, Thoreau 
“fathomed it [the pond] easily with a cod-line and a stone” and was consequently able to 
“assure my readers that Walden has a reasonably tight bottom” (192). Thoreau finds the 
solid bottom for which he was searching, yet it is not the “hard bottom and rocks in 
place” from which he hoped to launch his final description of “reality” (70). The pond 
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has only a “reasonably sound bottom” and it is too far removed for him to “work and 
wedge” his feet down in order to contact it. 
Yet this “reasonably sound” conclusion provides as convincing a counter to the 
myths of the pond’s infinitude as Latour’s “sturdy relativism” counters the notion that 
science is only a social construction (Pandora 4). Denied a Realometer, denied the 
presence of a totally knowable or totally distinct nature, Thoreau still finds ways to 
mobilize the pond and come to know it. While reporting data and drawing a cross-section 
of the pond based on his measurements (scientific constructions we can easily read as 
textual mobilizations in a Latourian sense), Thoreau also insists on the imaginative and 
symbolic power that come from knowing the pond’s dimensions. He asserts, “not an inch 
of it can be spared by the imagination” (192). Set side by side in the text, diagram and 
potential symbol both emerge from Thoreau’s embodied interaction with the pond. Both 
mean because they result from Thoreau’s persistent observations. Unlike poetic dreamers 
who observe from a distance, “who have lain flat on the ice for a long time, looking down 
through the illusive medium,” Thoreau gropes towards the pond’s depths and gains a 
reasonable knowledge. Thus, Thoreau develops a hybrid knowledge of a hybrid pond in 
pursuit of a solid bottom upon which to rebuild his own life. 
 In the end, a hybrid vision of the pond that accounts for human mobilizations and 
involvements provides a more convincing place from which to know and speak for the 
ponds than an idealized, empirical, definitive reality. Recognizing the pond as hybrid 
makes environmental responsibility possible. Thoreau’s agricultural role in “The Bean 
Field” involves participation. By contrast, his pastoral treatment of the pond ignores his 
own presence as a perceiving, representing individual, as well as other human 
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interventions on the pond, hiding behind the belief that the timeless power of nature will 
erase all changes to the environment. As long as the pond remains an ahistorical, natural 
item outside of human influence, capable of covering over any human traces, humans like 
the woodcutters become temporary aesthetic annoyances rather than meaningful 
extensions of Concord’s networks of exchange. By contrast, when Thoreau actively 
recognizes the human role in shaping the pond’s environment, he can discern between 
uses of the pond, condemning economic exploitation. 
But the mobilized construction that easily explained an agricultural space like the 
bean field seems less suited to a supposedly “wild” space like the ponds. However, in 
“The Pond in Winter,” Thoreau extends the agricultural metaphors of “The Bean Field” 
to a description of ice harvesting in order to argue against this use: 
In the winter of ’46—7, there came a hundred men of Hyperborean 
extraction swoop down on to our pond one morning [sic], with many car-
loads of ungainly-looking farming tools [. . .] I did not know whether they 
had come to sow a crop of winter rye, or some other kind of grain recently 
introduced from Iceland. As I saw no manure, I judged that they meant to 
skim the land, as I had done, thinking the soil was deep and had lain 
fallow long enough. They said that a gentleman farmer, who was behind 
the scenes, wanted to double his money, which, as I understood, amounted 
to half a million already; but in order to cover each one of his dollars with 
another, he took off the only coat, ay, the skin itself, of Walden Pond in 
the midst of a hard winter [. . .] when I was looking sharp to see what kind 
of seed they dropped into the furrow, a gang of fellows by my side 
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suddenly began to hook up the virgin mould itself, with a peculiar jerk, 
clean down to the sand, or rather the water,—for it was a very springy 
soil,—indeed all the terra firma there was,—and haul it away on sleds [. . 
.]. (198) 
This scene centers around a gentleman farmer, reminiscent of the experimenting Thoreau 
from “The Bean Field.” Thoreau deliberately draws the comparison by assuming this 
farmer wants, like him, to take advantage of the rich soil. But there are notable 
differences: whereas Thoreau wants to come to know beans, this gentleman farmer wants 
only “to double his money.” Whereas Thoreau participates in a long process of labor in 
order to harvest knowledge and an alternative lifestyle, this gentleman farmer puts in 
none of his own labor in order to harvest profit. And whereas Thoreau creates a hybrid 
space by mixing his own seeds and labor with the long-fallow earth, this farmer merely 
takes the earth and water itself without ever putting any labor into the ground. Thoreau 
makes this contrast explicit by imagining the ice on top of Walden Pond as “virgin 
mould” and “springy soil,” asserting that no “seed” was “dropped in the furrow.” Rather, 
the water is simply taken, loaded onto the railroad cars and hauled away. Instead of 
commingling in order to construct a hybrid plant, the earth remains distinct from humans, 
and it is this very separation that makes the thoughtless taking of Walden’s ice possible. 
 The fable of the ice harvest makes us recognize the value of a hybrid view of 
nature. True knowledge comes from interacting with the earth, mobilizing, measuring, 
planting, harvesting, observing. To ignore this constructed quality of the environment can 
enable its use or impede its protection. Such exploitation, far from allowing the human to 
know the environment as Thoreau came to know beans, removes the pre-conditions of 
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knowledge: instead of a hard bottom or even a reasonably sound bottom, the ice cutters 
take away “all the terra firma there was.” This loss of a solid material grounding reduces 
Thoreau to repeating purifications, attempting to cover over their incursion. He muses, 
“now they are all gone, and in thirty days more, probably, I shall look from the same 
window on the pure sea-green Walden water there, reflecting the clouds and the trees, 
and sending up its evaporations in solitude, and no traces will appear that a man has ever 
stood there” (200). The dream of purity, far from protecting environmental spaces, 
merely makes it possible to ignore their use. 
Conclusion: “Living Poetry Like the Leaves of a Tree” 
Thus, there are conflicting depictions in Walden of the relationship between 
human and environment, text and world. At times, as McMurry contends, Thoreau 
appears to be hopelessly inscribed within the poles of the modern constitution. He 
struggles to imagine a pure nature impervious to human contact, even as the incursions of 
the woodcutters and ice cutters – even as his own measurements, poems, and 
observations – create a proliferation of hybrids in and around the pond. But at other 
times, Thoreau recognizes the power of hybridity and imagines the relationship between 
text, observer, and world as connected by complex chains of transformation akin to 
Latourian processes of mobilization. Walden imagines a pastoral pond free from culture’s 
impurities; Walden also imagines bean fields and railroad banks where human activity 
mingles with the material environment to produce “ a sort of hybrid product” (205). 
 Indeed, Thoreau’s oft-discussed vision of the thawing sandbank in a railroad cut 
presents an image of the natural world as a truly hybrid construction, mixing human and 
natural space as well as text and materiality. McMurry argues that the hybrid railroad cut 
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provides “an initial foray into the vicissitudes of the nature/culture distinction” (135). He 
adds,  
The cut is where the orders of nature and culture meet: the sand foliage, 
after all, is inscribed as a blank canvas laid bare during the construction of 
the Fitchburg line. Without the quarter-mile stretch of transfigured earth 
(provided courtesy of surveyors, engineers, Irish work gangs, the state of 
Massachusetts, and, to press it, James Watt himself, whose steam 
technology helped inaugurate the age of the railroad) would Thoreau have 
been deprived of the images—that is to say, the sand images themselves 
and the tropes they provide? (136-37) 
As Thoreau watches the thawing sand patterns and imagines them as living poetry, as the 
revelation of universal laws, and as prototypes for a number of biological forms, his 
imagination leaps from material to symbolic and back again. Indeed, McMurry’s 
conflation of sand patterns and tropes points to a hybrid mixture of language and 
materiality, and I contend that this hybridity echoes the hybrid bean plants from “The 
Bean Field” chapter. 
But McMurry argues that Thoreau, “keen observer of nature that he was,” would 
have recognized that “Any precise parallels between the ontogenesis of sand, plant, 
human, society, and language must break down eventually” (138). McMurry contends 
that Thoreau insists on such a continuity in spite of its limitations in order to resolve the 
nature/culture split that the railroad’s hybrid history brings to his attention. Thus, Thoreau 
insists on collapsing flowing sand and writing because he is still participating in 
Latourian cycles of purification and proliferation, pulling apart nature and culture only to 
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smash them back together in unsatisfying combinations.27 Yet Thoreau’s observation of 
the sandbank reads differently when connected back to “The Bean Field,” since the 
images of language-plants grown from hybrid space echoes the self-conscious attention 
to hybridity evident in his agricultural experiments. Thoreau observes the sandbank and 
imagines nature as a creative Artist similar to Latour’s vision of the scientific 
experimenter, actively involved in constructive processes of material transformation: 
I am affected as if in a peculiar sense I stood in the laboratory of the Artist 
who made the world and me,—had come to where he was still at work, 
sporting on this bank, and with excess of energy strewing his fresh designs 
about [. . .] You find thus in the very sands an anticipation of the vegetable 
leaf. No wonder that the earth expresses itself outwardly in leaves, it so 
labors with the idea inwardly. (205) 
In its ending sentences, this passage repeats the images of language and materiality that 
Thoreau used to describe his own work in the bean fields. This parallel allows Thoreau, 
through his own participation in the hybrid space at Walden Pond, to move words and 
know the hybrid natural world better. His work in the fields helps him grow the 
metaphors of his writing and connects him to the thoughts of the earth. While formerly 
such an interactive process seemed at odds with the pure ponds he wanted to imagine, 
here the process becomes extendable to a world far beyond an agricultural field. The 
whole world, from the laws of nature to the divine Artist, becomes visible in an explicitly 
hybrid space; Thoreau’s insistence that this hybrid space gives him access to all of 
                                                 
27
 McMurry argues, “on the one hand, he seeks to purify nature from culture by ignoring the mixed origins 
of the deep cut sand images; on the other hand, by translating these same images across geological and 
biological domains into the domain of the social, he creates entities of nonhuman and human components [. 
. .] When he is engaged in purification he ignores the translation, and when he engages in translation, he 
cannot see he is purifying” (139).  
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nature’s truths suggests a dawning awareness that the nature he pursues may too be 
hybrid. Like the field expressing its thoughts in leaves, the natural world is constituted by 
hybridity, which makes it knowable and describable. Recognizing hybridity, Thoreau 
insists that the earth he observes is neither pure language nor pure materiality: 
The earth is not a mere fragment of dead history, stratum upon stratum 
like the leaves of a book, to be studied by geologists and antiquaries 
chiefly, but living poetry like the leaves of a tree, which precede flowers 
and fruit,—not a fossil earth, but a living earth [. . .]. (207) 
Instead of a dead, material world that one discovers and brags about mistakenly, “Spring” 
presents a living and hybrid world constituted by materiality and language. It is this 
hybrid world for which Thoreau can “speak a good word,” mobilizing the poetry of tree 
leaves and sandbanks into the poetry of the text through perception, interaction, and 
language.  
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CHAPTER IV 
“IF THE POETS BECOME MATERIALISED”: THE POLITICAL POTENTIAL OF 
MATERIAL REPRESENTATION IN FRANK NORRIS’S THE OCTOPUS 
If truth is not an actual work-a-day thing, as concrete as the lamp-post on 
the corner, as practical as a cable-car, as real and homely and work-a-day 
and commonplace as a boot-jack, then indeed are we of all men most 
miserable and our preaching vain. And truth in fiction is just as real and 
important as truth anywhere else  
Frank Norris, “The Need of a Literary Conscience” 
 
“If the poets become materialised, Mr. Presley,” declared Hartrath, “what 
can we say to the people?” 
  Frank Norris, The Octopus  
 
In the scene from which the second epigraph is taken, Presley, the protagonist of 
Frank Norris’s 1901 novel The Octopus, is arguing with a group of artists, writers, and 
capitalist investors at an art fete in San Francisco. Presley has recently moved to 
California in hopes of writing an epic poem about the West, but his interaction with the 
San Francisco artists as well as his increasing involvement in the politics of the San 
Joaquin Valley have pushed him to question the value of his poetry. At the novel’s 
beginning, Presley hopes to write “some vast, tremendous theme, heroic, terrible, to be 
unrolled in all the thundering progression of hexameters” and to write of “the West, that 
world's frontier of Romance, where a new race, a new people—hardy, brave, and 
passionate—were building an empire” (9-10). However, a growing political battle 
between the Pacific and Southwestern Railroad and his friends, a group of San Joaquin 
wheat ranchers, challenges his romanticized visions of Western empire and his 
romanticized definitions of art; his personal involvement opens his eyes to the escapist, 
apolitical nature of the San Francisco art establishment. The fete which Presley attends 
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and the artists with whom he associates are backed by railroad money – the very money 
derived from grain tariffs which his friends pay, the very money bribing railroad 
commissioners and driving the ranchers from railroad-leased lands. At the party, Presley 
accuses the railroad of using such “fairs and festivals” to simultaneously increase railroad 
traffic and distract public attention from the railroad’s political maneuvering. He realizes 
that art such as he hoped to produce, when divorced from the political and material 
conditions of its surroundings, can become a dangerous ideological tool. 
But the artist Hartrath responds to Presley’s concern with a question that haunts 
the novel: if poets become concerned with the material details of economics and politics, 
what will happen to the social or aesthetic power of their work? What appeal can art have 
for the population if it ceases to entertain and distract? Will art retain its appeal if it 
leaves the world of Romance and reenters the world of ordinary things? By exploring 
these questions, The Octopus becomes a novel about the materialization of art. As the 
conflict between the ranchers and the railroad intensifies, leading to a violent shoot-out 
between ranch owners and railroad management, Presley abandons abstract literature and 
turns his attention to the material details of the San Joaquin conflict. But Presley does not 
give up on creating an epic. He simply re-imagines epic as involving specific historical 
events and material conditions. Presley replaces a homogenous, general “West” with a 
more concrete description of conditions in the San Joaquin. The Octopus thus becomes 
more specifically a novel about what a materialized poetry – or, to use Presley’s own 
term, an “absolutely true poetical expression” – might look like (Octopus 13). The novel 
focuses on Presley’s search for an artistic mode that puts him in contact with both the 
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material world and the text in order to give his work an authenticity beyond mere 
aesthetic value. 
Presley’s search for a material yet epic mode of writing enacts theories about 
literature and the materially real evident in Norris’s own correspondence, criticism, and 
artistic practice. Like Presley, Norris traveled to the San Joaquin in search of literary 
inspiration; unlike Presley, Norris always planned to base his epic of the West in the 
material details of environmental and economic conflicts. Norris’s letters show that he 
went to stay on the wheat ranches specifically to research the Mussel Slough affair of 
1880 and to write a novel about the growth of the railroad trusts that occurred in 
California in the 1870s and 1880s.28 These letters and essays also present his new 
definition of “naturalism,” a literary mixing of realism and romance, based in material 
observation and factual accuracy but also in the creation of compelling stories. While 
Presley does not function as a stand-in for Norris, his transformation into a “materialized” 
poet does resemble Norris’s own developing naturalism: Norris’s theory avoids simple 
dichotomies by rejecting definitions that reduce literature either to artifice or to factual 
reproduction, threading a path akin to Presley’s between the allure of the literary and the 
desire for factual accuracy.29 
                                                 
28
 For example, in a letter to Harry M. Wright, Norris claims, “I mean to study the whole question as 
faithfully as I can and then write a hair lifting story...I mean to do it thoroughly.—Get at it from every point 
of view, the social, the agricultural, [and] political.—Just say the last word [on] the R.R. question in 
California” (qtd. in in McElrath and Crisler 340). McElrath and Crisler argue that Norris’s correspondence 
reveals his desire to write a book in what would come to be called the muckraking tradition (341). 
However, Norris eventually changes his plan, prompted by “the complexity of the situation” (344). For 
more details on Norris’s historical research of the Mussel Slough Affair – the 1880 railroad/rancher 
shootout that inspired The Octopus’s own shootout scene – see McElrath and Crisler (346-52). 
 
29
 Norris rejects the overtly literary in essays including “A Plea for Romantic Fiction,” where he scoffs at 
sentimental romance and calls it “a conjurer's trick box, full of flimsy quackeries, tinsel and clap traps, 
meant only to amuse, and relying upon deception to do even that” (1165). However, in the same essay, he 
also rejects simple realism, calling it a “harsh, loveless, colorless, blunt tool" (1166). 
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But, like theorists of representation in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, 
Norris struggles to identify a clear alternative to this dichotomy between reality and 
aesthetics. The result is a series of contradictory positions evident in his theory and his 
novels. On the one hand, Norris appeals to the material as a way of validating truth, 
encouraging writers to avoid the “fake” and “sham” writing represented in The Octopus 
by the San Francisco art scene. For example, in the 1901 essay from which the first 
epigraph is taken, Norris bemoans American literature’s lack of commitment to material 
and historical truth. While he congratulates popular writers on their ability to reach large 
audiences, he urges them to ground their work in a more material version of truth. Norris 
the critic’s impulse towards an objective, empirical truth reproduces the tension between 
artistic appeal and materiality evident in Hartrath’s question: although the popular artists 
Norris derides may have much to say to the people, in his estimation, they are not faithful 
to the facts of material reality. 
To correct this imbalance, Norris’s essay encourages writers to pursue truth based 
on material things – a truth imagined as “the hard nub of the business, something we can 
hold in the hand” rather than as “an elusive, intangible abstraction” (1158).30 Norris 
emphasizes the material by asserting that literary truth should be as immediately 
discernible as an ordinary object: a lamp-post, a cable-car, or a bootjack. Given this 
material world’s self-evident truth, more grounded literature should be easy to produce, 
requiring only that the author actively observe the world. “A whole Literature goes 
marching by, clamoring for a leader and a master hand to guide it,” he claims; “You have 
but to step from your doorway” (1158-59). Norris’s invitation to writers to step out and 
                                                 
30
 This essay, along with Norris’s other literary essays cited in this chapter, are reprinted in Donald Pizer’s 
Frank Norris: Novels and Essays. Page numbers refer to these re-printings. 
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observe the truth right outside their doors recalls Timothy Morton’s logic of “factual 
brutalism” (123). For it insists on the self-evidence of empirical truth, seeking, in 
Latour’s phrase, “an objective object untouched by human hands” (Pandora 13).31 Such 
formulations present truth as less a social construction than a tangible fact, just waiting to 
be perceived and shared by the observant individual writer. 
But the call for material truth that Norris makes in this epigraph is unusual in his 
critical writing. In other literary essays, Norris openly scorns his friend William Dean 
Howells’s brand of realism, with its interest in the workaday objects of the middle class. 
While “The Need for a Literary Conscience” exhorts the would-be American novelist to 
step out in the street and grab hold of a self-evident literature of bootjacks and lamp 
posts, essays such as “Zola as Romantic Artist” (1896) and “A Plea for Romantic 
Fiction” (1901) emphasize the artist’s role in selecting and constructing the truths of 
literary work. “A Plea for Romantic Fiction,” published the same month as “The Need for 
a Literary Conscience,” dismisses realism’s “meticulous presentation of teacups, rag 
carpets, wall paper and haircloth sofas” as reductive and superficial. Norris counters such 
superficiality by insisting that not just any observation will suffice as the foundation for 
truthful writing. While literary truth must be grounded in actual things, perception and 
selection influence texts, too. Although claiming the objectivity of truth by pointing to its 
foundation in material things, Norris also fully acknowledges the subjectivity of truth as 
the end result of human arrangement and selection. Thus, Norris’s definition of truth 
struggles to cultivate a dual allegiance to materiality and to representation. It seeks to 
                                                 
31
 Morton describes “factual brutalism” as the idea “that the space of factical things can put a stop to 
thinking” (123). He argues that appeals to facts thus serve as a way of ending argument; objects provide an 
end to the subjective wrangling of human discourse. 
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acknowledge the central roles of both the human writer and the material world being 
described. 
This struggle to encompass both materiality and construction is not only 
philosophical but also reflects the changing material conditions of the industrializing 
world. Norris’s novels document late nineteenth century America’s transition into a more 
transnational and industrial state of capitalism, a transition accompanied by a loss of 
material immediacy according to current theorists of globalization and transnationalism. 
Recent globalization theory describes how space, time, and things all begin to feel 
disembodied under the influence of capitalism. The alienation of laborers, the rise of the 
commodity, and the development of international systems of travel, communication, and 
exchange all disconnect experiencing subjects from the world of material things. 
Marshall Berman takes the following passage from The Communist Manifesto as 
indicative of capitalism’s effect on material relations to the environment: 
Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all 
social relations, everlasting uncertainty and agitation, distinguish the 
bourgeois epoch from all earlier times. All fixed, fast-frozen relationships, 
with their train of venerable ideas and opinions, are swept away, all new-
formed ones become obsolete before they can ossify. All that is solid 
melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and men at last are forced to face 
with sober senses the real conditions of their lives and their relations with 
their fellow men [338]. (qtd. in Berman 95) 
This passage presents a different vision of material things than Norris’s literary 
prescription. In Marx’s reading, the concrete specificity of things cannot be immediately 
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discerned by the individual; in place of the material realness of Norris’s lamp post, Marx 
describes the uncertainty of the commodity form and its consequent alienation. Other 
theorists diagnose capitalism’s symptoms in names that sound science-fictional but 
similarly emphasize material disconnect: time-space compression (Harvey); 
deterritorialization (Tomlinson); and dematerialization (Harvey).32 Relationships to 
material environments and the resources in them begin, as Marx predicts, to lose solidity 
as industrial processes of exchange, transportation, and production change human 
relationships to their physical environments. The effect of such changes on material 
definitions of truth is evident in The Octopus’s engagement with questions of 
representation, since, like the unfinished Trilogy of the Wheat of which it is a part, 
Norris’s novel focuses precisely on changing systems of exchange and production. 
To connect economic conditions to epistemological and ontological questions 
about the nature of the “real” is to argue that changes in material conditions alter our 
definitions of significance and truth. Harvey argues exactly this, contending that 
capitalism’s transformation of processes of exchange directly affects systems of 
representation. Harvey traces the “dematerialization” of culture back to the literal 
dematerialization of money: 
The breakdown of money as a secure means of representing value has 
itself created a crisis of representation in advanced capitalism [. . .] It is, 
furthermore, not hard to see how all of this might create a more general 
crisis of representation. The central value system, to which capitalism has 
                                                 
32
 See David Harvey’s “Time-Space compression and the postmodern condition” in The Condition of 
Postmodernity: An Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change; John Tomlinson’s “Deterritorialization: 
The Cultural Condition of Globalization” in Globalization and Culture; and Harvey’s “What's Green and 
Makes the Environment Go Round?” from The Cultures of Globalization. 
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always appealed to validate and gauge its actions, is dematerialized and 
shifting, time horizons are collapsing, and it is hard to tell exactly what 
space we are in when it comes to assessing causes and effects, meanings 
or values. (“Green” 298)33 
Harvey postulates representational effects from the transformation of material 
relationships, and sees a shift in economic representation influencing language and truth. 
While he makes this case specifically about late twentieth century global capitalism, this 
correlation between rapid shifts in material relations and changes in representation also 
logically applies to the industrialization occurring in Norris’s turn-of-the-century 
California. If “the changing experience of space, time, and money has formed a 
distinctive material basis for the rise of distinctive systems of interpretation and 
representation,” then the dramatic changes depicted in Norris’s novels can also provide 
the foundation for materialist interpretation – an interpretation which connects literary 
style to changing material conditions (“Green” 299). In this context, texts’ self-professed 
“realist” impulses can be read as doing more than blindly circulating ideologically 
constructed versions of the real. Given the increasing dematerialization of representation 
in the rising culture of industrialism and capitalism, the textual imperative to speak 
truthfully of the material world, as professed in letters and essays by Norris, contains a 
                                                 
33
 In “What’s Green and Makes the Environment Go Round?” Harvey argues that, “Since 1973, money has 
been de-materialized in the sense that it no longer has a formal or tangible link to precious metals” (297). 
The result is world reliance, “for the first time in its history, upon immaterial forms of money” and “Money 
consequently became useless as a means of storing value for any length of time” (297-98). Thus, Harvey 
identifies a literal dematerialization of symbolic representation within the money system. 
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radical political potential: the potential to undermine the dematerializing effects of 
capitalism and the anaesthetizing potential of aesthetics.34 
 Connecting representational with political questions provides a helpful framework 
for explaining The Octopus’s strange parallel narratives. One of the critical problems 
common to Norris criticism involves trying to reconcile the novel’s professed desire to 
focus on the political problems of the California railroad trust with its simultaneous 
interest in the processes of poetic representation, evident in the amount of narrative 
devoted to Presley’s poetic project. For William Vance, Presley’s story competes with the 
rancher-railroad narrative: “Presley is either a wholly superfluous character or else he is 
the most important character and the book is essentially about him. If the book is 
primarily about the growing of wheat and the rancher-railroad war, then Presley is 
useless” (130). But Vance concludes that the novel’s focus on Presley’s writing is self-
indulgent on Norris’s part. He claims, “It’s a little as though Homer had introduced into 
the Iliad a malcontent would-be bard who complained about the stink of the sacrifices 
and the difficulty of writing an epic about people who quarreled over concubines” (130). 
But connecting representational and political questions makes sense of the novel’s 
dual interest. The Octopus does not just ask what a materialized poetry would look like 
but also what political consequences materialized poetry can finally have. Presley’s 
desire for “absolutely true poetical expression” becomes more than an artistic problem as 
the events of the San Joaquin give him people and things for whom he wants to speak. 
                                                 
34
 Terry Eagleton explains the link between ideology, dematerialization, and aesthetics thus: “Aesthetics is 
thus always a contradictory, self-undoing sort of project, which in promoting the theoretical value of its 
object risks emptying it of exactly that specificity or ineffability which was thought to rank among its most 
precious features” (2-3). He elaborates, “it is never easy to distinguish an appeal to taste and sentiment 
which offers an alternative to autocracy from one which allows such power to ground itself more securely 
in the living sensibilities of its subjects” (27). 
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The Octopus thus depicts Presley’s gradual involvement in a form of political ecology, as 
Latour defines it.35 Presley abandons an initial separation of art and the material world, 
reminiscent of the Latourian modern constitution, and instead begins actively 
constructing texts from artistic conventions while mobilizing the events and things of the 
material world. This change in Presley is politically motivated, driven by the economic 
system that not only silences the material world by separating representative systems 
from sensible things but also silences people through misrepresentations and oppression. 
In this chapter, I explore how Norris’s version of material realism negotiates this 
dual potential of realistic representation, both acknowledging literature’s “sense of 
reality” as a constructed effect and attempting to speak truthfully of the world and thus 
counter the dematerialization of the late nineteenth century. Norris designed his Trilogy 
of the Wheat to document the multiple stages of international wheat exchange, from 
cultivation to trading to consumption, with the two completed novels, The Octopus and 
The Pit, focusing on the growth of wheat in California and the trading of wheat in the 
exchange pits of Chicago.36 Norris’s work on the American wheat economy thus 
embodies the intersection of concerns introduced here, describing economic changes at 
the end of the nineteenth century and exploring resulting challenges to material relations 
and written forms. His work explicitly cultivates a literature accountable to the material, 
contextualizes literary concerns in economic changes, and questions art’s potential 
                                                 
35
 For Latour, political ecology is the logical conclusion of challenging the modern constitution. True 
political ecology shifts from “distinguishing between questions of nature and questions of politics” to 
instead directly examining “those two sets of questions as a single issue that arises for all collectives.” 
(Politics 1). 
 
36
 Norris’s clear conception of this work as a depiction of the multiple stages of the wheat economy is 
explained in a letter that he wrote to William Dean Howells. In this letter, Norris claims, “My Idea is to 
write three novels around the one subject of Wheat. First, a story of California (the producer), second, a 
story of Chicago (the distributor), third, a story of Europe (the consumer) and in each to keep to the idea of 
this huge Niagara of wheat rolling from West to East” (qtd. in McElrath and Crisler 334). 
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effectiveness to stimulate ethical change within political and economic systems. In The 
Octopus, drastic changes to the economy brought about by industrialization and the 
expansion of capitalist influence challenge Presley to rethink his relationship to art and to 
material environments. Envisioned as an epic of wheat’s production, exchange, and 
consumption, the Trilogy of the Wheat shows a world in flux, where the solid is 
increasingly melting into air. Moreover, in attempting to negotiate transformations by 
keeping its characters connected to a sense of ethical truth while also recognizing the 
increasingly tenuous nature of representations of the real, the trilogy also exhibits a form 
of constrained realism. 
The Octopus and the Mussel Slough Affair 
The Octopus, as has been well documented, is based on a real gun battle that took 
place in the San Joaquin Valley, between associates of the Southern Pacific railroad and 
wheat ranchers who had moved onto and improved railroad lands based on the promise of 
an eventual, fair purchase price. The climactic shootout of The Octopus was directly 
inspired by the Mussel Slough incident of May 11, 1880, which took place on a 
homestead belonging to Henry Brewer.37 While relations between California ranchers 
and the railroad monopolies had been tense since tracks were laid into the San Joaquin in 
1872, the Mussel Slough shootout, which left five farmers and one railroad land-buyer 
dead, ignited matters. As in The Octopus, the ranchers had been involved in a string of 
legal and public relations battles throughout the 1870s; but these battles failed to make 
                                                 
37
 For a detailed summary of the Mussel Slough incident, see the introduction of Terry Beers’s Gunfight at 
Mussel Slough: The Evolution of a Western Myth. 
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any headway against the increasing political and economic control of the railroad trusts.38 
The railroads controlled the transport of wheat out of the valley, and by controlling 
transport rates through corrupt commissioners, the railroad neutralized ranchers’ profits 
during prosperous years. Norris’s character, Annixter, gives voice to the seeming 
omnipotence of the railroad when he gloomily asserts, “You can’t buck against the 
railroad” (105). Frustration at the railroad’s unchallengeable power found vent in ethical 
outrage about the Mussel Slough shooting. As Terry Beers says, “Press reports depicting 
the tragic events at Mussel Slough convinced many that the Southern Pacific was even 
more rapacious than previously believed” (2). Fictional representations further inflamed 
such sentiment: “dramatizing the incident in novels [. . .] offered an even more effective 
means for writers to attack the railroad monopoly and attempt to pry loose its 
stranglehold on commerce” (Beers 2). 
Though The Octopus was published in 1901, decades after the Mussel Slough 
shooting, railroad politics remained central in Norris’s time. According to Mansel 
Blackford, California wheat production peaked in the 1890s, with the San Joaquin 
gradually transforming into a fruit-growing region at the century’s end; but resentment 
about the railroad’s monopoly continued long after Norris’s death in 1903.39 The Mussel 
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 Mansel Blackford describes the escalating conflict in his history of turn-of-the-century California 
business: “State supervision of railroads in California started in the 1870s. The state constitution adopted in 
1879 set up a three-man regulatory commission elected by district. Empowered to lower rates upon the 
complaints of shippers and to enforce uniform bookkeeping practices for railroads, the commission would, 
Californians believed, bring the state’s lines to heel. The commission failed to fulfill these hopes. The 
Southern Pacific corrupted many of the commissioners [. . .] Unfavorable court decisions further eroded the 
commission’s effectiveness” (81). Norris’s novel relies heavily on this historical event in its own depiction 
of the railroad/rancher conflict, including its depiction of legal battles taking place in San Francisco prior to 
the shooting incident. 
 
39
 Blackford’s account of the San Joaquin documents the changing economy and the anxiety that 
surrounded these agricultural transformations: “When Frank Norris described large-scale wheat ranching as 
the principal activity of California farmers in his novel The Octopus in 1901, his observations had already 
become outdated, for the production of wheat was yielding to diversified fruit growing as the chief 
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Slough gunfight served as a conduit of outrage for a larger sense of conflict about the 
industrialization of agriculture and the power of trusts (the forerunner of modern 
corporate interests). And Norris participated in the mythologizing of this event, traveling 
to Southern California in 1899 to research his novel while in residence on the ranch of a 
friend in the San Joaquin.40 Norris’s correspondence preceding the trip indicates that he 
planned to go to California to uncover a politically effective as well as compelling story. 
Joseph McElrath and Jesse Crisler argue that Norris's letters show his desire to write a 
novel denouncing the railroads. “Although the term had not yet been popularized by 
Theodore Roosevelt,” they argue, “it seems that when he came to San Francisco Norris 
was intent upon writing a ‘muckraking’ book like Zola’s Germinal that singlemindedly 
championed the cause of ‘the people’ oppressed by a ruthless corporation” (341).41 But 
while political purposes motivated Norris’s work, he also expressed a commitment to 
historical facts. For his desire to reveal the corruption of the Trusts was tempered by the 
complexity of the railroad situation. As McElrath argues in “Frank Norris's The Octopus: 
The Christian Ethic as Pragmatic Response,” “Readers seeking simple moral melodrama 
of the muckraking variety in The Octopus then, are in for a disappointment. There are no 
                                                                                                                                                 
occupation of the state's agriculturalists. In 1890, California ranked second among the nation's wheat-
growing states [. . .] but in succeeding years production dropped drastically. [. . .] Soil exhaustion, 
increased competition with grain from Russia and Argentina, and the completion of railroad links between 
California and the rest of the nation, which made the growing of perishable crops for eastern markets 
possible, all contributed to the demise of the bonanza wheat ranches” (4). 
 
40
 For a detailed description of Norris’s historical research on the California ranches, see McElrath and 
Crisler (340-355). 
 
41
 Norris's correspondence reveals his plan to write a fairly damning critique of the Southern Pacific: “on 
16 October 1899, after he had returned to New York, Norris informed a Mrs. Lilla Lewis Parks that she 
would be disappointed in her hope that he would be a celebrant or defender of corporations like the 
Southern Pacific. She had suggested in a letter that he use the powers displayed in McTeague and Blix ‘to 
handle the subject of ‘Trusts’ in a way to convince the public that the Trust is a modern innovation—a 
business evolution that has come to stay, if rightly handled and honorably dealt with.’ Norris flatly declared 
that he was ‘enlisted upon the other side,’ though he assured her that he was ‘very anxious to hear [her] 
arguments . . . in favor of the trust’” (McElrath & Crisler 341). 
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untainted heroes in this portrait of American economic realities” (139). Moreover, The 
Octopus critiques the greed and environmental exploitation of the ranchers as well as of 
the railroad: 
Norris remained sympathetic to the people battling the Southern Pacific, 
the sins of which were fully utilized in The Octopus. But it is clear that at 
some point – if not during his research, then later as he composed – he 
realized the complexity of the situation would require a balanced 
perspective if he was to fashion a credible indictment of the railroad. 
(McElrath and Crisler 344) 
The balanced perspective that Norris develops involves not only weighing various moral 
positions, but also weighing the potential power of various modes of writing. 
While weighing a loyalty to material fact with an investment in persuasive 
narrative power, Norris also weighed a commitment to realistic forms of representation 
and to aesthetic creation. Beers describes this as a tension between “two different 
versions of the past: that recorded in history and that celebrated by myth” (5).42 The 
consequence, she imagines, is that “fiction rooted in real events often risks unraveling the 
fabric of history in favor of weaving patterns from the imaginative threads of myth” (5). 
Norris foregrounds these issues of representation and truth by focusing on the writer 
Presley, a character as concerned with the intricacies of representation as Norris himself. 
Presley begins the novel as a poet torn between romantic, aestheticized visions and 
commitment to the real. The events of the novel transform him, into a journal writer, a 
                                                 
42
 Beers distinguishes history from myth based on a narrative’s adherence to documented events and 
causes. Myths of the Mussel Slough Affair read the event in terms of larger cultural narratives “rooted in 
our collective imagination” whereas history “at its best supplements compelling storytelling with synthesis 
and analysis” that are “rooted in facts” (5). Myth involves large scale conceptual patterns; history involves 
close adherence to historical detail. Fiction must consider where to locate itself within these allegiances. 
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socialist poet, an anarchist speechwriter, and finally a ruined writer who collapses under 
his inability to “find expression” (307). Presley’s story of aesthetic transformation 
suggests that valuable romance must be “materialized” – not just in the Marxist sense, but 
grounded in the actualities of “grain rates and unjust foreign tariffs” (Octopus 13) 
“The Things that Live”: Norris’s Naturalism 
Norris’s quest for a true style of romance attempts to balance several 
contemporary realist practices. Norris’s letters and critical essays show him attempting to 
balance a commitment to events and material things as they are with an aesthetic 
commitment to developing interesting and effective textual narrative. His search for a 
form of writing situated between a literal, mimetic form of realism and an epic, inventive 
form of romance makes him an example of what I am calling “constrained realism.” In 
the preceding chapters, I built on Lawrence Buell’s formulation of realism as a corrective 
supplement to constructivism, emphasizing the influence of materiality on textual 
construction and arguing that a commitment to materiality does not preclude stylistic 
innovation, imagination, and aestheticization. Norris’s similarly constrained realism 
recognizes both the potential and value of what George Levine describes as realism’s 
difficult job: “the very hard work of trying to reach beyond words to things as they are” 
(16). Levine’s account of realism looks not to environmental writing but to the American 
Realists in order to consider the difficulties of material representation. Recent scholarship 
on the Realists parallels ecocritical concerns, focusing on the constructed nature of 
“reality” within Realist texts but also acknowledging Realist writers’ commitment to an 
apprehensible real world. Michael Davitt Bell, Amy Kaplan, and George Levine all 
combat reductive definitions of realism and assert, to varying degrees, that Realist 
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thinkers are aware of the role aesthetic tradition played in shaping a text’s sense of 
reality. My emphasis on Norris’s constrained realism is thus consistent with other Realist 
criticism, troubling simplified notions of realist representation and recognizing the 
complex constructions contributing to what Henry James called texts’ “sense of reality” 
(qtd. Bell 79).43 
What I call “constrained realism” Norris called literary naturalism, a model that 
grounded literature in the real while also developing epic narratives. Influenced by the 
work of William Dean Howells and Henry James but unsatisfied with their theories of the 
realistic novel, Norris’s naturalism combined a rejection of the overtly literary with self-
consciousness about the acts of construction constituting the literary text. Like Howells, 
Norris formulates his naturalism as a rejection of the aesthetic.44 As Norris asserted in his 
1897 article “An Opening for Novelists,” “We don’t want fine writing, we want short 
stories” (1114). The distinction he makes figures American literature in opposition to 
European traditions, centering this opposition around the dichotomy of reality and art. 
While European art is depicted as lost in words and tradition, the emerging American art 
for which Norris calls (figured alternately as the literature of the West, of California, or 
of San Francisco) will draw stories from the world of living and material things: 
                                                 
43
 Challenges to simplistic notions of Realism include Levine’s assertion that “Realism makes the 
difficulties of the work of representation inescapably obvious to the writer [. . .] No writer attempting to 
reach beyond words can fail to be struck by the work words do and cannot do, and therefore no such writer 
can fail to recognize the degree to which the creation of illusion is essential to the realist process (16). 
Kaplan asserts a similar Realist self-consciousness, though she blames social factors rather than the 
qualities of language: “Realists show a surprising lack of confidence in the capacity of fiction to reflect a 
solid world ‘out there,’ not because of the inherent slipperiness of signification but because of their distrust 
in the significance of the social. They often assume a world which lacks solidity, and the weightiness of 
descriptive detail – one of the most common characteristics of the realistic text – often appears in inverse 
proportion to a sense of insubstantiality (9). 
 
44
 Aesthetic rejection is evident in Criticism and Fiction, where Howells urges the writer to abandon 
aesthetics in favor of depicting the world directly. In Howells’s vision of realism, “The ‘literary’ is to be 
suppressed in the interest of the ‘real’ and ‘human’; this distinction is absolute, and it lies at the heart of the 
discussion of realism in Criticism and Fiction” (Bell 20). 
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Give us stories now, give us men, strong, brutal men, with red-hot blood 
in 'em, with unleashed passions rampant in 'em, blood and bones and 
viscera in 'em, and women, too, that move and have their being, people 
that love and hate something better now than Vivettes and Perilles and 
Goups. [. . .] It’s the Life that we want, the vigorous, real thing, not the 
curious weaving of words and the polish of literary finish. Damn the 
‘style’ of a story, so long as we get the swing and rush and trample of the 
things that live. (“An Opening for Novelists” 1113-14) 
Norris’s proposed literature lauds stories of “blood and bones and viscera” over “the 
curious weaving of words and the polish of literary finish.” Literary artifice, in contrast to 
true stories, works a “curious” black magic through its “weaving” and its “style.” But true 
stories break through words, becoming as visceral as bodies and things themselves. These 
stories have blood and bones in them, movement and being and life: they have a visceral 
materiality to them that the artist can “grasp” (1113). 
 However, while he endorses the anti-aesthetic tendencies of Howellsian realism, 
Norris’s interest in the constructed nature of textual reality leads him to reject this realism 
as insufficient. Like Howells, Norris believes that writing must avoid the accumulation of 
fact for fact’s sake, but he accuses Howells of this very transgression and mocks 
Howells’s attention to minute social dramas: 
This is the real Realism. It is the smaller details of everyday life, things 
that are likely to happen between lunch and supper, small passions, 
restricted emotions, dramas of the reception-room, tragedies of an 
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afternoon call, crises involving cups of tea. Every one will admit there is 
no romance here. (“Zola as Romantic Writer” 1106) 
Norris’s appeal to romance provides the critical difference between his naturalism and 
Howells’s realism. While wanting to ground his stories in the “things that live,” Norris 
does not believe that all things make for compelling stories. Norris dismisses realism as a 
“harsh, loveless, colorless, blunt tool" (1166). “Realism,” he qualifies, “is very excellent 
so far as it goes, but it goes no farther than the Realist himself can actually see, or 
actually hear. Realism is minute, it is the drama of a broken teacup, the tragedy of a walk 
down the block, the excitement of an afternoon call” (1166). Norris’s naturalism tries to 
see further and see more selectively, choosing from among real things but selecting the 
most dramatic or romantic in order to cultivate literary effect. And when all he could see 
was too minute, he relocated, as when he traveled to the California ranches. Thus, the 
role of the writer is to seek out ideal Truth within material fact; not all factual accounts 
end up making true stories. Rather, like Henry James, Norris contends that reality is an 
effect, a semblance, rather than a direct presentation of what already is.45 Norris’s vision 
of the real, then, pushes the writer to ground himself in the actual but refuses to stay 
confined to documentation. His naturalism provides what Lehan calls an “exercise [. . .] 
in constructed reality” or what Norris calls a “real romance” that selects its stories from 
truth (Lehan 242-43; Octopus 13). 
  
                                                 
45
 According to Bell, James argues that even realist texts can provide a “sense of reality only.” Bell claims, 
“James proposes a version of realism very different from the one Howells sets forth in Criticism and 
Fiction. Unlike Howells, first of all, he insists that even realism gives us not unmediated ‘reality’ but a 
‘sense of reality’--that in fiction ‘reality’ depends not on the truth of the writer's material but on the strength 
of his or her ‘sensibility’ or ‘imagination’” (79). James emphasizes the reality effect of a text as something 
constructed, defining “novelistic ‘reality’ as ‘a concrete image,’ not something reflected but something 
‘produced.’” (qtd. in in Bell 80). 
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“Absolutely True Poetical Expression”: Dual Accountability in The Octopus 
One way of reading Presley’s artistic struggles in The Octopus, then, is as an 
attempt to balance material fact with aesthetic sensibilities, combining the two to convey 
the truth of an increasingly complicated political situation. Presley’s initial frustration 
with the material components of daily life places him too far towards the romantic on 
Norris’s naturalist spectrum. But as his time in the San Joaquin continues, Presley moves 
further from a purely aesthetic understanding of art. While his initial preference for 
expansive landscapes, Homeric poetry, and grand themes cannot encompass the political 
and economic problems he observes, the increasing prominence of the railroad/rancher 
battle in Presley’s daily life forces him to adapt his art. He gradually recognizes the 
drama, romance, and tragedy existing within what at first seemed to be “sordid” and 
“material concerns” (Octopus 12). Thus, Presley changes, into both a nonfiction journal 
writer and a political poet of the people. As Russ Castronovo argues, Presley's story is 
that of 
a young poet turned young socialist who denounces the triumph of 
organized capital by scorning art. [. . .] the novel suggests ‘the people’ will 
be rejuvenated by twin attacks on corporate greed and genteel humanism. 
This counteraesthetic impetus correlates exactly with the young poet’s 
design to politicize the literary in ways that will advance democracy. (163) 
Presley, like Norris, however, does not fully embrace this “counteraesthetic impetus” and 
abandon aestheticism for a pure realism. Indeed, The Octopus’s prognosis regarding the 
political efficacy of art is more tentative than Castronovo suggests. Presley’s successes as 
a political artist are qualified and limited; his eventual decision to abandon art and head 
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east to Asia on board a wheat freighter suggests a total inefficacy of even the most 
political art. But Norris’s own completion of The Octopus hints at a competing thesis: 
that an artwork that acknowledges its own limitations and failures may still be able to 
meaningfully contribute to political, economic, and environmental discourse. While 
Presley fails to reconcile his epic ambitions with the reality of literature’s limitations, 
Norris does achieve an art that manages to depict political situations without disguising 
the failings of the literary. 
While Norris is interested in an art that is both political and material, Presley 
initially imagines art and the world in ways that reproduce the polarized dichotomies 
Latour identifies in the modern constitution, separating language from the material 
(Modern 32). Latour describes the humanities’ purifying impulse as a belief that 
“humanity, morality, subjectivity, or rights are worthwhile only when they have been 
protected from any contact with science, technology, and objectivity” (Pandora 18). In a 
parallel fashion, Presley believes that his poetry is successful only as long as it is 
protected from the “material, sordid, deadly commonplace” economic concerns and daily 
realities of the ranches (12). While he moves to California in hopes of finding a real-
world subject worthy of his poetic representation, he believes that such poetry must 
ignore material concerns. Instead of mobilizing the real world, Presley’s poetry functions 
as projection akin to what phenomenologists, science studies scholars, and ecologists all 
seek to avoid. Presley takes a style of writing, pre-existing within his own mind, and 
attempts to make it fit onto the world. 
From the outset, Presley’s artistic project is troubled by his divided loyalty to 
aesthetic conventions and to material realities. The novel introduces this tension in the 
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opening chapter, as it depicts Presley biking around the San Joaquin Valley, seeking 
escape from the insistently material realities of the ranches and longing for a transcendent 
viewpoint from which he can discover a landscape fit for poetic description. But this 
search reproduces the tension between material reality and poetic convention inherent to 
Presley’s desire for an “absolutely true” form of poetry: 
Just what he wanted, Presley hardly knew. On one hand, it was his 
ambition to portray life as he saw it—directly, frankly, and through no 
medium of personality or temperament. But, on the other hand, as well he 
wished to see everything through a rose-coloured mist [. . .] He had set 
himself the task of giving true, absolutely true poetical expression to the 
life of the ranch, and yet, again and again, he brought up against the 
railroad, that stubborn iron barrier against which his romance shattered 
itself [. . .]. (12-13) 
The phrase “absolutely true poetical expression” captures the paradoxical imperatives 
that Presley struggles to reconcile, also evident in Norris’s criticism: the desire to write 
literary, aesthetically pleasing work in tension with the desire to write from truth. Presley 
initially wants to fulfill “the picture of that huge romantic West that he saw in his 
imagination,” a picture marked by a “great scheme of harmony” (12). However, what 
interrupts this romantic harmony is the “presence of certain immovable facts” (12). The 
facts he cannot escape are the “eternal fierce bickerings between the farmers of the San 
Joaquin and the Pacific and Southwestern Railroad,” arguments that Presley finds 
irritating precisely because they are “material” (12). Presley’s contrasting preference for 
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“harmony” and “the romantic” as opposed to the “material” and the “commonplace” 
suggests that Presley’s vision does not allow the material and the artistic to coexist. 
But it is too simple to argue that Presley begins the novel as a naïve aesthete and 
ends it as a savvy material and political artist. Even his initial artistic preferences position 
him between two poles. On the one hand, he is more aesthetically inclined than ranchers 
such as Annixter and Magnus Derrick, who are actively engaged in economic affairs; on 
the other hand, he is more connected to the material world than Magnus’s wife, Annie, 
who uses art to escape harsh economic realities. Annie Derrick is overwhelmed by “the 
direct brutality of ten thousand acres of wheat, nothing but wheat as far as the eye can 
see” and consequently retreats into an aesthetic world of literary magazines and fine art. 
She is disappointed that Presley’s interests as a poet so rarely overlap with her own 
literary pleasures: 
Presley had disappointed her. That he—outside of his few chosen 
deities—should care little for literature, shocked her beyond words. His 
indifference to ‘style,’ to elegant English, was a positive affront [. . .] His 
‘Song of the West,’ which only once, incoherent and fierce, he had tried to 
explain to her, its swift, tumultuous life, its truth, its nobility and savagery, 
its heroism and obscenity, had revolted her. ‘But, Presley,’ she had 
murmured, ‘that is not literature.’ ‘No,’ he had cried between his teeth, 
‘no, thank God, it is not.’ (61) 
Annie Derrick represents cultivated aestheticism paired with fear of the “ferocious” and 
“masculine” realms of economics and politics. She represents the effeminacy of 
aestheticism and literariness that Norris’s essays scorn. Presley’s work contrasts with her 
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impotent aestheticism from the beginning; even though his poetry is loyal to literary 
traditions such as the epic rather than to observed fact or to economics and politics, his 
work avoids the artificiality, style, and elegance necessary to mark it as “literature.”46 
The Octopus thus, like Norris’s criticism, sets up a spectrum of relationships 
between art and reality. Presley struggles to position himself between, on the one hand, 
the “sordid” and “material” realities of daily life and, on the other hand, the useless 
aestheticism represented by Annie Derrick and the previously discussed San Francisco art 
scene. The San Francisco art fete is the place where Presley’s disdain for literature, while 
reproducing the gendered distinction between literary preferences, also reveals a political 
dimension. Here, Norris repeats his insistence on the uselessness of pure aesthetics: 
The ladies and young girls examined the production with little murmurs of 
admiration, hazarding remembered phrases, searching for the exact 
balance between generous praise and critical discrimination, expressing 
their opinions in the mild technicalities of the Art Books and painting 
classes. They spoke of atmospheric effects, of middle distance, of ‘chiaro-
oscuro,’ of fore-shortening, of the decomposition of light, of the 
subordination of individuality to fidelity of interpretation. (311) 
The narrator of The Octopus dismisses the narrow and “mild” world of the art show as 
politically dangerous; it is an isolated realm where technicality and the quest for socially 
                                                 
46
 Castronovo sets up the contrast between Annie Derrick and Presley in more political terms: “the poet 
renounces traditional aesthetics. Abandoning genteel verse along with the ‘cluttered bric-a-brac and 
meaningless objets d’art’ (371) associated with the feminine world of the landowner’s wife, Presley 
cultivates a counteraesthetic and pens a ‘Socialistic poem’” (394). However, I argue that even before 
Presley’s Socialist leanings begin, his work is contrasted to the art world of Annie Derrick. While socialism 
plays a crucial role in his artistic development, politics are not the sole cause of his anti-aestheticism. 
Rather, from the beginning, Presley’s concern with aesthetics seems specifically focused on issues of the 
relationship between writing and reality. 
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accepted, balanced ideas short-circuit any relationship between art and the external 
world. The art world is 
the Fake, the eternal, irrepressible Sham; glib, nimble, ubiquitous, tricked 
out in all the paraphernalia of imposture, an endless defile of charlatans 
that passed interminably before the gaze of the city, marshalled by ‘lady 
presidents,’ exploited by clubs of women, by literary societies, reading 
circles, and culture organisations. (314) 
As some of the men argue in this scene, the city’s devotion of time and energy to the 
“Fake” and the “Sham” distracts from political pursuits; the railroad donates money to 
the art scene in San Francisco, diverting the attention of the public from elections, 
struggles involving railroad tariffs, and the growing political control of the railroad. 
Presley’s friend Cedarquist asserts that “‘Shelgrim [the railroad’s manager] promotes 
your fairs, not only as Pres says, because it is money in his pocket, but because it amuses 
the people, distracts their attention from the doings of his railroad’” (317). As the 
argument between Presley and Hartrath develops, two possibilities emerge: the 
materialization of art and the subsequent mobilization of its political power, or the 
separation of material concerns from art and the preservation of a pure aesthetic realm. 
To validate art, according to this logic, must be to reclaim it and use it to battle 
commercialization and trickery. But Hartrath retorts with his question: “‘If the poets 
become materialised, Mr. Presley, [. . .] what can we say to the people?’” (317). 
This is the question that Presley’s own development as an artist plays out, and it is 
his desire to achieve materialization while still speaking to the people that pushes him to 
 145 
 
pursue a kind of writing that he classifies as “real romance” (13).47 But Presley’s initial 
disdain for daily details points to one of the difficulties of representing the material: it’s 
boring. As Dana Phillips points out in his own critique of recent realist trends in 
ecocriticism, detailed depictions of daily life lack imaginative power and as a result 
potentially lack ethical impetus.48 The monotony of ranch life drives Presley’s initial 
disgust as he attempts to write his epic: “These uncouth brutes of farmhands and petty 
ranchers, grimed with the soil they worked upon, were odious to him beyond words” (5). 
Presley’s disdain for life’s material details (its grime, soil, and pettiness) mirrors Norris’s 
critical frustration with the small scope of realism. What changes Presley’s dismissive 
attitude is an ability to recognize the violent potential within the railroad – and to 
recognize such violence as its own kind of universal epic. Presley’s stay on the San 
Joaquin ranches coincides with the escalation of conflict between the fictional Pacific and 
Southwestern Railroad and the San Joaquin ranchers over land ownership and land 
prices. This conflict’s growth from a minor economic concern to a fatal gun battle and the 
eviction of ranching tenants forces Presley to relocate the drama of Western romance 
from open range to economic, capitalist battles, making it possible for Presley to hang on 
to his competing commitments to accuracy and romance. But what really changes in The 
Octopus and makes the story of the rancher/railroad conflict more than a recasting of 
Western gunfighter mythology is Presley’s simultaneous shift from writing a mythology 
of landscapes and metaphor to a mythology of material conflict. 
                                                 
47
 Presley expresses this “real romance” directly in response to his own disdain towards daily life: “He 
searched for the True Romance, and, in the end, found grain rates and unjust freight tariffs. ‘But the stuff is 
here,’ he muttered, as he sent his wheel rumbling across the bridge over Broderson Creek. ‘The romance, 
the real romance, is here somewhere. I'll get hold of it yet’”(13). 
 
48
 In The Truth of Ecology, Phillips rejects Lawrence Buell’s argument for realist environmental writing. 
He claims, “Realistic depiction of the world, of the sort that we can credit as reasonable and 
uncontroversial, is one of literature’s most pedestrian, least artful aspects” (8). 
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The materialization of Presley’s romance begins in perhaps the most critically 
famous scene in The Octopus. At the moment when Presley comes closest to achieving 
his initially conceived epic poem, a collision between a locomotive and some sheep 
forces him to reconsider the abstract nature of his envisioned work. This scene literalizes 
the collision of literary aestheticism with the material presence of the railroad. A number 
of critics, including Leo Marx in his influential The Machine in the Garden: Technology 
and the Pastoral Ideal in America, have read this scene as an example of a trope called 
pastoral interruption. Prior to the collision, Presley feels inspired by the pastoral Western 
landscape, complete with sheep and epic vistas, and consequently experiences a moment 
of aesthetic idealism, thinking his poetic inspiration has occurred: 
Ha! There it was, his epic, his inspiration, his West, his thundering 
progression of hexameters. [. . .] Terrible, formless shapes, vague figures, 
gigantic, monstrous, distorted, whirled at a gallop through his imagination 
[. . .] Never had he so nearly grasped his inspiration as at that moment on 
the hill-top. Even now, though the sunset was fading, though the wide 
reach of valley was shut from sight, it still kept him company. Now the 
details came thronging back—the component parts of his poem, the signs 
and symbols of the West. (46-7) 
Latour’s conception of the modern constitution provides another way of reading this 
scene. Presley’s poetic inspiration in this moment is actually a hybrid, using observation 
to generate tropes for his poetry. But Presley attempts to re-purify the categories of 
material and textual in the aftermath of his inspiration, erasing his own mediating 
presence and erasing the very landscape itself. While Presley believes the earth itself 
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inspires his epic poem, the poem he imagines and the vision of the landscape he retains 
remain general and abstract. The world he observes has no concreteness, just “formless 
shapes” and “vague figures.” While “the details” of the scene supposedly come back to 
Presley as he ponders his poem, the novel does not describe such details. The reader has 
no idea what the valley looks like, for it becomes invisible to Presley as the sun goes 
down and the “valley was shut from sight.” The darkening landscape signals a literal 
erasure of any mediations between the world and the nascent poem, completing a re-
purification that returns to a basic word/world dichotomy. Thus, the “component parts” of 
Presley’s epic poem are not, in the end, any particular material qualities of the San 
Joaquin, but rather abstract “signs and symbols of the West” recycled as conventional 
writing. The physical description of the landscape omits detail and physical qualities, 
figuring the landscape as empty, “accentuated by stillness” and “exuding silence.” Even 
the material qualities of the earth – its food production, implied in Presley’s dramatic 
descriptions of the land as “nourisher of nations” and “feeder of an eternal world” – are 
recast on a scale so global as to become abstract. While Presley experiences “physical 
exultation” as he looks out on the earth, none of that exultation derives from observable 
physical qualities. 
 This is also the moment when language overwhelms Presley’s observations. He 
exclaims, “There it was, his epic, his inspiration, his West, his thundering progression of 
hexameters” (46). As he overlooks the San Joaquin Valley, he believes he has observed 
truth as readily apparent as the materiality of a bootjack or a lamp post. He believes the 
earth itself provides him with an epic poem. However, as he imagines the poem he will 
write, he talks in the abstractions of “[s]tupendous ideas for which there were no names,” 
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“[t]errible, formless shapes,” and “vague figures” (46-7). His imaginative erasure of the 
mediating steps translating between the world and imagination allows him to lose himself 
in “stupendous ideas.” Such erasures and such immersion perpetuate his fragmented 
approach to poetry: from the novel’s opening, Presley approaches the world with a set 
notion of what he will find. His quest for poetic inspiration is really a search for a set of 
conditions to match his pre-existing, abstract vision of the West. This subjective 
projection makes the pastoral fantasy Marx identifies possible, positing a real world 
while subsuming material observation to a predominantly cultural fantasy. 
But at this moment, when the fulfillment of aesthetic pastoral convention elides 
material details and reduces the land to a Western archetype, the material reality of the 
railroad asserts itself and shatters Presley’s romance. A flock of sheep that have 
wandered out onto the railroad tracks are run over by a locomotive. Just as the daily 
material difficulties of railroad conflict interrupted Presley’s earlier quest for poetic 
inspiration, now the unforgivingly material locomotive interrupts his aesthetic fantasy. 
The “reek of hot oil” and “the clamour of its iron hooves” draw Presley out of a primarily 
visual and linguistic relationship to his surroundings, engaging his other senses and 
creating a multidimensional experience of the real. Such an experience is grotesque and 
painful: 
The pathos of it was beyond expression. It was a slaughter [. . .] The black 
blood, winking in the starlight, seeped down into the clinkers between the 
ties with a prolonged sucking murmur. Presley turned away, horror-struck, 
sick at heart, overwhelmed with a quick burst of irresistible compassion 
for this brute agony he could not relieve. The sweetness was gone from the 
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evening, the sense of peace, of security, and placid contentment was 
stricken from the landscape. The hideous ruin in the engine's path drove 
all thought of his poem from his mind. The inspiration vanished like a 
mist. The de Profundis had ceased to ring. (50) 
For Leo Marx, this collision scene exemplifies the pastoral interruption mentioned 
earlier, the iconic moment in American literature, where the modern and the 
technological abruptly interrupt individual pastoral reverie. Such interruption of the 
pastoral by the technological, Marx argues, is actually part of the pastoral experience in 
American romance; the moment of intrusion and loss only highlights the contrasting 
pastoral peace. But in this instance, the pastoral interruption occurs on two levels, since 
this is a fictional scene about an artist rather than a nonfictional account of individual 
experience. Presley is not just trying to experience a pastoral moment but also to put 
himself into a pastoral aesthetic framework in order to write an epic American romance. 
The railroad is not just a jarring noise within an otherwise harmonious sonic landscape; it 
is a force whose presence interrupts the aesthetic process and forces Presley to give up 
his working definition of poetry. The interruption in this case is not just of a pastoral 
landscape but of pastoralism as a literary mode. By undermining Presley’s pastoral 
experience as an aesthetic mode, the collision brings him back from symbolic abstraction 
to material reality with a resounding smash. He cannot experience the landscape 
distantly, as a disembodied artist, when confronted with the sounds of dying sheep. Yet 
while Presley confronts the limits of his abstract aesthetic aspirations, the text of The 
Octopus benefits from the abstractable, symbolic power of the railroad collision scene. 
The novel thus re-aestheticizes Presley’s experience, simultaneously insisting on its 
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material reality and its symbolic significance. Even as the text of the novel progresses 
into ever more poetic language and reincorporates the train’s passing into melodrama, 
Presley’s poetic inspiration vanishes. In place of an empty landscape exuding mists and 
silences, broken bodies exuding “blinking blood” and horrifying moans appear. 
On the one hand, then, Marx’s reading fits The Octopus and the scene can best be 
understood as a struggle between psychic states – between peaceful reflection and violent 
conflict, between an aesthetically pleasing scene and a grotesque scene. But Marx insists 
that the ability of the pastoral experience to re-incorporate technological interruption 
suggests that trains like the one depicted here are primarily symbolic of society and 
technology, not indicators of material concerns. He argues, “it must not be thought that 
our writers necessarily use the image of the machine to direct attention to the historic fact 
of industrialization” (“Kingdoms” 80). However, aesthetic revulsion is not Presley’s only 
response. The presence of the train does cause him to think about the railroad's material 
expansiveness: the amount of country it covers, the number of places it connects, and 
indirectly, the expanse of its economic effects and transformations. The locomotive’s 
collision with the sheep also pushes Presley to reimagine the expansiveness of the West, 
not as a limitless spread of color and shape, but as the interconnection of points of 
exchange linked by industrial development: 
faint and prolonged, across the levels of the ranch, he heard the engine 
whistling for Bonneville. Again and again, at rapid intervals in its flying 
course, it whistled for road crossings, for sharp curves, for trestles; 
ominous notes, hoarse, bellowing, ringing with the accents of menace and 
defiance; and abruptly Presley saw again, in his imagination, the galloping 
 151 
 
monster, the terror of steel and steam, with its single eye, cyclopean, red, 
shooting from horizon to horizon; but saw it now as the symbol of a vast 
power, huge, terrible, flinging the echo of its thunder over all the reaches 
of the valley, leaving blood and destruction in its path; the leviathan, with 
tentacles of steel clutching into the soil, the soulless Force, the iron-
hearted power, the monster, the Colossus, the Octopus. (51) 
Like Thoreau measuring the ponds, Presley here imagines the railroad as a symbol 
precisely as he becomes more deeply aware of its material reality, imagining specific 
geographical features as well as symbolic aesthetic effects. Thus, the scene balances, on 
the one hand, a material specificity associated with industrial development and, on the 
other hand, a new naturalist abstraction that reimagines material conditions in terms of 
force. 
Within the narrative, the train forces Presley to see the environment as more 
concretely real than the silent San Joaquin he previously imagined. As the locomotive 
knits the previously vague expanse together into a mappable network of specific points, 
each with its own concrete economic concerns, the West also becomes concrete. At the 
same time, the figuration of the railroad as “The Octopus” provides an epic specter vague 
enough to inherit the menace and mystery of Presley’s Western mythology. As “The 
Octopus,” the railroad and the West it is spreading across function as both “the symbol of 
a vast power” and as insistently material, “steel clutching into the soil,” with the railroad 
both an abstraction of “soulless Force” and the material reality of “steel and steam.” 
There is an insistent materiality to these symbols, embodied in roaring noises, sparks, 
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steam, steel, and iron. The encounter with the railroad thus cultivates an epic myth of the 
West from the historically and materially specific. 
Presley’s encounter thus suggests that the writer should not give up pursuing the 
symbolic or the epic, but rather that he must ground the epic in the material. The first 
chapter of The Octopus thus enacts Norris’s naturalist theories, using the real to access a 
larger vision of the romantic rather than limiting the real to fit preexisting literary 
conventions. The collision with the locomotive challenges Presley’s preference for 
abstraction and primes him to see the epic in events he previously dismissed as dull and 
material. But this startling collision also leaves him at a loss for ways to write about the 
West. Struggling to find a new method of writing rooted in material realities, he must 
also discover how to capture the drama of romance. Consequently, Presley spends a large 
portion of the novel going back and forth between two different kinds of writing: a 
politically inspired journal and socialist poetry. 
“These Things I Have Seen”: The Romance of the [Material] Real 
Throughout the rest of The Octopus, changes in the material conditions of the San 
Joaquin correlate to changes in Presley’s writing. The train’s bloody collision with the 
sheep foreshadows the violent conflict between the ranchers and the railroad; the 
collision’s disruption of Presley’s abstract, epic poem anticipates his later, more political 
writing. Now the conflict that has lingered ominously but vaguely in the background of 
his poetic work moves to the foreground. All of Presley’s friends, including Magnus 
Derrick, the owner of the ranch on which he is staying, are ranchers who have spent 
significant money improving San Joaquin lands owned by the railroad, operating on the 
assumption that land prices will eventually be set towards the low end of the range 
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advertised on the railroad’s publicity fliers. With the summer promising an epic wheat 
harvest, many of the ranchers are poised to make up debts or to accumulate sufficient 
profit to purchase their lands. 
However, as the harvest nears, the railroad company announces prices 
significantly higher than the ranchers anticipated, telling them it will sell to other buyers 
should these prices not be met. Facing bankruptcy and eviction, the ranchers gather in 
Annixter’s harness room and decide to form a League to defend their land against the 
railroad. Caught up in these political events, Presley abandons his poetry and explicitly 
rejects his former disdain towards economic concerns: 
There had been a day when the affairs and grievances of the farmers of his 
acquaintance—Magnus, Annixter, Osterman, and old Broderson—had 
filled him only with disgust. His mind full of a great, vague epic poem of 
the West, he had kept himself apart, disdainful of what he chose to 
consider their petty squabbles. But the scene in Annixter’s harness room 
had thrilled and uplifted him. He was palpitating with excitement all 
through the succeeding months. He had abandoned the idea of an epic 
poem. In six months he had not written a single verse. Day after day he 
trembled with excitement as the relations between the Trust and League 
became more and more strained. He saw the matter in its true light. It was 
typical. It was the world-old war between Freedom and Tyranny [. . .]. 
(307) 
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Following the formation of the League, Presley’s aesthetic taste shifts to mirror his 
changing political leanings.49 Instead of seeing only “sordid” and “material” conflicts in 
the battle between the Trust and the League, he now recognizes the epic potential of a 
clash between “Freedom and Tyranny.”50 
 In the aftermath of the League’s formation, Presley’s sudden interest in “living 
issues,” combined with his self-professed need to “find expression,” drives him to 
experiment with journal writing, nonfiction essays, and political poetry: 
he must find expression. He felt that he would suffocate otherwise. He had 
begun to keep a journal. As the inclination spurred him, he wrote down his 
thoughts and ideas in this, sometimes every day, sometimes only three or 
four times a month. Also he flung aside his books of poems—Milton, 
Tennyson, Browning, even Homer—and addressed himself to Mill, 
Malthus, Young, Poushkin, Henry George, Schopenhauer. (307-08) 
Presley’s transformation into a journal writer represents a new attempt to maintain dual 
loyalties to artistic sensibility and to being “unflinchingly true” (12). He maintains his 
commitment to “portray life as he saw it” (12). However, his journal writing emerges 
from within a written tradition, too; he reads political philosophers in place of poets. But 
his failure as a writer continues. Whereas his pursuit of an epic poem left him writing 
within “a mist that dulled all harsh outlines, all crude and violent colors,” his foray as a 
                                                 
49
 Castronovo’s article provides a more detailed analysis of how The Octopus imagines politics in strictly 
aesthetic terms, seeing the work of the [Populist] artist as cultivating a taste for the common-man and the 
people.  
 
50
 The second novel of the Wheat Trilogy, The Pit, depicts a similar re-evaluation of art and material 
concerns. Laura, the protagonist of The Pit, initially dismisses economic concerns as sordid, material 
distractions from art. However, Laura changes her understanding of art after a dramatic discussion about 
the wheat trading pits breaks out in the interludes at an opera, causing Laura to experience economic 
conflict as its own kind of “drama and tragedy and death” that “invaded the very sanctuary of art” (The Pit 
40). 
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journal writer focuses only on the violent colors, leaving him uselessly nervous (12). But 
his failure is not so much in style or form as in his torn commitment to abstraction and to 
things as they are. Thus, although writing in a new way, Presley hangs on to his vision of 
the epic, merely replacing the vague notion of “the West” with vague notions of “the 
People” and “Social Injustice”: 
He attacked the subject of Social Inequality with unbounded enthusiasm. 
He devoured, rather than read, and emerged from the affair, his mind a 
confused jumble of conflicting notions, sick with over-effort, raging 
against injustice and oppression, and with not one sane suggestion as to 
remedy or redress. (308) 
While Presley continues to experience his surroundings as abstractions and to filter his 
experiences through books, his immersion in writing still fails to provide useful tools 
with which to respond to the escalating conflict of the San Joaquin. 
Yet failure to solve the problems of the San Joaquin are not solely due to his 
overly literary framing. Presley’s failures point to the circumscribed power Norris 
accorded the literary work. When asked about his intended Wheat Trilogy, “if I shall 
attempt any solution of the [trust] problem,” Norris replied, “I hardly think so. The 
novelist - by nature - can hardly be a political economist; and it is to the latter rather than 
to the former that one must look for a way out of the ‘present discontents’” (qtd. 
McElrath and Crisler 401). As McElrath and Crisler conclude, “The most Norris could do 
in The Octopus was to picture the historical and present situations in California as he 
understood them’ (McElrath and Crisler 401).51 According to Norris’s own assessment, 
                                                 
51
 The text of the letters quoted here is taken from Jesse Crisler’s collection, Frank Norris: Collected 
Letters. 
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the literary artist is not to provide “sane suggestions [. . .] to remedy” with regards to 
social ills but to provide instead an accurate depiction that accounts for material facts and 
the limitations of perspective while telling a compelling story. Writing may provide a 
“means of expression” that allows the writer to process emotional responses, political 
sentiments, and observations, but it cannot solve the problems it describes – and, in 
attempting to do so, it will fail as surely as Presley’s journal writing. 
While Norris is skeptical of literature’s prescriptive potential, the futility of 
Presley’s journal does not lie in his decision to write instead of act. For in The Octopus, 
action is equally futile. Late in the novel, Presley makes several failed attempts to 
become an anarchist, going so far as to bomb the railroad manager S. Behrman’s house. 
He does not kill Behrman or do significant damage, rendering his political action as 
ineffective as his writing. As Castronovo analyzes Presley’s ineffectiveness: 
Fed up with poetry, the poet turns anarchist and attempts a synthesis of 
counteraesthetics and revolution. Where he once moped about the 
landscape seeking inspiration, he now delivers impassioned speeches 
denouncing a monopoly that feeds on ‘the People’; where he once wrote 
verse, he now tosses a pipe bomb into the dining room of a railroad 
official. His reaction against aesthetics seems complete. Still, something 
remains missing from these incendiary acts. What they lack, The Octopus 
implies, is poetry. (173-74) 
While Castronovo dismisses this melding of poetry and political activism as naïve, I 
believe that The Octopus imagines this mixture as the only possibility for even qualified 
representational success. Just as Presley’s initial pure aestheticism disconnects him from 
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the people and from the environment, his acts of anarchist violence leave him desperate 
and depressed. The only successful artistic or political act depicted in The Octopus is 
Presley’s socialist poem, “The Toilers,” which, while not a perfect artwork, succeeds at 
least in raising political consciousness and expressing Presley’s emotions. 
 “The Toilers” thus achieves Presley’s vision of a “romance of the real,” 
combining epic poetry and aesthetic conventions with material documentation in order to 
create a compelling text: 
His writing had by this time undergone a complete change. The notes for 
his great Song of the West, the epic poem he once had hoped to write he 
had flung aside, together with all the abortive attempts at its beginning. 
Also he had torn up a great quantity of ‘fugitive’ verses, preserving only a 
certain half-finished poem, that he called ‘The Toilers.’ This poem was a 
comment upon the social fabric, and had been inspired by the sight of a 
painting he had seen in Cedarquist’s art gallery. He had written all but the 
last verse. (371) 
Presley’s poetry is inspired by the “living issues” of his time, by artistic convention, and 
by poetic skill. Presley’s draft of “The Toilers” exists in a mediating state between the 
material conditions of Presley’s time and the world of art. While the “social fabric” 
drives Presley from epic to socialist poetry, this poem finds equal inspiration in an 
artwork. In Cedarquist’s gallery, the very “fake” and “sham” art that Presley rejects as 
complicit with railroad trickery inspires his own political poem, a work challenging the 
growing power of the railroad trusts. The ambiguous origins of Presley’s poem point to 
the complexity of connecting the real and the literary. As McElrath and Crisler point out, 
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“while Norris conceived of himself as writing from real life in The Octopus, Presley's 
only literary accomplishment is a poem he derives not from life but secondhand from 
another work of art picturing the economically oppressed” (400).52 
But “The Toilers” is derived not only from another work of art but from a 
combination of “living issues” and art. Significantly, while the poem may be based on a 
painting, Presley does not complete it until his friend Dyke is bankrupted by an 
unexpected increase in freight tariffs and, as a result, these “living issues” inspire 
Presley’s angered expression: 
He too ‘saw red’; a mighty spirit of revolt heaved tumultuous within him. 
It did not seem possible that this outrage could go on much longer. The 
oppression was incredible; the plain story of it set down in truthful 
statement of fact would not be believed by the outside world. (371) 
By combining material representation and aesthetic influence, “The Toilers” serves as an 
example of a potentially superior art form as opposed to the sham art of the San Francisco 
aesthetes, a genuine response to changing material conditions. In order for the outrage to 
be believable, it must be written in a form other than straightforward narration. Like 
Thoreau, then, Presley faces an ethical conundrum bound up with aesthetic and stylistic 
concerns. While writing is a limited form that leaves him “sick with over-effort,” it is 
also the only form that can make sense of the political struggle and make it believable. 
This believability stems from “The Toilers” engagement in a network of material 
facts, mobilized and synthesized through Presley’s journaling project and his 
                                                 
52
 The layers of reality and literary reference go deeper. Presley bases his poem on a painting that he sees; 
and Norris bases Presley’s poem on a real-life poem derived from art: “Norris draws on a historical 
collision of the ‘literary’ and the popular by basing Presley’s socialist ode on Edward Markham’s ‘The 
Man with the Hoe’ (1899), a populist poem written ‘after seeing Millet’s World-Famous Painting’ (5)” 
(Castronovo 175).  
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participation in the unfolding events of the San Joaquin. While his imagined Great Song 
of the West worked hard to erase its material origins in order to minimize points of 
aesthetic inconsistency, Presley’s journaling project engaged him in a process of 
observation, writing, and response. Presley’s journal became a self-conscious hybrid: in 
place of a man on a hillside lost in thought and closing his eyes to the landscape before 
him, the journal features a self-conscious observer claiming, “These things, I have seen 
them” (538). Thus, while “The Toilers” repeats the elevated language of his first epic 
moment on the San Joaquin hillside, the context producing the poem differs significantly 
through its incorporation of both observation and aesthetics: 
As his prose grew more exalted, it passed easily into the domain of poetry. 
Soon the cadence of his paragraphs settled to an ordered beat and rhythm, 
and in the end Presley had thrust aside his journal and was once more 
writing verse. He picked up his incomplete poem of ‘The Toilers,’ read it 
hastily a couple of times to catch its swing, then the Idea of the last verse--
the Idea for which he so long had sought in vain—abruptly springing to 
his brain, wrote it off without so much as replenishing his pen with ink. 
(372) 
The ease with which Presley finishes the poem makes it seem, for one minute, as though 
he has achieved a total escape from aesthetics, resulting in a direct representation of the 
San Joaquin struggle against the injustice of the railroad. But while Presley attributes his 
artistic success to a burgeoning love “for the People” that replaces his initial “vast, vague 
impersonal Song of the West,” these People become meaningful to him only through his 
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close connection to Dyke, an individual person who connects Presley to the sensible 
world (372-73). 
The narrator also carefully reminds the reader that the final poem is a complicated 
construction, combining aesthetic concerns, individual affect, political commitments, and 
particular events. Norris thus undercuts simplistic visions of literary and political 
representation by drawing attention to the craft and revision necessary to the poem’s 
creation: 
Then the artist in him reasserted itself. He became more interested in his 
poem, as such, than in the cause that had inspired it. He went over it again, 
retouching it carefully, changing a word here and there, and improving its 
rhythm. For the moment, he forgot the People, forgot his rage, his 
agitation of the previous hour, he remembered only that he had written a 
great poem. (372-73) 
Here, Presley’s artistic processes are not imagined as mobilizing networks but as an 
oscillation between purely aesthetic concerns and a more engaged relationship with “the 
cause” inspiring his work. But even given Presley’s ability to isolate aesthetics from the 
material conditions inspiring him, we see him moving towards the “materialized” art that 
Hartrath derided, creating art that responds to and consequently influences the material 
world. 
The material and rhetorical effects of his poem are mixed. While “The Toilers” 
earns Presley both fame and derision as a “materialized” poet of the people, it is also co-
opted for advertising and art shows: 
 161 
 
Presley's Socialistic poem, ‘The Toilers,’ had an enormous success. The 
editor of the Sunday supplement of the San Francisco paper to which it 
was sent, printed it in Gothic type, with a scare-head title so decorative as 
to be almost illegible [. . .] It was discussed, attacked, defended, eulogised, 
ridiculed. It was praised with the most fulsome adulation; assailed with the 
most violent condemnation. Editorials were written upon it. Special 
articles, in literary pamphlets, dissected its rhetoric and prosody. The 
phrases were quoted,—were used as texts for revolutionary sermons, 
reactionary speeches. (394) 
This passage points to the simultaneous danger and potential of a hybrid, materialized 
poetry. The danger of such poetry is its ability to be co-opted as simply an aesthetic 
object, its political message and material origins elided. While “the plain story” of the 
railroad’s offenses lacks mobilizable political meaning, the move towards stylistic 
writing can also make the truth indiscernible. The printed title of the poem, “so 
decorative as to be almost illegible,” points to this potential for aesthetic obfuscation. 
Whereas genuine outrage at real events fuels Presley’s writing, the decorative nature of 
the poem causes it to be treated little differently from the paintings in Cedarquist’s 
gallery. Like the women exclaiming over artistic terms while looking at the paintings, 
critics of Presley’s poem comment only upon “its rhetoric and prosody.” However, the 
poem also has a political impact, fueling “revolutionary sermons” and “reactionary 
speeches” and ultimately inspiring Mrs. Cedarquist and a number of the San Francisco 
elite to organize and send ships of grain to the famine-stricken lands of India. 
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Thus, the materialization of poetry has material consequences, though the novel is 
skeptical about the political efficacy of Presley’s writing. Presley’s poem does nothing to 
prevent the deaths of his friends at the hands of the railroad; conversely, following their 
deaths, language breaks down for him. His attempts at public oration leave the audience 
silent; his attempts to respond in his journal deteriorate into simple recitations of fact: 
“‘Dabney dead, Hooven dead, Harran dead, Annixter dead, Broderson dead, Osterman 
dying, S. Behrman alive, successful; the Railroad in possession of Quien Sabe. I saw 
them shot’” (537-38). Finally, Presley abandons his writing, taking passage on a wheat 
ship bearing the San Joaquin harvest and bound for Asia. Within the confines of the 
novel, then, writing fails as a political and ethical tool. 
But if writing fails Presley, it is because he again slips away from the balance of 
epic framing and material grounding that would make his writing effective. By the 
novel’s end, he has returned to his initial abstract conceptions of landscape and a still-
abstractly epic understanding of the events he observed, as we see in the aestheticized 
landscape that frames his departure on the Swanhilda (649-652). As he looks over the 
mountains, he slips back into a distanced appreciation of landscape paired with abstract 
philosophical reflection on “[t]he larger view” which allows him to ignore his friends’ 
deaths, focusing instead on a vague “Truth that will, in the end, prevail” (652). With his 
hybrid representations of wheat and railroads as equally material and symbolic things, 
Norris clearly did not buy into any strict definition of realism. But perhaps Presley does. 
His departure on the Swanhilda – his literal disappearance into the international flow of 
exchange economies – points to a poet that has given up materialization along with 
writing. 
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If we read Presley’s complex relationship to material realities and to literary 
representation as a response to Hartrath’s question – as an exploration of what happens 
when poets become materialized – we discover an ambiguous answer. On the one hand, 
Presley’s final despair about writing, his decision to leave California, and his retreat into 
distanced, aesthetic relationships to landscape and to historical events suggests a 
pessimistic view of even materialized writing. Should a poet become materialized, he 
may well become despondent as art ceases to be a retreat from the harsh conditions 
accompanying turn-of-the-century America’s industrial transformation. On the other 
hand, Presley’s temporary success with the creation of “The Toilers” suggests the 
powerful potential of materialized representation. While we as present day readers may 
find the fleet of wheat ships, bound for India and inspired by Presley’s poem, to be a 
troubling example of expanding American imperial and industrial power, these ships also 
indicate the potential for poetic efficacy. By appealing to the things that he sees, Presley 
taps into the power of material representation, highlighting the double-edged potential of 
such appeals that we also saw in this project’s introductory analysis of oil commercials. 
The rhetoric of material appeals that can function as a powerful critique of developing 
industrial systems can also legitimate such systems’ continuation. The ethically 
ambiguous ending of The Octopus thus points us back to the dilemmas of political 
ecology Latour describes in his analysis of the modern constitution, insisting that an 
attention to material things is a necessary beginning for but will not automatically 
generate right political or ethical action. While poetry based in the material conditions of 
California can counter the dematerializing “melting into air” of a transnational system of 
railroad and ship exchange, it does not automatically generate anti-trust sentiment. The 
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hard difficulty of this political reality is what fuels Presley’s despair and the ambiguous 
ending of The Octopus. 
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CHAPTER V 
“THE SUBSTANCE OF REMEMBERING”: MATERIALITY, HYBRIDITY, AND 
HISTORY IN WILLIAM FAULKNER’S GO DOWN, MOSES AND ABSALOM, 
ABSALOM! 
Once there was—Do you mark how the wistaria, sun-impacted on this 
wall here, distills and penetrates this room as though (light-unimpeded) by 
secret and attritive progress from mote to mote of obscurity’s myriad 
components? That is the substance of remembering—sense, sight, smell: 
the muscles with which we see and hear and feel—not mind, not thought: 
there is no such thing as memory: the brain recalls just what the muscles 
grope for: no more, no less: and its resultant sum is usually incorrect and 
false and worthy only of the name of dream. 
William Faulkner, Absalom, Absalom! 
 
The word ‘substance’ does not designate what ‘remains beneath,’ 
impervious to history, but what gathers together a multiplicity of agents 
into a stable and coherent whole. A substance is more like the thread that 
holds the pearls of a necklace together than the rock bed that remains the 
same no matter what is built on it. In the same way that accurate reference 
qualifies a type of smooth and easy circulation, substance is a name that 
designates the stability of an assemblage. 
Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science 
Studies 
 
 In the first epigraph cited above, Rosa Coldfield pauses in the midst of 
reminiscing to muse on the nature of memory. Her own memories remain fixed on her 
brother-in-law Thomas Sutpen and his children, a family destroyed by the Civil War and 
by their own secrets. Absalom, Absalom! mirrors her obsession, following a handful of 
characters as they attempt to recreate the historical rise and fall of the Sutpen family from 
fragmented narratives and scraps of documentary evidence. Few facts remain from 
Sutpen’s history, and it falls to Rosa’s one listener, the young Quentin Compson, to 
combine the pieces he gleans from Miss Rosa, from public knowledge, and from his own 
father in order to explain the Sutpens’ post-bellum collapse. Quentin knows that Sutpen 
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created a huge plantation on the outskirts of Jefferson, Quentin’s own hometown, and 
that Sutpen lost this plantation after the war. He knows that Sutpen married Miss Rosa’s 
sister, Ellen, and had two children with her, Judith and Henry; he knows that Henry killed 
Judith’s alleged fiancé Charles Bon. He knows that Sutpen fought as a colonel in the 
Civil War, that he lost all his land in the Reconstruction years, and that he was eventually 
murdered by his squatter neighbor, Wash Jones. Aside from these facts, Quentin’s only 
evidence comes from oral conjecture such as Miss Rosa’s and from a handful of artifacts: 
an unsigned letter Judith gave to Quentin’s grandmother; the Sutpen gravestones in a 
grove of cedars; the crumbling Sutpen mansion. Yet from these stories and these artifacts, 
Quentin – and Miss Rosa, and Quentin’s father, Mr. Compson – dream of recreating a 
true story, something more substantial than the “incorrect” and “false” “dream” that Rosa 
describes. 
Absalom thus locates historical narrative and memory in the space between fiction 
and nonfiction, and between materiality and language. The novel explores constraints on 
the construction of memory and history, recognizing the role that human language and 
culture play in shaping these narratives while also insisting on their foundation in a “real” 
world. These tensions between materiality and language play out in Miss Rosa’s musings 
cited above. Her own life of bitter remembering has left her hungry for historical truth 
that can transcend memory’s contingency. While she remains skeptical of memory’s 
reliability, she also imagines memory as something other than mere “mind” or “thought.” 
She interrupts the fairy tale invocation, the “Once there was” of her story, by drawing 
attention to the material conditions of wisteria, sun, and dust that surround her and 
Quentin, even as she contemplates the now-absent material world that surrounded Judith, 
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Henry, Sutpen, and Bon. This juxtaposition of the present world’s immediacy and the 
past world’s absence gives the word “was” a paradoxical sense. On the one hand, “was” 
implies a once-existing presence; as Miss Rosa tells her tale of Sutpen’s Hundred, she 
insists that “once there was” a material world which the Sutpens could “see and hear and 
feel” (143). But on the other hand, the past tense of “was” suggests the transience of 
materiality. Quentin’s and Miss Rosa’s muscles grope without success to reach for the 
Sutpen’s Hundred of the 1860s. In Miss Rosa’s vision, memory reaches at once for what 
one body could perceive and what another body can never perceive. Memory constitutes 
an ephemeral approach to a once-material world of bodies and things that has been 
reduced to almost-perceptible dust: “obscurity’s myriad components.” As a result of this 
ephemeral quality, Miss Rosa fears that human memory of the past can never reach any 
conclusion that is not simply a “dream.” 
Yet  the process of memory Miss Rosa imagines is less abstract than what one 
might expect from a mere dream. Rosa recognizes one potential path for memory’s 
success: an accumulation of knowledge (via “distill[ation]” and “attriti[on]”) based on 
what few “components” of the past can be groped towards by the human body and mind. 
She reimagines memory as a liminal process situated like dust and shadows in the space 
between the present material world and the immaterial past. Thus, for Miss Rosa, there is 
an undeniable “substance of remembering,” a tangibility translated from the material 
world that differentiates memory from fiction. Memory is “not mind, not thought” alone, 
but rather an embodied process of seeing, hearing, and smelling (143). Memory is thus a 
“groping” that pushes against the division between mind and thing as the body reaches 
out towards the world around it. In language similar to Merleau-Ponty’s 
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phenomenological description of sensory perception, Miss Rosa imagines memory as 
struggling to draw together a material world, a sensing human body, and a synthesizing 
human mind.53 Why, then, given Merleau-Ponty’s optimistic assessment of perception as 
granting humans access to a true knowledge of the world and given Miss Rosa’s similarly 
sophisticated understanding of memory as a synthesis, does she finally conclude that 
memory can only be a “false” groping for an elusive world, doomed by its very nature to 
failed status as “only [. . .] dream”? 
 Quentin Compson also struggles with “the substance of remembering.” Absalom 
begins with Miss Rosa’s memory but becomes an account of Quentin’s attempt to make 
historical meaning via storytelling. Listening to Miss Rosa and Mr. Compson share their 
takes on the Sutpen legend, Quentin attempts to corral these competing accounts and 
connect them to the world he sees. By examining material artifacts and listening to 
stories, Quentin also attempts to unite a world split into dichotomies of past and present, 
material and immaterial, story and reality. This reading conflicts with a critical tradition 
that associates Quentin with language, a loss of referentiality, and idealism. Joel 
Williamson makes one version of this argument, claiming, “Quentin was given almost 
totally to idealism. He was so consumed by his passion for what ought to be that at age 
twenty he was unable to deal with the impurities of this earthly world and had to leave it” 
(360). For Williamson, Quentin’s frustrated attempts at understanding memory ultimately 
                                                 
53
 As I summarized in Chapter II, in Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty describes perception as 
the reaching out of the human body towards an already existing, material world. He claims, “I have the 
world as an incomplete individual, through the agency of my body as the potentiality of this world [. . .] 
because my body is a movement towards the world, and the world my body's point of support” (408). Such 
a process can only be understood as taking place over time and involving an embodied human 
consciousness encountering a similarly material world. Perception gives humans true knowledge of the 
world, he claims, specifically because “The union of soul and body is not an amalgamation between two 
mutually external terms, subject and object, brought about by arbitrary decree. It is enacted at every instant 
in the movement of existence” (102). 
 169 
 
drive him to suicide in The Sound and the Fury; this frustration stems from his inability 
to situate himself within the dichotomy of idealism and reality that also plagues him in 
Absalom. 
Williamson offers this dichotomy between the ideal and the real as a rubric for 
understanding the moral universe of Faulkner’s novels. He reads their characters as 
caught within two key dichotomies: the first, the tension between idealism and realism; 
the second, the tension between nature and society (358-61). A successful solution to the 
philosophical problems posed by these poles requires balance. “The challenge” for 
Faulkner’s characters, Williamson claims, “was both to know the real world and to 
transcend it, to walk the middle line in the schematic, the line between the ideal and real” 
(361). He claims that Quentin’s idealism revolts against the fundamental impurity of a 
world built out of both material substance and language. But while I agree that the 
impurity of the world contributes to Quentin’s despair (in both Absalom, Absalom! and 
The Sound and the Fury), I do not think a balance between ideality and reality would 
provide him any relief. Indeed, trying to walk the same narrow tightrope between the 
ideal and the real upon which his father and Miss Rosa teeter drives Quentin into 
philosophical defeatism. Quentin has inherited a fundamentally useless dichotomy within 
which one cannot walk an effective middle line. What is a balance between idealism and 
reality, aside from the defeated “stalemate of dust and desire” that Mr. Compson 
espouses from within his alcoholic cynicism (Sound 123-24)? Even if Williamson’s 
diagram of two dichotomies aptly describes how Faulkner imagined his philosophical 
universe, these dichotomies cannot provide the escape his characters seek. 
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But Bruno Latour offers us a slightly different way to look at how Miss Rosa, Mr. 
Compson, and Quentin are all stuck between a sense that there is something substantially 
true about memory, and a sense that memory cannot be trusted since it is finally a 
construction of language. Their struggle to reconcile language and reality makes perfect 
sense when considered as a historical way of understanding – what Latour calls the 
“modern constitution” (Modern 32). As I described in Chapter II, the modern constitution 
is a conceptual framework that Latour sees as foundational to modern notions of truth; it 
insists on the need to purify two separate realms, an objective nature and a subjective 
culture, creating a détente between poles similar to Williamson’s dichotomies. Latour 
describes how the modern constitution demands that nature be purified from society, the 
material be purified from the ideal, and the subject be purified from the object. At the 
same time, Latour argues, the modern constitution’s drive towards such purifications 
merely masks the constant hybrids created through human interaction with the world. 
This theoretical organization thus creates many of the problematic divides that drive 
thinkers like Miss Rosa and Quentin into philosophical knots: “Things-in-themselves 
become inaccessible while, symmetrically, the transcendental subject becomes infinitely 
remote from the world” (Modern 56). If Quentin struggles futilely to find a middle 
ground between the transcendent and the real, it is because the modern constitution offers 
him a useless, paradoxical way of understanding his world. 
That we see these dichotomies and purifications at work in Faulkner, a 
quintessential American modernist, should not be surprising. What is surprising is that 
Latour’s assessment of this modern paradox can help us make sense of Quentin’s despair, 
Mr. Compson’s relativism, and Miss Rosa’s frustrated immobility. For Latour, the only 
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solution to the paradoxes of representation is not balance but renunciation of the 
dichotomy’s basic premises. He admits, “The moderns are quite right to want reality, 
language, society and being all at once. They are wrong in believing that these sets are 
forever contradictory” (89). Instead, things and language are connected by processes: by 
observation, recording, translation, experimentation, and transformation. Thus, as 
Merleau-Ponty imagines accurate perception as “the movement of existence” that must 
be enacted whenever an observer approaches the world, so Latour similarly describes 
accurate representation as “a matter of moving toward the world, making it mobile [. . .] 
and making it available for arguments” (Pandora 100). Both theories stress a movement 
that Mr. Compson’s “stalemate” or Williamson’s dichotomies lack. 
Latour’s skepticism towards modern dichotomies suggests that any attempt to 
balance the real and the ideal will be doomed by the paradoxical terms in which it is 
framed. In this chapter, I argue that the difficulties Faulkner’s characters face in Absalom, 
Absalom! result from persisting dichotomies, ones which Latour argues are finally false. 
Faulkner’s characters cannot successfully maintain the purity of the material world of 
things and the human world of language, given the proliferation of hybrid forms that fill 
their memory and histories. These characters need a successful vision of hybridity in 
order do something more successful than walk a tentative line between poles. 
The same hopelessness at the world’s hybridity evident in Absalom, Absalom! 
also fills Go Down, Moses, particularly the novella “The Bear.” “The Bear” tells the story 
of Ike McCaslin’s initiation into a disappearing, mythical wilderness space as well as his 
renunciation of his family’s farm. As Ike attempts to track down the descendants of his 
grandfather and his grandfather’s slaves, a quest to discover historical truth similar to 
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Quentin’s drives him. And a similar impasse between language and materiality haunts his 
efforts to learn of the history of the McCaslin family and their land. Like Quentin, Ike 
experiences his life in Jefferson as the inheritance of a history ruined by the Civil War 
and by the historical mistakes of his ancestors. Like Quentin, Ike attempts to recreate his 
history from scraps of historical evidence and from inherited stories of his youth. But 
while pursuing the truth of the past, Ike also observes the Big Bottom Woods 
disappearing before his eyes, transforming from material trees into myth. The deaths of 
the giant bear, Old Ben, and Ike’s wilderness mentor, Sam Fathers, further transform the 
material world of the Big Bottom Woods into abstraction, where Old Ben becomes a 
natural ghost. Ike’s search through the McCaslin ledgers seeks an opposite relationship to 
materiality; he strives to return materiality to language and to recreate tangible history as 
a counter to the present world’s dissolution. 
Quentin Compson and Ike McCaslin, the two Faulknerian protagonists who are 
this chapter’s focus, thus each inherited a world whose histories have become 
meaningless because language has been cut off from the material world. Ike lives in a 
world where his material inheritance is replaced by empty language, where the woods of 
his childhood are replaced by stories while they are literally whittled away by the 
growing lumber industry. Quentin lives in a world that his father insists cannot be 
explained, since all explanations are “just words” and since all stories, letters, and 
historical artifacts point only to events condemned to inscrutability (Sound 78). For Ike 
and Quentin, the sign and the referent have been literally severed, leaving language a 
mysterious shadow and leaving materiality a dumb accumulation of stones, rag dolls, and 
empty houses. 
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Latour’s vision of truthful knowledge as a collaborative, constructed network 
provides an apt model for understanding these struggles with history and memory. If truth 
for the Latourian scientist depends on creating and preserving chains of transformation 
that connect textual representation and material events – that preserve the processes and 
events by which true knowledge becomes possible – then truth for the Faulknerian history 
teller must also ground its truth-making in encounters with the material. History and 
memory must base themselves on a material world that cannot be objectively known but 
that must be encountered, transformed, and mobilized. While Absalom repeatedly insists 
on the unreliability of memory, the division of language from the material world, and the 
elusiveness of history, it also voices a longing to reconnect stories to material reality. It is 
this reconnection that would make a meaningful “substance of remembering” possible. 
The tragic fate of Faulkner’s characters points to the folly of living within narratives 
purified from the material world and consequently reduced to self-referential language – 
what Quentin calls “a fine dead sound” (Sound 174). The battle to maintain this 
purification and ignore the “proliferation of hybrids” that occurs in the search for 
memory leaves the characters of these novels defeated (Latour Modern 51). 
Critical Responses to History and Materiality in Faulkner’s Fiction 
My focus on Faulkner’s interest in materiality participates in a larger trend of 
criticism that emphasizes Faulkner as a writer tied to nature and the material world. In the 
fairly recent past, a number of publications from the annual Faulkner and 
Yoknapatawpha Conference have discussed William Faulkner’s work in terms of 
materiality, ecology, and the natural world, including Faulkner and the Natural World, 
Faulkner and the Ecology of the South, and Faulkner and Material Culture. In different 
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ways, each of these volumes introduces critical approaches that more firmly connect 
Faulkner’s work to material concerns. By examining Faulkner’s depictions of Mississippi 
deforestation and flooding or by analyzing the use of material artifacts in Faulkner’s 
fiction, material approaches insist that, in spite of his works’ evident interest in textuality 
and representation, these texts do not entirely focus on an artificial, literary world. 
However, as Donald M. Kartiganer’s introduction to Faulkner and the Natural World 
reveals, this emphasis on Faulkner’s material representation faces a greater level of 
hostility than, say, material assessments of Thoreau or Norris. Kartiganer believes that 
this resistance to an exploration “of the environmental imagination” in Faulkner’s fiction 
results from a critical tendency to associate Faulkner with “high modernism’s [. . .] 
revolution against referentiality itself” (ix). Traceable to “the late nineteenth-century 
movement, especially among the French Symbolist poets and their British enthusiasts, 
‘against nature’,” such interpretations of Faulkner’s work align it with “the attempt to 
raise art above the merely given [. . .] and move beyond realism and the material world” 
(viii). This move beyond materiality severs the referential relationship between words 
and the world: “Language, instead of functioning as the transparent, passive sign of the 
object, faithfully reflecting what is already ‘out there,’ takes on a greater solidity, a 
substantiality of its own, enabling it to recover, or invent, a more essential Reality” (ix). 
The turn towards environmental or material readings of Faulkner thus faces many 
of the same theoretical impasses that hampered first-wave ecocriticism’s realist recovery. 
More specifically, the idea of a “high modernist” imperative to surpass realist or 
materialist aesthetics reproduces a theoretical asymmetry that Buell diagnoses: an over-
emphasis on “structure, text(uality), [or] ideology” (Imagination 86). In other words, 
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Faulknerian criticism runs up against the familiar poles of Latour’s modern constitution; 
it is told that it should not confuse Faulkner’s textual and symbolic representations with 
references to the material world. And yet, a more qualified understanding of 
representation that accounts for material transformations as well as textual functions 
would prove helpful not only for topical investigations into Faulkner’s environmental or 
material sensitivity but also to the larger critical tradition struggling to come to terms 
with Faulkner’s strangely hybrid Yoknapatawpha, an entirely fictive county with close 
connections to the geographical and historical Lafayette County. 
Indeed, Malcolm Cowley’s 1946 introduction to The Portable Faulkner describes 
Faulkner’s writing in terms that both purify and re-combine the poles of text and world. 
He argues that Faulkner’s work performs a “double labor: first, to invent a Mississippi 
county that was like a mythical kingdom but was complete in all its details; second, to 
make his story of Yoknapatawpha stand as a parable or legend of all the Deep South” 
(viii). Caught between fiction and realistic representation, Yoknapatawpha’s relationship 
to the historical world Faulkner inhabited is thus more complicated than a simple 
purification can explain. This may help account for similar critical conflicts over the 
exact relationship between Faulkner’s imaginary Yoknapatawpha and the Lafayette 
County that was his historical home. According to Charles Aiken, Faulkner himself was 
fascinated by the tension between the “actual” and the “apocryphal” that manifested in 
his imaginary geography (qtd. in “Geographical Fact” 13). His Yoknapatawpha has an 
illusory air of reality, beginning with the two maps which define the county, and perhaps 
reaching its most fantastical form in books like Martin J. Dain’s Faulkner’s County: 
Yoknapatawpha, which uses photographs from Jefferson to illustrate excerpts from 
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Faulkner’s fiction.54 A geographer and Lafayette native, Aiken argues that a close 
relationship exists between turn-of-the-century Mississippi geography and the landmarks 
of Faulkner’s maps. 
By contrast, noting the way Faulkner’s map locates landmarks in relation to key 
narrative events rather than to simple geographical features, Thomas McHaney argues 
that “Faulkner’s map for Absalom, Absalom! is a ‘literary’ map and not a ‘real’ map, not 
even a fictional map that actually imitates cartographic expression” (521). Joseph Urgo 
similarly downplays any connection between historical geography and Faulkner’s maps, 
positing that “Yoknapatawpha may be less a place than a perspective, less significant for 
mapping a landscape than mapping a mode of consciousness” (“Yoknapatawpha” 639). 
This debate over imaginary geography asks where the emphasis should lie: on the 
imagination or the geography? Should we focus on constructed acts of fictionalizing, on 
the narrative functions or imaginative uses of geographical places? Or should we focus 
on referentiality, emphasizing the connections between the world and the text? Such 
connections surely exist, prompting Urgo to insist that, while Faulkner’s literary legacy is 
“phenomenally irreconcilable with the material reality of the place,” still “the two worlds 
[the material world and the textual world] intersect continuously; they must intersect if 
either is to be recognizable” (Introduction xi). 
“Bigger than Any Recorded Document:” The Material, Mythical Woods of “The 
Bear” 
With its discussion of the disappearing Big Bottom Woods, the land-ownership 
issues of the McCaslin family, the history of racial conflict regarding the land, and the 
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 The first of these maps, crudely sketched, is presented in Absalom’s supplementary material; the second, 
simplified version appears in Cowley’s The Portable Faulkner. 
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mythological significance of wilderness space, Go Down, Moses thoughtfully examines a 
host of material, textual, and ecological issues. The stories collected in this work also 
struggle between the poles of the real and language that so haunt Absalom, Absalom! 
“The Bear” in particular tells the story of Ike McCaslin’s changing relationship to the 
material land of Yoknapatawpha. Like Absalom, “The Bear” demonstrates the conflicts 
that a dichotomous understanding of language and material environments make possible. 
It is commonly recognized that there are two distinct narratives at odds within this five-
part story, both of which deal with the connection between texts and the environment. 
The first three parts of the “The Bear,” as well as Part Five, depict Ike’s youthful 
participation in ritualistic bear hunts that take place in the Big Bottom Woods; Part Four 
describes Ike’s decision to renounce his right to inherit his grandfather’s farm, basing 
such renunciation on a mixture of guilt about the McCaslin’s slave-owning past and an 
idealized preference for wilderness over tamed land. Parts One through Three show Ike 
recognizing the hybridity of wilderness but also participating in modern acts of 
purification, such as the hunt for the bear Old Ben. That is, while the attitude towards 
wilderness that Ike inherits is a hybrid mixture of material encounter and cultural myth, 
the act of killing Old Ben enacts a strange purification that attempts to separate the 
material, “mortal” creature from the mythic, transcendent wilderness. The under-
examined Part Four, on the other hand, eschews mythical takes on wilderness, focusing 
instead on textual transmissions of ownership and records of material changes to the land. 
As the racial and economic conflicts of Part Four make clear, the mythological purity of 
wilderness can be preserved only by eliding its material history: ignoring the 
disappearance of the literal Big Bottom and its creatures and ignoring the historical 
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mistreatment of slaves in service of agricultural development. But the ledgers at the 
center of Part Four challenge such erasure. Unlike the shadowy texts of Absalom, these 
ledgers clearly document the material conditions of the past. “The Bear” thus 
demonstrates how a tension between the poles of the modern constitution shapes the 
McCaslins’ interactions with the land. 
 A number of critics have focused on connecting part four to the rest of “The 
Bear.” Paul S. Stein accomplishes such connection by arguing that these two stories are 
actually parallel tales about ignored social responsibility. That the two narratives are 
meant to be read in concert is evident, Stein argues, given the virtually identical openings 
of Parts One and Four.55 He argues that these stories both rest upon Ike’s failure to take 
responsibility for his own implication in the systems of slavery and land ownership. 
Finally, Ike chooses the passivity of observation and renunciation rather than action: 
“What links the two initiations, making them in essence two retellings of the same story, 
is that it is really one and the same force being personified: that of Ike’s own sense of 
culpability and involvement in the ongoing crimes and guilts of his people” (Stein 76). 
Stein argues that Ike renounces ownership as well as connection to the land, as he moves 
back to Jefferson and limits his relationship with the wilderness to “yearly holiday hunts 
(excepting the relation of being, as a carpenter, a customer for the lumber company that is 
eating up the wilderness)” (67). Ultimately, Ike’s passivity replaces real woods with 
mythical woods: “Ike does thereby preserve the wilderness – the mythic wilderness he 
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 Part 1 begins, “There was a man and a dog too this time [. . .] He was sixteen. For six years now he had 
heard the best of all talking. It was of the wilderness, the big woods, bigger and older than any recorded 
document” (191). Part 4 begins, “then he was twenty-one. He could say it, himself and his cousin 
juxtaposed not against the wilderness but against the tamed land which was to have been his heritage” 
(254). Stein emphasizes the parallel language that links these two openings: the emphasis on age and the 
description of the land surrounding Ike. 
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has created. Having preserved the idyllic myth, Ike has no further need of the real 
wilderness” (81). 
But while Stein focuses on the primacy of mythical over material woods, other 
critics insist that Faulkner’s work forwards a more ecologically thoughtful response to the 
historical deforestation of the South. While Ike sinks into an escapist wilderness myth, 
this myth is shot through with material loss, as the Big Bottom Woods vanish through 
deforestation and the encroachment of the railroad. While “The Bear” initially brushes 
off such ecological change as the “punily gnaw[ing]” work of humans and as the 
“pygmies about the ankles of a drowsing elephant,” it also admits that this wilderness is 
“doomed” (193). As is already suggested in Part Five of “The Bear,” by the time Ike 
reaches old age in “Delta Autumn,” the puny hacking axes have gnawed the elephantine 
wilderness down to a small patch of trees “two hundred miles from Jefferson” (342-3). 
An ecological reading emphasizes Go Down, Moses’s clear awareness of the economic 
systems destroying the Big Bottom Woods.56 Thus, as Buell argues, 
although the claims of the natural world were seldom paramount in 
Faulkner’s fiction, they could take on a life of their own [. . .] Faulkner 
was no mere literary pastoralist or primitivist in his reflections on 
Southern environmental history, but ventured them against the background 
of considerable knowledge of its economic, social, and racial 
ramifications. (“Faulkner” 14-15) 
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 Buell points out that the collapse of the Big Bottom and the sale of Major de Spain’s land “may or may 
not have been revisiting a real-life event: the demise of his [Faulkner’s] own Big Bottom happy hunting 
ground, bought and held as an investment property by his friend Phil Stone’s father, a successful 
timberland speculator until the Great Depression caught up with him and he died debt-ridden” (“Faulkner” 
10). 
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The Big Bottom Woods, then, is presented not just as a symbolic place but also a material 
resource caught in economic change. 
Indeed, throughout “The Bear,” Faulkner imagines the wilderness as a 
complicated balance between material actuality and cultural construction. On the one 
hand, the woods of Ike’s youth are undeniably material. These woods are “bigger and 
older than any recorded document” and material trophies from the woods pile up at the 
hunters’ camp, “the concrete trophies, the racked guns and the heads and skins” (192, 
emphasis mine). As Ike goes out to the Big Bottom Woods for the first time in Part One, 
the text celebrates the sensory immediacy of his encounter, imagining wilderness as an 
essence that can be distilled. The men even drink “some condensation of the wild 
immortal spirit” when they share whiskey in their hunting camps. However, the cultural 
construction of wilderness also appears at the story’s beginning, as we learn that Ike was 
primed for his experience by the “best of all talking [. . .] of the wilderness, the big 
woods” (192). Ike grew up among “the voices quiet and weighty and deliberate among 
the concrete trophies,” surrounded by both material and linguistic traces of the woods 
(192). Thus, the woods that Ike encounters when he finally sees the Big Bottom mirror 
this balance of concreteness and ephemerality: the animals he hunts are at one moment 
“smoke-colored, elongated with speed, vanished” and at another moment the concrete 
“skin, bones, and antlers of the trophy-kill” (196). This tension suggests the hybridity of 
the wilderness space and the danger of trying to purify its components. Only killing can 
render the creatures totally material, and it is only back in town that the simultaneously 
real and symbolic animals become purified, separated into, on the one hand, dead 
carcasses mounted on a wall and, on the other hand, stories to be shared. 
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Old Ben, the bear that is the “epitome and apotheosis of the old wild life,” also 
reveals this hybrid quality, appearing as both a shared story and an identifiable creature 
(193). Old Ben is both material, “a shaggy tremendous shape,” and immaterial, “a 
phantom” (193). Ike recognizes this hybridity when he first sees traces of the bear: 
he looked quietly down at the rotted log scored and gutted with claw-
marks and, in the wet earth beside it, the print of the enormous two-toed 
foot [. . .] for the first time he realized that the bear which had run in his 
listening and loomed in his dreams since before he could remember and 
which therefore must have existed in the listening and the dreams of his 
cousin and Major de Spain and even old General Compson before they 
began to remember in their turn, was a mortal animal [. . .]. (200-01) 
This passage suggests a hybrid composite of the mortal bear in the woods and the 
immortal, phantom-like “Old Ben” of legend. “Old Ben” is not simply an imaginative 
projection that humans place after-the-fact on a meaningless totality otherwise known as 
the objective “Big Bottom Woods.” Rather, this fabled creature grows out of a process of 
encounter and description, and his reality is crafted from both language and observation. 
Beginning with General Compson, the members of Ike’s party have gone to the woods, 
experienced and observed the wilderness (“began to remember in their turn”), and then 
returned to their plantation offices and their town houses with both material trophies and 
stories for retelling. The stories of the woods that Ike inherits are thus not entirely 
disconnected from the Big Bottom, even if they are constructions. Rather, the hunting 
party reconnects stories to the material world by participating in the annual ritual of the 
hunt, a transformative process that changes woods and hunters by mutual interaction. 
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“The Bear” thus sets up a constructed vision that connects material presence and 
language. While Old Ben begins as more myth than mammal, Ike eventually recognizes 
his existence as a mortal bear; while wilderness is a myth generated by storytelling, it is 
also a physical space Ike can learn to navigate as he becomes a “fair woodsman.” Ike 
develops a “real” knowledge of the wilderness that, like the Latourian description of 
science, is a constructed product deriving from encounter with the nonhuman woods. The 
idea of “wilderness” is a cultural construction, but it is not an idea that is simply imposed 
on the Big Bottom; it is a story-based way of understanding this natural space that 
mobilizes the material woods through yearly rituals of reconnection, observation, and 
human involvement. Such a way of viewing the woods becomes troubling only when it 
becomes inconsistent: when it remains a static vision of naturalness that does not account 
for genuine ecological change. That is, the concept of wilderness becomes troubling 
when it becomes purified from material reality – when Ike faces a material reality of 
ecological destruction, on the one hand, and a perpetual story of untouched natural space 
on the other. It is significant that Ike’s deepest encounters with the bear and with the 
woods occur when he has abandoned his gun, thereby abandoning his ability to 
participate in the killing that will purify the bear’s body from his enduring myth. If, by 
the time of “Delta Autumn,” stories of the wilderness’s immortal greatness are at odds 
with the reality of the wilderness’s shrinking status, we must ask what has changed 
between Ike’s childhood and his old age. What interrupts the chains of transformation 
that make the idea of wilderness a viable way of knowing the Big Bottom, one that 
allows Ike to navigate the woods safely? What completes the purification of a wilderness 
myth from the woods’ threatened materiality? 
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 The answer to this question, of course, is the literal disappearance of the 
wilderness, prompted by Major de Spain’s sale of land to the timber companies, and the 
parallel killing of Old Ben, the harbinger of the wilderness spirit. As Ike ages, the woods 
begin to disappear, straining the relationship between stories and material reality. In Ike’s 
childhood, the hunt for Old Ben was a “yearly rendezvous” without concrete goal, 
designed to avoid the taking of material trophies, a ritual from which men “would return 
with no trophy, no skin” (194). The bear’s death purifies his real presence as a skin-
bearing body from his mythical status as a wildness exceeding human capacities to 
capture. This purification makes him at once more definitively material and more purely 
mythical. At no point is Old Ben more material and mortal than when Lion latches onto 
his throat, Boon sinks his knife into him, and all three “[fall] all of a piece, as a tree falls” 
(241). But Old Ben’s death also makes it possible for Ike to mobilize him as a purely 
symbolic representation of wilderness. When Ike buries Old Ben’s paw above Lion and 
near Sam Fathers, he transforms all three of these beings into a mythical network of 
symbolic wildness. Like the material tokens of tobacco and peppermint candy that Ike 
leaves on Sam’s grave, these buried bodies are “merely translated into the myriad life 
which printed the dark mold of these secret and sunny places” (328). Thus, the three 
characters most directly associated with wilderness in this story become a diffuse and 
abstract myth of wilderness rather than an apotheosis or condensation of it: their material 
bodies become distinct from their status as symbolic beings. 
Yet even this purification of the bear into material body and myth cannot escape 
the proliferation of hybridity. The mystical unification of Old Ben, Lion, and Sam Fathers 
with the wilderness has a biological as well as a symbolic component. The individuals 
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dissolve as solid entities and literally reenter wilderness through their particulate merging 
into the cycles of life. As Ike realizes months later, when he returns to the site, they are 
“not held fast in earth but free in earth and not in earth but of earth, myriad yet undiffused 
of every myriad part, leaf and twig and particle, air and sun and rain and dew and night” 
(328). Like the dust pervading Miss Rosa’s imagination, the disintegrating bodies of 
these creatures enact liminality. Their literal material transformation from perceivable 
entities into dust and particles resembles the liminal transformations that language 
performs when rendering them into mythical symbols. On the other hand, as they lose 
material unity, they become disembodied symbols of wildness. The individual deaths of 
bears and woods and men dissipate into a timeless vision of mythic unity that 
underemphasizes human participation in this killing. 
Thus, the disappearance of the Big Bottom and the death of Old Ben lead the men 
of “The Bear” to participate more and more in dichotomous thinking as they purify the 
transcendent concept of “wilderness” from the material devastation of the land. The 
creation of nature mythology now depends on ignorance of material conditions, and in 
this regard Stein’s assessment is right: Ike can reconcile his decision to participate in the 
hunt for Old Ben and in the deforestation of the Big Bottom Woods by clinging to a 
nostalgic vision of an absent natural world and ignoring the destruction of the natural 
world in the present. The purification of the material from language – the separation of 
the linguistic wilderness of stories from the material wilderness of exploitable resources – 
sets up a divided consciousness that ignores the proliferation of hybrids occurring in the 
Big Bottom. This separation ignores the encroachment of human presence, the hybridity 
of spaces like the hunting camp, and the stories that are built out of both language and 
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encounter. Such purification is both troubling and powerful. It allows the hunters of the 
Big Bottom to have it all, keeping their dream of wilderness while using the woods as a 
resource. This loss of wilderness is symptomatic of a larger disconnection taking place in 
Yoknapatawpha, a disconnection made possible for white Southerners like Ike McCaslin 
by plantation slavery’s erasure of laboring bodies in its history.57 These hidden material 
bodies – of dead bears and of enslaved workers –intertwine in Part 4. For Ike’s mythical 
wilderness is made possible not only by burying Old Ben’s body but also by burying the 
truth of slavery and the land’s troubled history. To keep believing in a wilderness that no 
man can tame, own, or capture, Ike must bury the evidence of man’s capacity to kill and 
cultivate, retreating to a primordial time prior to ownership. This, in turn, means ignoring 
the racial struggles that have allowed Major de Spain to own the Big Bottom and to 
preserve it as a recreational space. 
“Pale Sentence or Paragraph Scrawled”: Dematerializing McCaslin Legacies 
If Parts One through Three tell the story of how conceptual purification separates 
timeless visions of wilderness from the material history of the land, Part Four tells a 
converse story – of Ike’s attempt to unearth hidden histories and to engage with hybrid 
truths, buried not in dirt but in textual documentation. While the saga of Old Ben shows 
Ike’s participation in mythologies that erase their origins, Part Four shows him 
recognizing the social cost of such mythology. The myths of his family have erased his 
black relatives and denied them their own due inheritance. This injustice invalidates Ike’s 
own sense of himself as noble in relationship to the wilderness. In Part Four, Ike fights 
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 See Godden’s reading of slavery and alienation in Absalom, Absalom!’s Thomas Sutpen, where Sutpen’s 
identity crisis and struggle to read the land rely upon a paradoxical disconnection brought about by slavery: 
white men’s identity necessarily depends upon a loss of self-reliance in the Tidewater plantation system, 
since the self-actualized white male must stop working the land himself and rely upon the labor of black 
bodies. Such a realization troubles individual autonomy and thus must be suppressed. 
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dematerialization as he attempts to recreate the history of the McCaslin family from the 
ledgers in order to act justly towards his grandfather’s descendants. 
 Thus, one way of connecting all the parts of “The Bear” is by looking at them as 
telling the story of the dematerialization of Ike McCaslin’s inheritance. The land that he 
inherits from Carothers McCaslin is land he reads as stolen from the very woods that 
continue to disappear right before his eyes. Similarly, we learn in Part Four, Ike’s 
inheritance is in the process of transforming from materiality to language. While he is 
supposed to inherit a silver cup full of gold coins, what he eventually unwraps is a tin 
coffee pot full of copper coins and handwritten IOUs from his Uncle Hubert Beauchamp. 
Significantly, the fate of Ike’s inheritance also resembles that of the wilderness: the 
gradual loss of the material and the persistent accumulation of language. While described 
as inevitable, the disappearance of the Big Bottom Woods is also described as 
inexplicable, magic akin to a curse. Indeed, the loss of Ike’s inheritance is equally 
mysterious and magical. 
 From the first description of Ike’s legacy, Faulkner insists on its materiality as 
opposed to the legacies that Carothers McCaslin promised his slaves. Whereas Carothers 
offers them a “pale sentence or paragraph scrawled in cringing fear of death by a weak 
and trembling hand as a last desperate sop flung backward at retribution,” the inheritance 
that Uncle Hubert gives Ike is “a Legacy, a Thing, possessing weight to the hand and 
bulk to the eye and even audible: a silver cup filled with gold pieces and wrapped in 
burlap and sealed with his godfather’s ring in the hot wax” (300-301). In an annual ritual 
designed to verify this legacy through empirical observation, Uncle Hubert makes every 
member of the family shake the cup containing the gold pieces and thus feel for 
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themselves its material weight, “insisting that each take it in turn and heft it for weight 
and shake it again to prove the sound” (304). Slowly, Hubert begins to modify the test so 
that it provides only an illusion of material realness, while he steals from the legacy and 
replaces the coins with worthless pieces of paper: 
his uncle no longer put it even into his hands now but carried it himself 
from one to the other, his mother, McCaslin, Tennie, shaking it before 
each in turn, saying: ‘Hear it? Hear it?’ his face still innocent, not quite 
baffled but only amazed and not very amazed and still indomitable [. . .]. 
(304) 
Eventually, following a mysterious fire, all that remains of the legacy is a “a burlap 
parcel wrapped in a shirt, the tawny wax-daubed shapeless lump sitting again and on an 
almost identical shape [. . .] the burlap shape become almost three times its original 
height and a good half less than its original thickness” (305). Thus, like the Big Bottom 
Woods of Ike’s childhood, this inheritance too disappears before his very eyes while 
culturally constructed rituals enact an illusion of its preservation. 
Like the substance of memory for which Miss Rosa’s senses grope, the seeming 
substance of Ike’s legacy is finally suspect. Somehow, the yearly ritual of verification 
fails. Just as the wilderness became myth, so too does Ike’s legacy become a collection of 
meaningless coins and leftover stories: 
he lifted it, the burlap lump which fifteen years ago had changed its shape 
completely overnight, which shaken gave forth a thin weightless not-quite-
musical curiously muffled clatter [. . .] standing amid the collapse of 
burlap folds, the unstained tin coffee-pot still brand new, the handful of 
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copper coins and now he knew what had given them the muffled sound: a 
collection of minutely-folded scraps of paper [. . .] all dated and signed, 
beginning with the first one not six months after they had watched him 
seal the silver cup into the burlap on this same table in the same room by 
the light even of this same lamp almost twenty-one years ago: I owe my 
Nephew Isaac Beauchamp McCaslin five (5) pieces Gold which I,O.U 
constitutes My note of hand with Interest at 5 percent. Hubert Fitz-Hubert 
Beauchamp [. . .]. (306-07) 
Here, the most religiously preserved chain of transformation fails. The same package in 
the same room held by the same hands still changes entirely. Uncle Hubert’s yearly 
testing of the legacy does not stop him from transforming the verifiable Thing into a pile 
of useless “pale sentence[s].” The value is stripped from Ike’s legacy, both land and 
coins, and it is thus against the dual pressures of failed promises and dematerialization 
that Ike fights as he pores over his grandfather’s ledger books, stubbornly trying to 
reconnect this text to material actions in a material world. Faced with his own Legacy’s 
evaporation into language, Ike hopes to re-validate his grandfather’s failed promises by 
tracking down the descendants described in the ledgers and paying them the money they 
were originally promised in frail, failing language. 
The key to this discovery lies in immersing himself in the ledgers’ detailed 
records of material exchange. Their referents once existed, and the act of recording “the 
slow outward trickle of food and supplies, and equipment which returned each fall as 
cotton made and ginned and sold” had a direct purpose outside of mimetic representation, 
helping to run a plantation. The ledgers’ lists of “the molasses and meat and meal, the 
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cheap durable shirts and jeans and shoes” explicitly establish a chain of transformation, 
tracing the material land’s translation into representations. The ledger account hovers 
between the material and the textual, functioning on the one hand as a “fragile thread” of 
language whose connection to the world is a construction – a truth emphasized by Ike’s 
recognition that language functions for him and other white men who can read, but that 
for the former slave whose life lies recorded in the text, language is unverifiable, for there 
is “no way under the sun for him [the former slave] to test it [the white man’s word], as to 
how the account stood” (267). On the other hand, language provides an “iron thread” that 
controls the lives of former slaves, and that controls Ike’s life, too. Language binds 
former slaves to plantations by tracing back to material goods. The ledgers thus epitomize 
textual hybridity, serving as a locus that brings together language and materiality. 
“The Bear” imagines Ike’s awakening guilt and his growing awareness of his 
family’s past specifically in terms of a magical reincarnation of the past, one opposite to 
the magic that turned his legacy into mere language. As Ike reads the ledger, “it would 
seem to the boy that he could actually see the black man, the slave whom his white owner 
had forever manumitted by the very act from which the black man could never be free” 
(266-67). The ledgers connect Ike to stories that, when activated by his reading and 
interpretation, “took substance and even a sort of shadowy life with the compassions and 
complexities too as page followed page” (266). Ike cannot dismiss these books’ words as 
fiction, and thus he finds that recorded memory is something stronger than mere dream or 
invention. Ike gets caught in an ecomimetic paradox that demonstrates the descriptive 
power of hybridity. For it is only via the proliferation of language, page following page, 
that he sees the shadowy reality of his history. Yet this same language can never be the 
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same as the world itself. The “shadowy life” that these ledgers evoke recalls his earlier, 
youthful impression of the smoke-like, phantom animals of the woods that eventually 
resolve into mortal beings. However, the humans doing the exchanges depicted in the 
ledger gradually “take substance” for Ike, and events traced in these books seem just as 
real as the bear he watched fall at Boon’s hand. Thus, Ike McCaslin’s long apprenticeship 
with the ledgers, like his apprenticeship in the woods, is a process of learning how to read 
in order to connect to material bodies. 
But in the commissary he discovers the contingency of this connection: only 
active reading will make the ledgers more than scratches, the stories more than dead 
sounds. In his imagination, even the Allknowing must read and re-read in order to 
decipher the McCaslin history: 
To him, it was as though the ledgers in their scarred cracked leather 
bindings were being lifted down one by one in their fading sequence and 
spread open on the desk or perhaps upon some apocryphal Bench or even 
Altar or perhaps before the Throne itself for a last perusal and 
contemplation and refreshment of the Allknowledgeable before the 
yellowed pages and the brown thin ink in which was recorded the injustice 
and a little at least of its amelioration and restitution faded back forever 
into the anonymous communal original dust [. . .]. (261) 
In this passage, Ike’s recognition of the ledgers as material things that can disintegrate 
reframes textuality itself as a material quality, as a state of recorded documentation that 
can become immaterial legend. As long as the ledgers remain hybrid material texts 
composed from “yellowed pages” and “brown thin ink,” they provide a last chain of 
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transformation connecting the McCaslin legends to actual bodies and to history. They 
concretize memory and events, providing a literal trace of the moment when Carothers 
McCaslin distributed food or clothing in exchange for promised labor. They document an 
event, in the Latourian sense: a moment when the material world was transformed, 
resulting in a changed relationship between the world and observer. But when these 
ledgers disintegrate, as Old Ben’s body disintegrates, they lose their potency. 
In the case of both Old Ben and the family ledgers, the validity of legends rests 
upon chains of transformation connecting the material world to stories. What threatens 
the value of these legends, relegating the post-bellum descendants to life as shades or to 
life as an ongoing renunciation, is not a fundamental division between language and 
things but a disruption of these chains of transformation brought about by attempts at 
purification. When the woods disappear and the legends of wilderness no longer function 
correctly, it is not because the referent has lost its unique one-to-one connection to the 
sign – because the name “Big Bottom Woods” no longer refers to a real place or the 
name “Old Ben” no longer refers to a real bear. The disruption occurs because the 
continuation of cultural myths requires the erasure of changing material conditions: the 
two realms are purified of relation. In the case of the ledgers, these books become cut off 
from the economic processes and material exchanges from which they emerged. As 
records of a fixed past rather than living documents of a still-changing present, the 
ledgers function only as “old books” that contain things “fixed, immutably finished, 
unalterable, harmless” (268). But when Ike finally takes the ledgers down from the 
commissary shelves, he re-engages the networks translated to the ledgers. The hybrid 
texts of the ledger are not just artifacts of past injustices but a network of still-existing, 
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still-evolving relations which demand ongoing participation – perhaps the reason Ike 
refused to read them for so long. 
As living documents rather than dead artifacts, the ledgers translate the realities 
they depict into Ike’s life. At first, Ike reads them as though they were simply chapters of 
a novel. But then Ike translates the pages into his own life, making “the yellowed pages 
in their fading and implacable succession” into “part of his consciousness” that will 
“remain so forever” and thereby escape dissolution. The act of remembering becomes a 
translation that continues the chain of transformation: from material goods to ledger 
record; from record to act of reading; from reading to memory. These translations also 
extend into the material world. Thus, Ike follows the “frail and iron thread strong as truth 
and impervious as evil and longer than life itself and reaching beyond record and 
patrimony both to join him with the lusts and passions, the hopes and dreams and griefs, 
of bones whose names while still fleshed and capable even old Carother’s grandfather 
had never heard” (299). The “frail and iron thread” that Ike recognizes in the ledgers is 
history’s capacity to convey truthful information about the past. Ike experiences 
skepticism about language’s referential possibility but also an opposing recognition that 
language can connect to the material “bones” of generations long gone. The power of 
such reference extends “longer than life” and connects to systems of reference beyond 
either memory or writing. Yet such referential capacity is also tentative, a “frail” thread 
which could be snapped by the reader’s lack of participation. 
Since they are able to evoke the past material world, Ike imagines these ledgers 
differently from other texts. When he gestures in his conversation with Cass, it is “not 
even towards them,” but towards a whole network: “not only [to] the ledgers but the 
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whole plantation in its mazed and intricate entirety—the land, the fields and what they 
represented” (298). The material world of the plantation and the textual world of the 
ledgers intertwine. By contrast, in other rhetoric and texts emerging in the time 
surrounding and after the Civil War, Ike observes a disconnection between material 
conditions and language. Political rhetoric, speeches, activism, and pamphlets ignore the 
material realities of the South and offer abstractions instead, resulting in exploitation or 
escapist hope. For instance, Ike condemns the empty rhetoric of Northern politicians 
which ignores the material conditions of slavery and the material consequences of 
freedom, using slavery and freedom merely as abstract concepts for political purposes. As 
he explains his repudiation of the land to his cousin McCaslin, Ike explicitly imagines the 
curse of the South as the increasing separation of the material from abstract rhetoric. He 
decries the loss of “woods for game and streams for fish and deep rich soil for seed” and 
the consequent emergence of “the thundering cannonade of pulpiteers earning Chataqua 
fees, to whom the outrage and the injustice were as much abstraction” (284). The double-
edged curse Ike imagines falling on the land parallels the land’s fallowness and the 
collapse of the South’s agricultural economy with the collapse of a linguistic economy of 
reference. Thus, it is the purification of text from world, rhetoric from world, language 
from world that Ike identifies at the root of the South’s problems. 
 This severance of reality from textuality ultimately overwhelms Ike’s efforts; his 
attempt to fix the sins of his ancestors runs up against a Reconstruction world holding 
material despair at bay with empty rhetorics of hope. This tension between empty words 
and real material conditions appears most forcibly when Ike finally tracks down Fonsiba, 
one of his grandfather’s descendants. When he finds her failing farm in Arkansas, he 
 194 
 
discovers that her Northern freedman husband has eschewed reality and immersed 
himself in books. The farm remains in total poverty while her husband is 
sitting in a rocking chair before the hearth, the man himself, reading — 
sitting there in the only chair in the house, before the miserable fire for 
which there was not wood sufficient to last twenty-four hours, in the same 
ministerial clothing in which he had entered the commissary five months 
ago and a pair of gold-framed spectacles which, when he looked up and 
rose to his feet, the boy saw did not even contain lenses, reading a book in 
the midst of that desolation, that muddy waste fenceless and even pathless 
[. . .]. (278) 
This man clings to an illusion of prosperity while living in the midst of material want, 
and this delusion is figured explicitly as the man’s preference for a textual rather than 
material world – neither of which he can read well. While Fonsiba’s husband spouts 
hopeful rhetoric about the “new Canaan” that he and Fonsiba will build on their Arkansas 
farm, Ike sees this farm as “a nameless and valueless rubble of dissolution” and as “a 
farm only in embryo” (277). For such a farm to become successful will require, in Ike’s 
estimation, “labor, hard and enduring and unflagging work and sacrifice” rather than 
reading, a contrast marked by Ike’s perception of the “lenseless spectacles held like a 
music master’s wand in the other workless hand” of Fonsiba’s husband (278-79). He is a 
man who makes pretenses at reading while remaining workless. Fonsiba’s husband reads 
poorly and reads out of contact with reality, and as a result he also cannot recognize his 
own entrapment in an unforgiving economic system. Ike’s strong reaction to this man 
may well include a racial prejudice towards this Northerner who reads rather than works 
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and refuses to say “Sir” to white men. But Ike’s angry outburst at him also involves 
frustration that the man is living an immaterial life of stories that cannot help him 
survive. 
This recognition leads Ike to declare the South cursed and to surrender his own 
material participation in the quest started by the ledgers. He leaves his “golden belt” 
which contains a thousand dollars in coins with a banker in Fonsiba’s town, transforming 
the literal money into “pencil and paper” designed to keep her alive. He thereby 
relinquishes his last material portions of Carothers McCaslin’s legacy. This, we are told, 
“was all” and Ike’s quest ends like the now-dead ledgers. “That is all” – the dissolution of 
world and text is complete, and Ike eventually renounces both land and text, never more 
reading the ledgers or claiming ownership of the land: “1874 the boy; 1888 the man, 
repudiated denied and free” (281). In this renunciation, Ike imagines the ideal man as one 
who eschews language for action and gives up argument to go back to the wilderness: 
out of all that empty sound and bootless fury one silence, among that loud 
and moiling all of them just one simple enough to believe that horror and 
outrage were first and last simply horror and outrage and was crude 
enough to act upon that, illiterate and had no words for talking or perhaps 
was just busy and had no time to, one out of them all who did not bother 
Him with cajolery and adjuration then pleading then threat and had not 
even bothered to inform Him in advance what he was about so that a lesser 
than He might have even missed the simple act of lifting the long ancestral 
musket down from the deerhorns above the door [. . .]. (284-85) 
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Ike imagines the ideal supplication before God as the “silent” act of an “illiterate” man 
with “no words for talking” and no “cajolery” or “adjuration.” But by idealizing the silent 
man who acts, who simply “lift[s] the long ancestral musket down from the deer horns 
above the door,” Ike substitutes a wilderness fantasy for the world of rhetoric and 
troubled economic ownership. The savior will pick up his gun, leave behind this system, 
and simply return to the land. The irony is that such Christlike repudiation simply 
replaces Reconstruction rhetoric and pleading with an equally abstract and escapist 
vision. Replacing one immaterial world of escapist language with another, Ike thereby 
continues to erase the real changes taking place in the Big Bottom Woods and in 
Jefferson. By the time Ike reaches old age in “Delta Autumn,” it is clear that he no longer 
troubles himself with understanding the hybridity of the wilderness fantasy, nor does he 
trouble himself with resisting the material changes such fantasy facilitates. He allows the 
world of stories to substitute for the world around him, and by insulating these stories 
from the true changes taking place in the Big Bottom, Ike loses any ability to resist or 
respond to the wilderness’ continuing loss. 
“Be Sutpen’s Hundred”: The Material Magic of Language in Absalom 
 Just as “The Bear” fixates on a hybrid artifact connected to the material world (the 
McCaslin ledgers), a hybrid inheritance that is transformed from the material to the 
linguistic (Ike McCaslin’s cup full of silver), and a number of hybrid artifacts that 
contribute to the creation of legends (the bear and the Big Bottom wilderness), Absalom, 
Absalom! brings a similar set of hybrids into play. For Quentin, the central 
material/literary artifact is Charles Bon’s letter; the mixed material and linguistic 
inheritance includes a letter Mr. Compson sends his son at Harvard and a number of oral 
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stories about the Sutpen collapse; and the artifacts tying Quentin’s investigations to the 
land include the Sutpen graves and the ruined house at Sutpen’s Hundred. Like Ike, 
Quentin attempts to reconcile the stories that he grew up with to the realities that he sees; 
he attempts to ground what he hears in material fact; and he attempts to escape the slide 
into legend, myth, shadow, and dust that, for Faulkner, characterizes the post-bellum 
collapse and the simultaneous severance of material reality from stories. 
 Like “The Bear,” Absalom also initially seems more interested in immaterial than 
material things: ghosts, shadows, legends, stories, and memory. Quentin considers the 
past distant and abstract. He imagines the Sutpen family springing from nothingness, 
“looking as though they had been created out of thin air,” and he imagines the Sutpen 
plantation as props on a stage, “the synthetic and spurious shadows and shapes” of a “set” 
(72). As Quentin gets further immersed in the memories foisted upon him first by Miss 
Rosa and then by his father, he increasingly imagines the past in their immaterial terms: 
in Miss Rosa’s case, as a dream, “the might-have-been that is more true than truth” (143). 
In adopting the language of Mr. Compson, Quentin imagines memory and stories as 
liminal figures like shadows and shades, or as the endless play of language. However, 
while Absalom’s characters insist on language’s inability to refer to actuality and on 
memory’s inability to extend beyond the individual mind, what lurks behind Miss Rosa’s, 
Mr. Compson’s, and finally Quentin’s frustration is a longing for a materially verifiable 
reality that could be translated into language. The cynicism and self-reflexivity of 
Absalom’s storytellers results from this longing for artifacts that could make the story of 
the Sutpen family clear. Relegated to the status of shades, these characters strive to 
rematerialize the subjects of their stories, bringing all back to embodied life. 
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 Thus, despite the skepticism about language that pervades Absalom, for the 
characters, the dream remains that the right kind of retelling will miraculously reanimate 
materiality. From the novel’s opening, truth is described in terms of the solidification and 
reanimation of long-dead bodies or the reemergence of lost spaces, buildings, and woods. 
And thus, storytelling that resembles the divine invocation of “let there be light” creates a 
material world. For example, Quentin imagines the emergence of Sutpen’s Hundred as 
the result of a magical invocation, where language brings a substantive world into being: 
Quentin seemed to watch them [Sutpen, his slaves, and his architect] 
overrun suddenly the hundred square miles of tranquil and astonished 
earth and drag house and formal gardens violently out of the soundless 
Nothing and clap them down like cards upon a table beneath the up-palm 
immobile and pontific, creating the Sutpen’s Hundred, the Be Sutpen’s 
Hundred like the oldentime Be Light. (8-9) 
Of course, Sutpen’s Hundred does not emerge out of “soundless Nothing” but out of the 
“tranquil and astonished earth,” and it is not a magical invocation but the labor of black 
slaves that creates the “house and formal gardens” of Sutpen’s wealth. The Sutpen legacy 
as experienced by Quentin in 1910 is a thoroughly hybrid entity, a mixture of material 
effects, events, stories, and language. However, the long history of coming to terms with 
the Sutpen legacy functions as a purification that erases material realities and that isolates 
legends. According to Richard Godden, the Sutpen erasure of material realities includes a 
suppression of the plantation’s racial history of injustice. Sutpen can become an 
archetypal Southern plantation owner or a phantomlike force of evil only if he emerges 
from nothingness. Again, as in “The Bear,” racial amnesia leads to imagined 
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immateriality. This myth of miraculous appearance ignores the plantation’s reliance on 
the material labor of captive bodies, the material origin of the buildings, and the material 
processes required to make woodlands into cotton fields. The processes of translation 
connecting the wilderness to the plantation, and the plantation to the present ruins are 
processes of labor; ignoring these mobilizing steps results in the disconnected elements of 
a mythical wilderness, a mythical plantation, and a mythical fall. So, Quentin’s 
knowledge of the Sutpen family must rest upon an understanding of transformations and 
events; his quest to trace back to the Sutpens’ past may well unearth suppressed material 
connections of labor and race. 
 And thus, as Absalom opens, it features a central myth that, like the wilderness 
myth of “The Bear,” relies on imbroglios of materiality and immateriality. Characters 
struggling to understand the Sutpen story seek on the one hand to find a bedrock of 
undeniable truth by turning to material artifacts. On the other hand, they strive to render 
the story merely mythical, ignoring the material realities of the past, including the labor 
of slaves and the eradication of wilderness spaces. To use Latour’s language, they 
participate in the creation of hybrid forms while trying to purify these hybrids. Torn 
between such competing desires, the characters of Absalom imagine themselves as 
equally hybrid figures situated between the material and the immaterial. But these 
“impure” identities are, according to the terms of the modern constitution within which 
the characters operate, eternally caught, as Mr. Compson imagines in The Sound and the 
Fury, in “a stalemate of dust and desire” with dust representing a liminal state somewhere 
between material reality and the immaterial space of myth. 
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 Even more so than “The Bear,” Absalom obsesses over dust, a gritty material 
substance that hovers at the boundary of perceptibility. Dust appears in many roles in this 
novel: it gathers on untouched artifacts; it is left behind by rotted bodies and 
disintegrating letters, a marker of materiality’s passing; it floats on the air during the hot 
summer of Rosa’s retelling, differentiating this air of the Southern past from the icy cold 
air of the Northern present, when Quentin and Shreve try yet again to reconstruct the 
Sutpen legacy. It is not from nothingness but from “out of the biding and dreamy and 
victorious dust” that Sutpen and all his offspring emerge. It becomes one of the sensory 
markers linking Quentin the Harvard storyteller back to Quentin the Jefferson listener: 
when Mr. Compson’s letter arrives, it is the dust, “the wistaria, the cigar smell, the 
fireflies” that are evoked by “his father’s hand” on the page, all of which together are 
“attenuated up from Mississippi” by the written word (173). 
Dust thus provides a metaphor for the hybridity of memory, locating narration 
between the material and the immaterial. This liminal doubleness appears when Quentin 
calls the dust both “weightless permeant dust” and a thing that can “itself move sluggish 
and dry across his sweating flesh,” alluding both to dust’s elusiveness and its tangibility 
(362). Dust illustrates the material world’s hybrid nature, signifying its potential to 
become insubstantial. The term “shade” or “shadow” similarly illustrates the dual nature 
of people. Somewhere between the ephemerality of a spirit and the solid flesh of a living 
body, the storytellers of Absalom partake of the same mixture of embodiment and dream 
that defines the dusty landscape. As Quentin listens to Miss Rosa talk, he imagines 
people’s bodies functioning in the liminal space between the material and the imagined, 
becoming “notpeople, in notlanguage” (9). A childhood spent participating in a half-
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actualized process of remembering transforms Quentin himself into a shade, a being 
caught between materiality and language. His “very body was an empty hall echoing with 
sonorous defeated names; he was not a being, an entity, he was a commonwealth. He was 
a barracks filled with stubborn back-looking ghosts” (12). This formulation resembles the 
hybrid relationship between the material and the immaterial that appears in Go Down, 
Moses. Quentin’s role as storyteller does not just invite him to walk a middle line 
between language and the material world. Instead, his existence is hybrid, his “very 
[material] body” composed out of ghosts, voices, and stories. Living, material bodies are 
thus partially created from the immaterial. 
This hybridity explains why there can be transformations between the language of 
storytelling and the material bodies of the past – why “as though in inverse ratio to the 
vanishing voice, the invoked ghost of the man who she could neither forgive nor revenge 
herself upon began to assume a quality almost of solidity, permanence” (13). When living 
bodies immerse themselves in language, when language evokes a memory or a “quality” 
of “solidity,” the division between language and the material becomes small: not an 
ontological gap to be bridged by philosophical leaps of faith, but small gaps that can be 
overcome by the process of telling stories in “elapsed and yet-elapsing time” (22). Shreve 
and Quentin’s attempt to understand the Sutpen story finds them navigating this space 
between the material and the imagined as, hundreds of miles from Quentin’s home, they 
piece together the Sutpen tale from what material evidence Quentin gathered. The two 
both become hybrid shades by interacting with stories and artifacts. When, for example, 
Shreve and Quentin interact with Mr. Compson’s letter, a material artifact that contains a 
written tale, they collapse their identities with the shades of Charles Bon and Henry 
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Sutpen: “both of them were Henry Sutpen and both of them were Bon, compounded of 
each both yet either neither, smelling the very smoke which had blown and faded away 
forty-six years ago” (351). 
Louise Westling argues that Shreve’s and Quentin’s retellings of the Sutpen story 
attempt to replace embodied relationships with textual connections. Specifically, their 
“marriage of speaking and hearing” provides an alternative to the fleshy, embodied 
relationships that united Thomas Sutpen with his slaves. For Westling, Absalom connects 
bodies and the earth, investigating “dark bodies that stand for the wild energies and dark 
volcanic body of the earth” (127). Sutpen wrestles his slaves, taming them to his will and 
using them to tame the earth into plantation farmland. These relationships between bodies 
are sexualized, suggesting “Sutpen’s real marriage is to the primitive landscapes of Haiti 
and Mississippi” (128). In Mr. Compson’s account of Sutpen’s self-creation we see “the 
violence of Sutpen’s engagement with the virgin bottom land,” a “process of submersion, 
physical union, and almost erotic struggle with the substance of the wilderness earth” 
(Westling 131). Shreve and Quentin match the intensity but not the violence of Sutpen’s 
passion as they strive to understand his story. These characters, unlike Sutpen, strive 
towards “a Platonic marriage of words that he [Faulkner] cannot really believe” and they 
thus “strain [. . .] to become ‘free of flesh’ like the ghosts they conjure” (140). Yet 
Westling points out that this flight from materiality fails since “the promised 
transcendence cannot occur” (140). She highlights how Shreve and Quentin remain 
fleshy bodies in a cooling room. Their status as embodied beings and the world’s status 
as a concrete thing interrupt their textual fantasy. While they may pursue a purely textual 
relationship, such a fantasy is just another form of purification that ignores the hybrid 
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nature of storytelling. Despite Quentin’s attempts to escape into language, he cannot 
suspend his belief in the reality of the events described. Faulkner reminds us that it is 
only to one of them, “to Shreve,” that the characters and stories they create remain 
“shadows in turn of what were [. . .] shades too” (303). For Quentin, no difficulties of 
language nor dreams of textuality can erase the fact that the Sutpens were, as Mr. 
Compson said, “people once as we are [. . .] who had the gift of loving once or dying 
once instead of being diffused limb from limb from a grab bag and assembled” (89). For 
Quentin, unlike Shreve, his own experiences and sensory memories mingle with the 
stories he heard and with the words passed to him on paper. 
If his embodiment thwarts his escape into a purely textual relationship with 
Shreve, it also animates the texts for him, making them more than ghosts, myths, or tales. 
As Quentin remembers his trip to the Sutpen house, he insists on still-immediate sensory 
perceptions: “He could taste and feel the dust [. . .] He could even smell the old woman” 
(362). Quentin’s sensory memory makes the Sutpen story unbearably real for him even as 
the fluid play of storytelling makes the Sutpen story feel unreal. To the extent that he 
believes in the need for modern purification, he is stuck. He acknowledges the Sutpen 
story as an assembled construction “out of the rag-tag and bob-ends of old tales and 
talking [of] people who perhaps had never existed at all anywhere” (303). But he also 
recognizes a difference between his stories of the South and pure fiction: the very air he 
breathed was breathed by the figures standing behind these stories. These characters left 
marks on the land, pressed hand to page, and left scratches of writing behind. Textuality 
offers Quentin no escape because he remains embodied and because the characters he 
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assembles connect back to beings who were once embodied. The uncomfortable reality of 
history is that it cannot be hermetically sealed off from the world: it is not only fiction. 
Like Ike, Quentin discovers that an escape into textuality can attempt, as Westling 
argues, to conceal past material violence. But this attempt crumbles if one recognizes the 
hybridity of storytelling. Ike cannot pursue the bear, the great symbol of wilderness, 
without finally seeing, even slaying, this body; such a move challenges the abstraction of 
wilderness, which opens up the door to considering the bodies of slaves and Native 
Americans that were erased to maintain a purified concept of wilderness. Quentin cannot 
witness Miss Rosa’s tale without accompanying her to the Sutpen house, seeing the 
actual Sutpen bodies, and realizing the erasures that Thomas Sutpen hid from himself as 
he built his plantation. Quentin’s violent closing assertion that he does not hate the South 
thus functions as a desperate attempt to keep just such knowledge at bay. 
“At Least a Scratch”: Writing and Material Artifacts 
 Quentin’s desperation at the end of Absalom demonstrates his failure to 
understand the history of the Sutpens within the dichotomy of reality/language he inherits 
from his father. The general uselessness of this dichotomy and its power in the 
Compsons’ intellectual life appears most vividly when Mr. Compson and Quentin are 
considering a letter supposedly passed from Judith to Quentin’s grandmother. This 
anonymous letter proves to be one of the most critically central artifacts in Absalom. 
David Krause’s point that the Bon letter is “just about the only scrap of evidence (other 
than the gravestone) that a man named Charles Bon ever existed and intruded on the lives 
of the Sutpens” highlights this letter’s importance (225). Supposedly written to Judith by 
Bon (but unsigned), the product of confiscated Union stove polish impressed onto paper 
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confiscated from a Southern plantation, the letter offers both symbolic possibility and 
self-reflexive obscurity. The letter also prompts Mr. Compson’s frustrated skepticism 
towards language and history. For it is of this letter that Mr. Compson proclaims the 
ephemeral existence of 
Judith, Bon, Henry, Sutpen: all of them. They are there, yet something is 
missing; they are like a chemical formula exhumed along with the letters 
from that forgotten chest, carefully, the paper old and faded and falling to 
pieces, the writing faded, almost indecipherable, yet meaningful, familiar 
in shape and sense, the name and presence of volatile and sentient forces; 
you bring them together in the proportions called for, but nothing happens; 
you re-read, tedious and intent, poring, making sure that you have 
forgotten nothing, made no miscalculation; you bring them together again 
and again nothing happens: just the words, the symbols, the shapes 
themselves, shadowy inscrutable and serene, against that turgid 
background of a horrible and bloody mischancing of human affairs. (100-
101) 
Here, Mr. Compson interprets the letter in terms of failed chains of transformation. The 
comparison of writing to a failed chemical reaction suggests that some critical material 
component that preserves translation is missing. Without the missing information, what 
remains is that frustrated dichotomy between the text and the past world – between “the 
words, the symbols, the shapes” and “men and women who once lived and breathed.” 
While Mr. Compson’s interpretation provides the origin for his frustrated view of 
language, the Bon letter demands more analysis. Krause argues that it is difficult to get a 
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fix on what the letter proves, since Faulkner situates it within competing readings and 
within uncertainty regarding its origin, its delivery, and its eventual transfer to the 
Compson family. The letter itself, when the reader finally sees its text, appears as self-
reflexive and mystifying as Faulkner’s prose. Krause juxtaposes the letter with Thomas 
Sutpen’s own attempts to learn how to read while he is in school, discovering in both 
clues as to how to read Absalom itself. When Sutpen hears stories about the West Indies 
that prompt him to seek his fortune there, he believes that the stories tell the truth and that 
he must follow them in order to succeed. According to Krause’s reading, the “innocence” 
of which General Compson accuses Sutpen lies in his willingness to read texts as 
“representational, referential truth” free from authorial manipulation; Sutpen believes 
reading is an “innocent, transparent activity, merely a matter of neutrally processing 
material embedded in words printed on a page” (Krause 228). By contrast, the rest of 
Faulkner’s literate characters develop more sophisticated modes of reading as they 
analyze Bon’s letter. 
These characters’ more skeptical approaches suggest, according to Krause, a 
number of realities about how reading relates to history for Faulkner: first, reader and 
writer must work together to establish truth; second, reading must incorporate both 
textuality and speech – what Donoghue calls “epos” and “graphos” (qtd. in Krause 226); 
third, “Faulkner, like Foucault, sees text as (simultaneously) ‘document’ and 
‘monument’” – that is, both as a historically functioning artifact that points to past 
material events and as a text that can function as an independent, even literary piece 
without need of external referent” (Krause 226). For example, Quentin and Shreve 
reimagine reading as a process contingent on their situated perspectives as readers, and 
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they reimagine textuality as a multifaceted connection between language and materiality 
rather than as the kind of adequatio suggested by Sutpen’s mode of reading. 
But their struggle to avoid Sutpen’s innocence and develop a more satisfactory 
reading strategy becomes even more complexly related to materiality if we also consider 
Richard Godden’s economic and racial interpretation of Sutpen’s innocence and his 
failure to read well. According to Godden, Sutpen’s collapse is not caused by innocence 
but by “his disorientating insight into the dependencies of slave production” (696-97). 
Godden argues that Sutpen’s education was an economic awakening forced on him by his 
family’s move from Appalachian mountain independence to poor white inferiority in the 
land of Tidewater plantations. When turned away from a plantation door by a black slave, 
young Sutpen feels inferior due to poverty for the first time in his life, becoming 
enmeshed in the paradoxical hierarchies of race and class in the antebellum American 
South. Unlike the mountain man, whose worth derives from strength and independence, 
the white plantation owner’s worth derives from a cultivated passivity, where (the young 
Sutpen observes) white men lay in hammocks and black men work in the fields and pour 
the white men drinks. The privilege of the white man thus entirely depends upon the 
labor of black bodies, and the only way to access privilege is to make oneself equally 
dependent. Godden argues, “What [Sutpen] sees is traumatic because it leaves him no 
possibility of an un-enslaved life” (696-97). Either one is working as a slave to support 
the privilege of the relaxing white man, or one becomes the relaxing white man who is 
enslaved by dependency to the labor of others. Thus, “Sutpen’s solution is innocence” or 
more specifically, a forgetting of the racial dependencies and paradoxes shaping his life 
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(Godden 696). Like the McCaslins, Sutpen salvages identity by erasing the material 
existence of the black individuals shaping his past. 
Pairing Godden and Krause’s readings allows us to situate Sutpen’s beginnings in 
the plantation system with regards to both the material world and textuality. Like Ike and 
the McCaslins, Sutpen erases material history and escapes into a textual fantasy, 
substituting a world depicted in books because he believes in the transparency of 
reference. Even before his escape into a textual dream of the West Indies, Sutpen tries to 
retreat from a complex material world into a world of myth, “remov[ing] himself,” as 
Godden argues, by crawling into the woods “from human nature to nature, and from 
cotton production to self-sufficiency” (697). Like Ike McCaslin, Sutpen tries to dissolve 
his economic implication and salvage his identity through reversion to a conventional 
American myth of wilderness self-sufficiency. However, as Godden points out, “Both 
removals are illusory. In the cotton South, the earth itself is a fact of labor, whose 
meaning is inseparable from the dominant form of work” (697). In Sutpen’s cotton South, 
the myth of wilderness is not an accessible fantasy, as it is for Ike whose mythic 
wilderness is facilitated by the collapse of cotton farming in the 1890s. Instead of Ike’s 
ignorance of the methodical erasure of the woods, Sutpen’s innocence ignores his 
reliance on slave labor and his participation in the cotton economy. And just as Ike’s 
transformation of material wilderness into wilderness myth stems from his own 
capitulation to a dichotomy between language and the world, Sutpen’s myth and his 
creation of a plantation from the forest derives from a naïve form of reading that 
privileges referentiality at the expense of processes. Ike and Sutpen both fail to develop 
the complex mode of reading that, according to Krause, Faulkner sees as necessary. In 
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Latour’s terms, Ike and Sutpen both also fail to read hybridity, substituting simplified 
myths for complex webs of material interconnection and cultural narrative. 
Thus, to read his own artifacts and history correctly, Quentin needs to balance a 
commitment to texts’ potential referentiality with an awareness of meaning’s 
contingency. He must learn, unlike Sutpen, how the relationship between text and 
material reality can deceive if the two are separated. Such reading involves traversing that 
risky, slippery path between materiality and textuality, coming to terms with history and 
reality as constrained constructions, shaped by the reader, fragile in their truths, but also 
able to connect the individual to meaning. Krause explores how one might develop such a 
reading in his discussion of the tension between “epos” and “graphos,” between textuality 
and artifactuality, and between “semiotics” and “semantics.” According to Krause, Mr. 
Compson struggles as he reads Bon’s letter because he comes to it in search of history 
and meaning, wanting it to be both an artifact that points to specific past events and a text 
that communicates its own self-contained meaning: 
Mr. Compson [. . .] confronted in Bon’s letter with a nearly anonymous 
text from the past, a fragment of different circumstances, cannot recover 
or discover the sense of history, the cultural or imaginative contexts, texts, 
and codes that make the letter readable [. . .] in Bon’s self-referential 
letter, Compson finds not just a physical symbol from the past that he 
cannot read semiotically but a self-enclosing text of ‘spidery script’ (129), 
a verbal web that he can neither read semantically nor disentangle from 
himself. Instead of history Compson finds poetry, and he cannot 
understand that the unreadibility of the letter as poetic text allows him to 
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go on, to generate his own reading, his own (hi)story. Compson looks in 
the letter for something not there and sees himself looking. (229) 
For Krause, Compson cannot enjoy the play of language in the letter because he is trying 
to do “epireading” rather than “graphireading.” Compson pursues historical truth instead 
of embracing the free proliferation of “his own (hi)story” that, unhinged from the 
limitations of reference, can give him endless cultural power. Krause argues that the 
historical accuracy of the Sutpen story is not finally of real importance. A demand for 
referentiality limits the multiple social or psychological functions texts potentially fulfill. 
Similarly, R. Rio-Jeliffe claims that Absalom argues for the power of fiction; 
fiction can be more powerful than history, since, as Miss Rosa contends, invented or 
potential truths can be “more true than truth” (143). Thus, Rio-Jeliffe contends that in 
“The historical context of Absalom, Absalom!, the actual presence of fact is of less value 
than Quentin’s magical transmutation of ‘shadowy. . . myth’ into ‘shadowy character’ 
(104) who nevertheless lives” (77). Historical reality matters less than an effective sense 
of reality (80). Indeed, the thwarted desire for a non-existent historical “truth” explains 
why Mr. Compson experiences the letter as “a chemical formula” that fails; “just the 
words, the symbols, the shapes themselves” are insufficient for Mr. Compson’s purposes, 
because he wants historical truth and not just language. In Krause’s estimation, what 
could have helped Mr. Compson’s reading is Foucault’s way of thinking about historical 
writing as both artifact and text: 
Historical reading [of the kind Mr. Compson mistakenly practices] sees 
the text as document in need of translation, interpretation, while 
archaeological reading sees the text as monument to its own textuality and 
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temporality. [. . .] In Absalom, Mr. Compson values interpretation and 
referentiality (‘men and women who once lived and breathed are now 
merely initials or nicknames [100-01]) and closure. Like most critics who 
come after him, Compson wants to read Bon’s letter as a document, 
though the letter itself insists on its temporality, its condition as monument 
in time: ‘Because what IS is something else again because it was not even 
alive then’ (131). (Krause 230) 
Krause insists that Foucault’s “archaeological reading” could help Mr. Compson interpret 
the tensions of the Bon letter by keeping him from reducing the letter’s own playful 
relationship to the world into unsuccessful referentiality. Krause sees a model of this kind 
of double, liminal, archaeological reading in Judith’s approach to the Bon letter. Judith, 
by contrast to Mr. Compson, 
minimizes, even tries to erase any meaning (‘it not to mean anything in 
itself’) and emphasizes significance (‘at least it would be something’); she 
stresses the unstable activity of signifying, downplaying signifiers and 
signified. [. . .] Judith reminds us that even a scrap of paper may demand 
attention as both document and monument [. . .]. (232) 
For Krause, what matters about Judith’s way of reading as imagined by Mr. Compson – 
and what he wishes Mr. Compson would himself practice – is flexible doubleness that 
leaves space for both material connections and textual self-sufficiency. “Significance,” 
the unreferential but memorable import of actions; and “meaning,” the ability of the text 
to point to historical realities, are both possible. But the text cannot be forced to occupy 
either one of these functions. Krause sees in Compson’s Judith the both/and of dust and 
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liminality. He claims, “written texts endure for Faulkner (as for Foucault) as uniquely 
coded monumental documents” (238). Therefore, he concludes, “their most complete 
reading must be one that works hard (yet relaxes enough) to remain acutely sensitive to 
the intricate, ceaseless play of signification, thing and word, silence and voice, scrap of 
paper and faint spidery script” (238). 
The actual, material problems driving the characters’ struggle to understand 
representation should suggest why the concept of “intricate, ceaseless play” is not finally 
enough for either Ike McCaslin or Quentin Compson. The economic and racial problems 
driving Quentin’s flight to Harvard and Ike’s flight into an imaginary wilderness are too 
pressing to be dismissed with paradox and the play of theory. If Faulkner’s characters are 
to embrace play, they must emphasize the thing as much as the word, the meaning as 
much as the significance, or they will end up as frozen as Miss Rosa or as useless as Mr. 
Compson. The idea of play between textuality and historical reality ends up reproducing 
the dichotomy that Mr. Compson forwards, insisting that language sometimes is just 
language and that one is wrong to try and make it mean something more. Thus, the 
concept of “play” seems too cavalier to ground Quentin’s hunt for understanding. While 
Krause reads this idea of play as something that would have helped Mr. Compson, it 
reproduces the slipperiness of signification that Mr. Compson already practices. It is after 
all he who ventriloquizes Judith. When Quentin notes that all of the novels’ narrators 
(Mr. Compson, Miss Rosa, Shreve, and Quentin himself) sound the same, he suggests 
that they all have adopted a dichotomous approach to language and the world. They are 
already engaged in the liminal state of play, where Quentin and Shreve collapse their 
identities with the shades they have created. But they cannot experience the fluidity and 
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motion that Krause ascribes to such play without finding a way to escape the limiting 
poles of their paradoxes. 
From Stalemate to Hybridity: Object Lessons for Ecocritics 
The danger that Quentin fears and that Mr. Compson embodies is that viewing 
language and texts as pure play can lead to moral relativism. Like ecocritics that have 
reacted to the constructivist turn in environmental studies by reaffirming language’s 
referential capacity, Quentin reacts against the way that the play of language can reduce 
the seeming urgency of ethical commitments. As ecocritics developing sophisticated 
awareness of and responses to the complicated relationship between language and 
materiality, we hope for more tenable solutions to our paradoxical situatedness than such 
despair. While Faulkner’s novels provide a sophisticated examination of the relationship 
between the world and the text, showing us how economic, environmental, and literary 
concerns interconnect, in the end Faulkner’s novels offer only desperate solutions 
because his characters remain committed to the purification of language and the world. 
While recognizing the ways that racial exploitation, economic collapse, and 
environmental destruction all contribute to his experience of the South as cursed, Ike still 
cannot address these balances; he cannot adapt his stories of the wilderness to changing 
material conditions. Thus, instead of a changed relationship with the environment, Ike 
chooses renunciation of the land and immersion in a fantasy. Warping the Thoreauvian 
model of retreat, Ike immerses himself in a masculinist wilderness fantasy that cannot 
speak to the injustices affecting his home. Like Thoreau, he recognizes the moral 
shortcomings of his region’s economic system and like Thoreau he retreats towards an 
ideal of wilderness as a response. However, unlike Thoreau, Ike McCaslin continues to 
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participate in the corrupt economies he sees and salves his conscience with temporary 
retreats into woods that he simplifies into a fantasy vision of wilderness. 
While recognizing a similarly complex and troubled history – one mingling 
deluded representations, racial lies, and poor uses of the land – Quentin Compson also, in 
his own way, simply renounces his inheritance, embracing the opposed imperatives of 
purification and hybridity in his suicide in The Sound and the Fury. This death separates 
his bones from his soul, but then reimagines his soul as a pair of floating eyes that 
continue to perceive the world he longs to escape (80). He recognizes Mr. Compson’s 
relativity and immersion in language as poisonous symptoms of a broken relationship 
between words and things; he recognizes that material loss has triggered the breakdown 
in meaning that allows Mr. Compson to dismiss letters, morality, history, and Quentin’s 
own suffering as “just words.” But unable to provide any alternative hermeneutics – 
unable to read any better than Mr. Compson – Quentin chooses a death that renders him 
as paradoxical as history or as text, one that embodies hybridity while imagining itself as 
a successful purification. 
Yet, although they do not provide us with a hopeful model of how to develop a 
politics strong enough to encompass both the tenuousness and the iron strength of 
language, Faulkner’s novels serve as warnings about the dangers of embracing the 
dichotomy between words and the world when we approach our own negotiations 
between the interconnected issues of race relations, resource management, economic 
viability, environmental protection, and the preservation of history. Focus only on 
language, Faulkner’s novels warn, and you will become like Mr. Compson, drinking 
himself to death without the ability to reach out to his children or to take on any ethical 
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stances. Alternatively, you might become like Ike, living in a simplified world that 
functions through disavowal and denial, that allows participation in despicable systems 
and leaves you impotent to react when hidden material realities reemerge. To divorce the 
material world from language is to diminish the power that histories can have to warn and 
to guide: had Ike listened to the stories of his past and recognized them as more than 
mere myths, he might have been able to recognize the continuity between the ownership 
battles of early colonial Jefferson and the industrialization of the land in his present day. 
He might also have been able to believe that these stories could provide something other 
than mere myths– that they could point to actions that a community should avoid and 
address rather than simply describe a doom already set in stone.  
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CHAPTER VI 
“WHAT LITTLE I CAN IN WRITING”: LET US NOW PRAISE FAMOUS MEN AND 
THE ETHICAL POSSIBILITIES OF CONSTRAINED REALISM 
This is a book only by necessity. More seriously, it is an effort in human 
actuality.  
James Agee, Let Us Now Praise Famous Men 
 
It is simply an effort to use words in such a way that they will tell as much 
as I want to and can make them tell of a thing which happened and which, 
of course, you have no other way of knowing.  
 James Agee, Let Us Now Praise Famous Men58 
 
 
Almost three hundred and fifty pages into Let Us Now Praise Famous Men, writer 
James Agee finally tells the reader the story of the first day he stayed with the Gudgers, 
one of the three tenant families that became the focus of Agee’s collaborative project 
with Farm Security Administration photographer Walker Evans. An assignment for 
Fortune magazine sent Agee and Evans to Mill Hill, Alabama in 1936 to write an article 
about Southern tenant farmers for the magazine’s “Life and Circumstances” series 
(Lofaro xxii)59. But the intended article never made it to print. Not published until 1941, 
the finished book that grew out of their research differed significantly from the planned 
journalistic exposé and from the bulk of Depression-era documentary journalism. As 
Agee explains when he describes first coming to stay with the Gudgers, his experience in 
Mill Hill was neither clear-cut nor objective. Instead, his experience was one of failure, 
self-consciousness, and loss of control. In an age when documentary journalism was 
                                                 
58
 According to their respective introductions to Let Us Now Praise Famous Men, James Agee and Walker 
Evans envisioned this work as a truly collaborative project, combining Evans’s photography with Agee’s 
writing in a way that escaped hierarchy or privilege of either form. However, when referring primarily to 
the prose writing, I simply cite Agee. This concision of reference is in no way intended to downplay the 
complex working relationship between these two artists. 
 
59
 James S. Miller claims that the article was originally planned as a five thousand word essay in support of 
rural electrification projects (385). 
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taking off as a tool of social reform and as a government-subsidized response to 
widespread crisis – in a time when works such as Ernest Caldwell and Margaret Bourke-
White’s You Have Seen Their Faces claimed to capture the very faces of America’s 
farming poor – Agee’s prose exhibits a contrasting ambivalence. In one scene, the story 
of Agee’s arrival at the Gudger home repeats questions of surrender and control, success 
and failure that shape Praise as a work that simultaneously embraces the political 
potential of documentary to “tell of a thing that happened” and rejects documentary 
journalism’s aesthetic, ethical, and representational failings (217). 
Throughout Praise, Agee doubts the accuracy of his experiences as well as his 
writing’s ability to convey what he observed to his readers. As he claims, speaking of his 
first encounters with the Gudgers, “Things which were then at least immediate in my 
senses, I now know only as at some great and untouchable distance; distinctly, yet coldly 
as through reversed field-glasses, and with no warmth or traction or faith in words: so 
that at best I can hope only to ‘describe’ what I would like to ‘describe,’ as at a second 
remove, and even that poorly” (355). This typical hesitance makes Agee believe that all 
he can do is make an effort to translate the experienced world of real events and material 
things into the poor substitute of words, and that this effort is likely to fail. He doubts his 
own situated perception’s ability to grasp what was seemingly “immediate to my senses,” 
and he doubts the “traction” of words, the ability of language to capture such fleeting 
immediacy. And yet, in spite of this doubt, he argues that his book, “in the cleanest terms 
I can learn to specify: must mediate, must attempt to record, your warm weird human 
lives each in relation to its world” (87). Agee’s desire to capture individuals and their 
worlds in order to expose and challenge the existing system of American agriculture 
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unites him with his journalistic contemporaries. It is his insistence that this project may 
not “be lightly undertaken: not lightly, not easily by any means: nor by any hope 
‘successfully’” that makes Praise unusual (87). 
These tensions of hope and failure mark Agee’s project from his first moment of 
encounter with the Gudgers. He literally gets stuck at their door. While he and Evans 
have already met and photographed all three families who will form the center of Praise, 
the men have not yet started staying with them. Staying with the Gudgers becomes 
necessary in the aftermath of a violent rainstorm when Agee gets his car stuck in the wet 
clay road outside their home. In a passage entitled “Second Introit,” Agee explains that 
his car gets stuck specifically because he fails to read and navigate the mud correctly. Yet 
this failure provides an opening into the lives of the families. As Agee describes the 
mechanical trouble that leads to his first night in the Gudgers’ home, his hesitance about 
driving becomes a metaphor for his general anxiety about the documentary project60: 
the clay was so wrought-up it was necessary each time to guess again. You 
can’t afford to use brakes in this sort of material, and whatever steering 
you do, it must be as light-handed as possible; about the only thing to say 
of speed in such situations is to go a full shade faster most of the time than 
you can imagine is at all safe to go. [. . .] driving, you feel less like an 
‘operator’ than like a sort of passive-active brain suspended at the center 
of a machine, careful to let it take its own way [. . .] well, I didn’t know 
                                                 
60
 Peter Cosgrove also reads Agee’s driving scene as metaphorical for artistic process, emphasizing the way 
that the car manifests Agee’s ambivalence about intrusion into rural communities. But Cosgrove also reads 
the car as representative of Agee’s desire to control the process of representation, seeing his run off the 
road as paralleling the thwarted objectivist realism that Agee, despite his protestation, longs to achieve. His 
reading does not emphasize, as mine does, the odd mix of delight and frustration that Agee finds in his 
car’s failure. 
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then, and don’t now, whether the things I was doing to save it were 
‘correct’ or not, and whether or not it was by my will that I wrung the 
wheel and drove so deep that there was no longer any hope at all of getting 
it out [. . .]. (359-60) 
These tensions about the car mirror the tensions framing the work as a whole: a sense of 
losing control and yet trying to steer lightly, of trying to be a “passive-active” being as he 
approaches his subjects; guilt about his presence paired with exhilaration at having 
reached a point of being in so deep that there is no chance of leaving; uncertainty about 
whether the writing and the observation he plans to do will be the “correct” way to “save” 
the tenant families. By recklessly launching himself into just such a mire of emotions, 
risking a failed effort to drive through mud and a failed effort to read his material 
environment accurately, Agee finds entrance into the lives of the Gudgers. The 
vulnerability born of his failures and his resulting need for shelter allow Agee to share an 
intimate moment with this family. Failure and impasses thus create possibilities for 
moments of genuine encounter that go beyond the formality of photography and 
interviews. 
On a larger scale, Praise’s failure to capture the material detail and emotional 
complexity of the Gudgers’ lives results in the book’s self-reflexive sense of impasse, 
while also leading to its unusual intimacy and attentiveness. Whether or not documentary 
journalism is the “correct” response to the stuck situation of 1930s tenant farming, Praise 
rushes in anyway, aware of and yet attempting to finesse its way across the ethical 
dangers of speaking for those unable to represent themselves, hoping that such daring 
will open up moments of vulnerability and genuine contact. Any documentary knowledge 
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of tenant farming and any ability to represent these farmers successfully must come from 
within this mix of earnestness and stuckness. Thus, Praise enters the lives of the 
Gudgers, Ricketts, and Woods families with a mix of reckless speed, guesswork, and 
failure. The self-reflexive agonizing of Praise suggests a central narrator who has driven 
in too deep to extricate himself; caught in the muddy and “wrought-up” world of the 
tenant farmers, Agee has no choice but to seek their hospitality, embracing all the 
inconvenience and intrusion his presence causes and hoping some good will come of it. 
The discomfort, self-reflexivity, and effort that Agee describes in the mud scene 
are thus integral to his efforts to steer through the failures of documentary journalism. 
Despite its roots in journalism, the finished Praise hesitates to embrace what T. V. Reed 
has seen as the predominantly realist mode of representation evident in documentary 
work from the 1930s. Rather, the book constantly revisits Agee's moral and political 
skepticism about photojournalistic texts that 
pry intimately into the lives of an undefended and appallingly damaged 
group of human beings [. . .] for the purpose of parading the nakedness, 
disadvantage and humiliation of these lives before another group of human 
beings, in the name of science, of ‘honest journalism’ (whatever that 
paradox may mean) [. . .]. (Agee 5) 
Frequently read as a rejection of reform-oriented documentary in general and specifically 
framed in Agee’s appendices as a rebuttal of Bourke-White’s and Caldwell’s You Have 
Seen Their Faces, Agee's cynicism about ‘honest journalism’ questions not only 
reporters’ and photographers’ invasion of disadvantaged communities but also the very 
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notion of “realist” documentary representation.61 Praise as a whole despairs of ever 
finding words and images to convey the harsh life of tenant farming without in the 
process reducing its subjects to sentimentalized, simplified objects of pity, types of a 
class, or aestheticized images within a lifeless, ineffectual art. While Praise engages with 
ethical and political questions about the effects and effectiveness of the documentary, this 
political skepticism connects directly to a more fundamental skepticism: a skepticism 
about words and language, about perception and the self. Like science studies and 
ecocritical theory, Praise challenges both the idea of being able to know the world 
through the accumulation of data and the idea of adequately referential language, 
insisting that no amount of documentation or data can ever capture the full complexity of 
a human life and its environment. But like science studies and ecocritical theory, Praise 
also insists on the importance of acknowledging a real, knowable world and of attempting 
to speak for this world in the face of injustice. Given the limitation of the documentary 
form and of language in general, Agee fixates on how to represent the three tenant 
families with whom he lived for eight weeks. His ever-present sense of impending 
failure, his deep sense of guilt about his ethical obligations to the families he is 
representing, and his earnest desire to make an “effort” at effective, accurate 
representation lead Agee into a paradoxical relationship with the documentary form he 
uses. 
This linkage of representational with ethical skepticism appears in both of the 
epigraphs cited above. In the first epigraph, Agee dismisses Praise as “a book only by 
                                                 
61
 In his appendices, Agee reprints a magazine interview with Bourke-White that references her hobbies 
and her supposed love of coats. This reprinting frames her as a wealthy photographer that naively believes 
in the political efficacy of documentary work. Such a framing associates her with the “honest journalism” 
Agee so virulently attacks. 
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necessity” and hints towards his desire to replace writing with more direct access to 
observed reality, re-imagining the project as “an effort in human actuality” (ix; emphasis 
his). By contrasting a book to actuality, Agee sets up a fundamental dichotomy between 
the material, historical world and the realm of discourse, language, and writing. This 
dismissal of the book as an ineffective substitute for material things themselves recalls 
the tendency towards “factual brutalism” that we have seen Morton describe (Morton 
123). The second epigraph more explicitly develops this tension between the material 
world and writing. Here, Agee’s attempts to represent the tenant farmers are limited by 
his own perspective as well as by language, and he admits that his text will only tell “as 
much as I want to” and “as much as I [. . .] can make them [words] tell of a thing” (217). 
While he wants to “represent, not betray, nor pretty up into art” what he calls the “chain 
of truths” that “did actually weave itself and run through” his experiences, he ultimately 
believes that accurate representation cannot be undertaken “easily” or “successfully” 
(87). As he sets out to know and represent the tenant farmers, Agee is thus as mired in his 
own limited perception and as tethered to language as he is stuck in the clay outside the 
Gudger house. 
Thus, while Agee rejects documentary journalism in specific and writing in 
general as inadequate and potentially exploitive, he also recognizes the need to represent 
the realities he observes on the tenant farms. Just as he sits in his foundered car, “feeling 
a smile all over the bones of my face as strange to me as greasepaint,” Agee feels a 
troubling, uncomfortable, yet hopeful commitment to the project of representation even 
in the midst of being mired (360).62 The need to attempt representation in spite of 
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 Given Praise’s self-conscious discomfort with the ongoing stratification of race in Alabama, it is possible 
that this mention of greasepaint is a deliberate reference to its use in blackface performance. Such an 
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documentary’s shortcomings rests on a paradox evident in the second epigraph: while 
documentary writing and photography cannot adequately represent the world, such 
representational forms may well be the only tools available for appealing to audiences 
and working towards social change. The widespread appeal of the documentary in the 
1930s shows the social reach of such work. At the same time, these popular 
documentaries disseminated images that Agee felt were unjust representations of the 
tenant farmers. To counter Bourke-White and Caldwell’s images of the sharecropper and 
to counter unjust social systems, Agee must refer to his personal experience of the 
historical, material realities of tenant farmers. His text engages with something very real 
(something “which happened”) and which the reader might not learn about any other way 
(217). The decision not to speak will only perpetuate the unethical state of tenant farming 
or sentimentalized representations of tenant farmers. As Reed explains, 
Agee and Evans’s work can illuminate the problem of representing 
‘disadvantaged’ others, a problem played out between the danger of 
appropriation and reduction through representation on the one hand and 
the equal danger on the other hand of leaving these ‘others’ unrepresented 
or represented less scrupulously and less justly. Neither pseudofastidious 
avoidance of the responsibility to represent, nor arrogant assumption of 
that responsibility, can offer much comfort to those denied the means of 
self-representation. Something other is required. (157) 
Thus, Agee finds himself in an ethical bind: to write is to risk misrepresentation, due both 
to language’s ontological difference from the world of observable things and to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
allusion would only strengthen the discomfort Agee expresses here. For an example of Agee’s discussion 
of discomfort at his intrusion into race relations, see specifically “Late Sunday Morning” (23-34). 
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inevitable distortions of personal perspective; not writing risks the unchallenged 
continuation of the status quo and leaves observed injustices in secrecy.  
In Praise, then, Agee positions himself as caught between two imperatives – first, 
to document the lives of those unknown to his readers, and second, to acknowledge the 
inevitable failure of this representational project. The desire to represent the world in 
detail for his readers stems from the idea that “If authors could make readers identify 
with the people they depicted [. . .] they might promote action to alleviate economic and 
social inequality” (Quinn 338-39). However, the impulse to disavow such identification 
reflects a fundamental skepticism about “the vast gulf in experience between readers and 
subjects” as well as “the limitations of language” (Quinn 338). In Agee’s text, the 
competing drives to get at the real and to avoid inadequate representation manifest as a 
dialectical movement between two rhetorical tendencies. On the one hand, Agee attempts 
to describe the real world as closely as possible through detailed attention to the material 
objects of his environment; as he says, “The most I can do – the most I can hope to do – 
is to make a number of physical entities as plain and vivid as possible” (97). On the other 
hand, Agee undermines textual illusions of reality by drawing attention to their 
constructed nature. Although Agee promises “plain and vivid” description, he qualifies 
such promises by also offering only “a series of careful but tentative, rudely 
experimental, and fragmentary renderings of some of the salient aspects of a real 
experience” (217). Thus, unlike many documentary projects of the time, Agee’s writing 
gives nearly as much attention to its own failures to represent the world as it does to the 
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details of the lives it describes, striving towards the “something other” Reed claims 
ethical representation demands.63 
In this chapter, I explore how Praise develops a mode of representation that, by 
acknowledging its contingency, paradoxically creates a more ethical, self-reflexive 
representation of the unrepresented environments and people of the Southern tenant 
farms. Like Reed, I argue that Agee develops a sophisticated tension between 
representational skepticism and detailed description in order to avoid the poles of 
“pseudofastidious avoidance” and “less scrupulous” representation. While many 
photodocumentaries of the 1920s and the 1930s attempt to represent the untenable 
position of American agriculture, Praise is unique in its self-conscious framing of writing 
as “effort” – as an ongoing, active attempt at communication with no guaranteed success. 
By focusing on what the process of “effort” looked like to Agee, I specifically investigate 
how we can read Praise as an “effort in human actuality” (emphasis mine). How does 
Agee imagine the processes of perception and writing as related to “actuality,” the 
material world of things that eludes language? And how can we build an ethics based on 
a “human actuality”– that is, on an inescapably human vision of the world-as-it-is shaped 
by individual perception, by language, and by specific moments of encounter? 
To understand these concepts of effort and human actuality, I look at two major 
strands in Agee’s writing. First, I examine his obsession with material things. Second, I 
focus on Agee’s obsession with the relationship between human perception and the 
material world. In his effort to capture actuality, Agee focuses on a basic division 
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 Reed argues of Praise, “the text aims in two directions: on the one hand, it seeks to make its 
presentations in typo- and photographic form as intimate, immediate, and realistic as possible (Agee at one 
point wishes he could put bits of wood, fabric, and excrement on the page; 13). And on the other hand, the 
text evolves a whole series of devices to inject doubt about any text's ability to achieve immediacy or full 
representation” (161).  
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between the material items constituting the environment of the tenant farm, the human 
acts of perception which allow the individual to engage with this environment, and the 
language available for description. Praise pairs detailed material descriptions of things – 
houses, cotton, furniture, earth, food – with self-reflexive dismissals of language’s 
referential capacity. In an effort to escape the fundamental dichotomy between textual 
construction and material reality, Praise exhaustively catalogues the material things in 
the tenant houses. This descriptive excess not only provides an alternative ethical 
approach, seeing plenitude and excess rather than lack within the farmers’ lives.64 It also 
attempts to leap across the ontological chasm, pushing language to the very edge of 
materiality. 
But even while invoking this material excess, Agee pauses, drawing attention to 
the ways in which his textual descriptions cannot capture the material world of the 
farmers’ homes. By playing with the fundamental disconnect between words and things, 
Agee forces readers to recognize possible gaps in representation: if words do not 
correspond exactly to material things, then neither can they correspond to the full reality 
of a human life or a place in the world. If words cannot provide the reader with direct 
access to plates, shoes, beds, chairs, and soil, how could they possibly provide direct 
access to the lives and faces of infinitely more complex human beings? Praise oscillates 
in its use of language, first drawing attention to the gap between language and the world, 
and then calling upon the very representative power it disavows. The gaps of human 
perception play a similarly dual role as the failings of language. Agee feels connected to 
                                                 
64
 Jeanne Follansbee Quinn assesses Agee’s exhaustive cataloguing in these terms, asserting that this 
abundance counters the typical documentary presentation of tenants as those lacking food, possessions, and 
the material markers of middle-class life. Such a reversal attempts to avoid a sentimental or simplified 
vision of the tenant farmers, illustrating how much that is not immediately visible may exist within a single 
farmer’s life. 
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and learns about the tenant farms via his own experience of the tenant farms’ sensory 
immediacy. And yet, it is only by recognizing the gaps and failures in perception that 
Agee recognizes the ways in which he can never hope to understand the world. Thus, the 
very failures of representation function, not as a distraction from the project’s political 
and ethical intervention, but as a way of creating ethical possibility. Self-reflexive 
hesitation paired with elaborate description allows Agee to use all the tools of 
nonfictional writing but helps him slow down before claiming to know all of the tenant 
families or their world. Focusing on this tension at the level of the individual, material 
object allows Agee to recognize the problems of representation and also begin to imagine 
a way of using writing and perception that still provides politically useful truth. 
 This combination of uncertainty, sensory immediacy, and material specificity 
functions as a form of what I have been calling constrained realism: literary writing that 
strategically mobilizes the world via personal observation while also self-consciously 
foregrounding the textual nature of such mobilization. Agee’s work demonstrates the 
same two competing imperatives evident in other examples of constrained realism: first, 
the imperative to recognize language and perception as subjective, constructed, and 
incomplete; second, the imperative to appeal to the material world of things in support of 
larger political or ethical claims. The tension between language’s constructed, human 
quality and the autonomy of the material world becomes particularly important in works 
that, like the documentary nonfiction of the 1920s and 1930s, struggle to make ethical 
claims about actual, material, historical conditions. To call the hardship of tenant farming 
merely a social construction is to deny its political urgency; to ignore Agee’s influential 
role in shaping how such hardship is presented is naïve and vulnerable to a sentimental 
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politics of pity.65 Agee forestalls such pity by challenging the validity of representation 
and by closely interrogating the empirical impulse to ground political decisions in 
indisputable physical artifacts. While he uses the rhetorical power of representational 
skepticism to insert doubt into facile or sentimental forms of identification, he also uses 
the rhetorical power of material description to insist on the urgency of addressing the 
economically unjust tenant farming system. The foundation of Agee’s two-part strategy 
is, as we will see, to resist viewing language as automatically representative of reality and 
instead to re-imagine it as a contingent effort with potential good effects, reckless and 
stuck as it may be. 
“Honest Journalism”: Praise’s Rebellion Against Documentary 
In undertaking the assignment for Fortune magazine, Agee and Evans became 
part of the proliferation of documentary journalism that began in the late 1920s and 
continued throughout the 1930s, fueled by government funding as well as the emergence 
of photograph-oriented magazines such as Fortune and Life. Beginning in 1935, the 
Resettlement Agency, which became the Farm Security Administration in 1937, began a 
program of photodocumentation intended to illustrate the conditions of American rural 
poverty and generate support for New Deal programming.66 But while Agee’s and 
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 Paula Rabinowitz argues that the self-reflexive nature of Praise helps to challenge the sedimentation of 
us/them binaries between viewers and documentary subjects. She contends that such disruptions in 
perception are necessary to create the possibility of political change, since us/them dichotomies reinforce 
pity and fail to challenge the social division at the root of such oppositions. Similarly, Quinn argues that 
Praise avoids sentimental pity by interrupting patterns of identification and distancing at work in 
documentary representation. 
 
66
 Michael L. Carlebach summarizes the history of the Farm Security Administration’s photography 
program, organized under Roy Stryker. In December 1936, the Resettlement Agency was made part of the 
Department of Agriculture; in September 1937 , this organization was given legal status and the name Farm 
Security Administration by the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenancy Act. Carlebach describes FSA photography 
as propaganda, not to diminish its worth but to rightly categorize it as work intended towards educating the 
urban population about the rural works of the New Deal and convincing people of the political necessity for 
government aid and reform programs. Carlebach claims that FSA photography has occupied a curious 
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Evans’s stay with the tenant families of Mill Hill originated from this documentary 
impulse and was intended to create similar magazine journalism, the final work’s self-
awareness about the limitations and failures of representation made it a reaction against 
as well as a participant in documentary trends. T. V. Reed, Paula Rabinowitz, and Jeanne 
Follansbee Quinn all argue that a tension between documentary realism and modernist 
skepticism towards language distinguishes Praise from other contemporary 
photojournalistic texts. These critics also argue that this tension allows Praise to criticize 
the superficial, sentimental ethics promoted by these “realistic” examples of 
photojournalism. Praise provides a documentary countertendency to embrace “an at 
times extreme skepticism towards the referential reliability of realist modes of narration” 
(Solomon 800). In a time when the photojournalistic piece was becoming the great 
weapon of left-leaning writers, Agee hesitates; he trusts his own words’ ability to 
transmit reality to his readers only as much as he trusts his own ability to transcend a 
privileged past and assimilate into the tenant families with whom he is living. Agee’s 
complication of reality and representation pushes against the validity of documentary 
projects, many of which assume that language can directly represent the world. 
According to Reed, 
The collapse of the capitalist economy in 1929 ushered in the most intense 
period of documentation, the most exhaustive effort to represent the ‘real’ 
in American history. The economic crash seems to have brought down 
systems of representation with it. Almost overnight, the rich modernism of 
the twenties gave way to a new realism. (156) 
                                                                                                                                                 
critical position, alienated from its political and social context and treated either as pure art or as strict 
factual documentation. 
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During this period, funded by private industry or by US government programs such as the 
Farm Security Administration (FSA) or Federal Writers’ Project (FWP), journalists and 
artists spread across the continent to capture contemporary American culture and 
document the suffering caused by the Dust Bowl and the Great Depression. On an 
unprecedented level, as Reed suggests, the circumstances of American catastrophe were 
being documented for the unaffected portions of the American public. 
There is a way in which the Dust Bowl and the Great Depression were aptly 
suited for the explosion of photodocumentation and lent themselves to this rhetoric of 
reactionary realism: these disasters’ effects were material, visible, and easily 
photographed. They had a clearly tangible reality. For example, in their classic 
documentary work An American Exodus, Dorothea Lange and Paul Schuster Taylor 
repeat an overheard “salutation in Cimarron County, Oklahoma” from August, 1938. It 
begins, “Hello there Bill. What do you know for certain?” To the response “Nothin’,” the 
original speaker claims, “Well, I know it’s windy and dusty. It’s got so we get a half a 
day between the Spring Dust Storm and the Summer Dust Storm” (103). This exchange 
codes ecological disaster as the one constant in the world of the suffering farmer. The 
familiar cycle of seasons has been replaced with a new certainty: the inescapable material 
presence of dust and wind. This world of constant, certain dust persisted across the 
United States throughout the 1930s, blanketing the entire country in a gritty, material 
reminder of the ecological disaster taking place across the North American Great Plains. 
According to Timothy Egan, “At its peak, the Dust Bowl covered one million 
acres” (9). As the plains lost their top soil, victim to persistent drought, extensive 
deforestation, and years of over-farming across the agricultural regions of the Americas, 
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the entire United States encountered disturbing physical evidence of the disaster. Clouds 
of blown soil landed in Eastern cities as well as on the towns of the West and the South: 
“dust fell like snow over Boston and Scranton, and then New York slipped under partial 
darkness” during the great storms of 1934 (Egan 151). Lange’s photograph of “The Great 
Blow of 1934” captures epic evidence of an environment gone awry, showing clouds of 
dust billowing uncannily behind the buildings of an American main street. Photography 
and a journalism committed to fact – realist modes of representation – seem like logical 
cultural responses to the combination of a material crisis too massive to ignore and a 
representational system troubled by economic collapse. Photographs of barren landscapes 
and descriptions of dirt blanketing the continent point to the sensory immediacy of the 
ecological crisis. Other ecological crises of the 1920s and 1930s were similarly visible 
and material, like the massive floodings of the Mississippi River in 1927 and 1937.67 The 
extensive documentation of the economic and ecological disasters sweeping the United 
States suggested that if only one could capture all the details of the disaster, then the 
American public could be convinced of the problem, sociological and economic solutions 
could be discovered, and the difficulties could be ameliorated. 
 But there were potential ethical dangers within this large-scale documentary 
project: sentimentalism; simplification; exploitation. For example, Daniel Fox points to 
one of the dangers of realist representation in his examination of the American Guide 
Series, a set of documentary projects completed under the FWP: “A disturbing note runs 
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 Consider the dramatic representation of the Mississippi flooding in Pare Lorentz’s 1938 film The River. 
As the booming voiceover proclaims, the flooding was a catastrophe that could be clearly charted as it 
cascaded past geographical locations, “carrying every drop of water” and “carrying all the rivers that run 
down two-thirds of the continent.” The repeated chant of “river rising” that accompanies footage of 
turbulent, muddy water reinforces the way in which this ecological disaster could be observed as it 
progressed and spread. 
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through almost every volume in the American Guide Series,” he argues, “the implication 
that the tour technique is an adequate presentation of history. The federal writers often 
have a somewhat blurred historical perspective” (Fox 4-5). According to Lionel Trilling 
along with a loss of historical perspective comes a loss of moral complexity. The result of 
the realist documentary impulse was a “social consciousness” that was “without fiber and 
contradiction” (qtd. in Rabinowitz 153). Documentary realism, in this assessment, 
presents reality as transmitted straight from world to reader and presents language as 
transparent, resulting in a glib, fast-paced “tour” across the surface details of a place or a 
group of people. Such cursory documentary does not challenge readers to change their 
lives or examine contradictions in their own behavior but cultivates what Trilling calls “a 
pity which wonderfully served the needs of the pitier” (qtd. in Rabinowitz 153). Seen 
materialized in a dark cloud looming over an American street, the Dust Bowl can invite a 
sense of horror but does not necessarily invite readers to examine how American 
capitalism contributed to over-farming and the destruction of American top soil. Even 
when such a connection is glossed by voiceovers or prose, as in The River, American 
Exodus, and You Have Seen Their Faces, that gloss can feel at odds with the pictures. 
Here, sociological analysis and sentimental pity compete for the reader’s attention, 
leading the reader to turn outwards in search of a perpetrator to blame for the destruction. 
 This tension between sociological distancing and sentimentalizing pity can be 
traced back to the progenitor of 1930s American photodocumentary works, Jacob Riis’s 
1890 How the Other Half Lives. Its very title reproduces all the paradoxes of 
representation that haunt Agee’s work: the subjects whom this documentary seeks to aid 
are unavoidably “other” than the work’s audience. The documentary work promises a 
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portal between these two worlds, offering an account not just of the other half’s 
conditions but also a participatory experience of how the other half lives. What Riis 
provides is far different, however; his chapters group around individual tenement 
buildings, alleys, or neighborhoods in late nineteenth century New York. The “surface 
level” feeling of “tour” that Fox describes fits Riis’s work, as description moves the 
reader from “The Down Town Back-alleys” to “The Cheap Lodging-houses,” from 
“Chinatown” to “Jewtown,” and from “The Color Line in New York” to “The Reign of 
Rum.” The text treats people similarly, moving from “The Italian in New York” to “The 
Bohemians” to “The Working Girls of New York.” Descriptions of the tenement dwellers 
focus more on types, groups, or categories than individual stories. The readers may learn 
the conditions defining the existence of Swedes, Chinese, Irish landlords, blind tenants, 
or immigrants, but there are few individual stories that set forth what the experience, the 
how, of this life is like. The documentary provides a sociological, detached, sweeping 
overview which culminates in a clean summation of “the bare facts with which we have 
to deal in New York” and a proposed solution: the closing chapters are entitled “What 
Has Been Done” and “How the Case Stands” (223). At the same time, photographs of 
obscenely crowded tenement houses and of children sleeping on street corners demand 
pity from the reader. Stories of women and children burning to death in fires and 
suffering from disease outbreaks function similarly. The how of life here is markedly 
viewed from the outside, and the text does not try to assess the perspectives or 
experiences of individual tenants. 
In contrast to Riis’s work, Bourke-White and Caldwell’s watershed You Have 
Seen Their Faces “struck reviewers as a new kind of book, one in which pictures 
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appeared on an equal basis with words” (Trachtenberg v). Yet Faces reproduces a 
mixture of sentimental identification, sweeping narrative, and sociological fact similar to 
that which marks How the Other Half Lives. Like Riis’s captioned photographs of 
particular areas of New York, Bourke-White’s photos identify places in their captions. 
Unlike Riis’s photos, however, these photos stand separate from the chapter text, in 
captioned clusters between the unnamed, numbered chapters, and are glossed with what 
appear to be lines of dialogue, as though the subjects themselves speak to the reader (an 
illusion that the text itself disavows in the forward note: “The legends under the pictures 
are intended to express the authors’ own conceptions of the sentiments of the individuals 
portrayed; they do not pretend to reproduce the actual sentiment of these persons”).68 The 
fictionalized captions and the separate grouping of the photographs has made the 
relationship between language and photographs a matter of critical debate, especially 
since Faces’ coherent chapters and captioned photos so starkly contrast the open-ended 
chapters and the stark, separate photographs of Praise. If Praise undermines its 
coherence via self-reflexive examination of the boundaries between text and reality, 
Faces creates coherence by collapsing this boundary through fictionalizing and summary. 
Trachtenberg calls the work “more documentary fiction than strict documentation or 
sociological analysis” (v). The text’s commitment to narrative effect over factual detail 
allows Caldwell to speak in generalities, creating an epic tone in his prose. “The South 
has always been shoved around like a country cousin,” Caldwell proclaims in the first 
chapter’s beginning. “It is the Southern Extremity of America, the Empire of the Sun, the 
Cotton States; it is the Deep South, Down South; it is The South,” he continues, setting 
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 The page on which this disclaimer appears has no page number, but is situated right after the foreword 
and right before the first title page. 
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the work’s epic scope. But, as we saw in Chapter IV with Presley’s thwarted attempts to 
write the Great Song of the West in The Octopus, such generalizing, epic representation 
risks losing sight of specifics, subsuming daily concerns in service of aesthetic or 
dramatic effect, and becoming incapable of seeing daily life as anything other than 
commonplace and dull in its very materiality. 
Caldwell’s conclusion also illustrates how an epic framework reduces the tenant 
subjects to symbols of poverty: “Ten million persons on Southern tenant farms,” he 
asserts, “are living in degradation and defeat. They have been beaten and subjected. They 
are depleted and sterile. All has been taken from them and they have nothing” (48). 
While individual faces fill Bourke-White’s frames, these faces are without specific 
histories and become more representative of certain class conditions and potentialities of 
suffering than of individual lives or experiences. According to Quinn, it is exactly this 
reduction of farmers to a general mass that Agee and Evans combat. While Caldwell can 
only weakly assert, “they are still people, they are human beings. They have life,” Agee 
and Evans seek to capture this humanness and life by narrowing their focus to the lives of 
a very few families. 
However, Trachtenberg is right to question the late twentieth century critical 
tendency to polarize Bourke-White and Caldwell against Agee and Evans, seeing one as 
simple, self-indulgent, and exploitive and the other as complex, self-reflexive, and 
ethical. As Trachtenberg argues, 
To admirers of James Agee, Caldwell’s prose now seemed simplistic and 
callous, and against the stern eye of Walker Evans, Bourke-White’s 
looked excessively theatrical and manipulative. Agee’s anguished, self-
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questioning prose and Evans’s uninflected, seemingly styleless 
photographs seemed to readers in the 1960s exactly what honesty, 
discretion, and moral integrity should look like. (vii) 
To see Bourke-White and Caldwell as naïve aesthetes misses the ways in which, 
arguably, their text does a better job of addressing the socioeconomic concerns involved 
with the plight of tenant farmers. For instance, Caldwell clearly lays out the intersecting 
economic and environmental conditions contributing to the continuing oppression of 
tenant farmers, explaining, “The soil has been depleted and eroded” and “The plantation 
system pauperized the soil to such a great degree that raising cotton became a means of 
making a living rather than a method of making a fortune” (3-4). The very epic and 
dramatic qualities that can make Faces seem reductive or simplifying also give it a 
narrative power and allow it to make firm conclusions about the causes of the depicted 
injustice. However, Faces still reveals a tendency to erase individual stories in favor of 
the epic, as evident in the utopian strains of Caldwell’s conclusion: 
The youth of the South can succeed where their mothers and fathers failed 
if they will refuse to raise another man’s cotton while hungry and in rags. 
With hope and a dream before them, they can change a hell into a living 
paradise. (48) 
Such utopian hopefulness springs from a rejection of the destructive conditions that have 
dominated the text and the photos of the preceding pages. 
The contrast between Faces’ apocalyptic/utopian rhetoric and Praise’s search for 
a more immanent hope within the already existing world appears most immediately in the 
contrasts between two of Bourke-White’s and Evans’s photographs. Quinn explores how 
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Bourke-White’s photographs generate sentiment by turning their subjects into markers of 
class. An often analyzed photograph of a family in their kitchen in Okefenokee Swamp, 
Georgia provides an example of such sentiment. To contrast this photograph, Quinn 
considers Evans’s photograph of the Gudger kitchen, highlighting the surprising lack of 
human presence. In terms of the objects they contain and their physical characteristics, 
the photographed kitchens closely resemble one another: patterned oilcloth, boards with 
gaps of light shining through, hand-hung shelves filled with mismatched bowls. Yet these 
photographs evoke different worlds. Bourke-White’s photograph captures crowded 
conditions, the people sitting at the table pushed up against the walls and the shelves 
cluttered with jars and dishes. Quinn notes that this scene evokes pity by featuring lack. 
Poverty appears in the thin faces of the boys at the table, in the bare plates, in the 
downcast eyes of the mother fingering her knife, in the worn, matte surface of the 
oilcloth, and in the glaring gaps between the wall boards. The dinner scene is haunted by 
absence: the absent gazes of the family; the absence of food highlighted by the caption 
text, which explains, “Every month the relief office gives them four cans of beef, a can of 
dried peas, and five dollars, the old lady generally spends a dollar and a half of it for 
snuff.”69  
By contrast, Evans’s photograph of the Gudger kitchen glows with light. 
Separated by hundreds of pages from its descriptor text – emptied of all human presence 
– the photograph of the Gudger kitchen draws attention to the collected objects: the grain 
of the floorboards; the bright whiteness of a hanging towel; the sheen of light on the side 
of a milk dasher; the fluted sides of the oil lamp that features so prominently in Agee’s 
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 The pages of photographs in You Have Seen Their Faces are not numbered. This particular photograph 
appears between page 34 and page 35, between Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
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later prose. Quinn explains the contrast thus: “Evans’s photographs reveal sparse 
simplicity in a tenant kitchen [. . .] Bourke-White’s show empty plates on a rough table 
with children sitting behind them” (352). 
My point here is not to argue that Evans’s photograph offers a more genuine 
reflection of tenant life than Bourke-White’s family photograph. As James C. Curtis and 
Sheila Grannan note, by rearranging the Gudger family furniture to get the impossible 
angles of this kitchen shot, Evans creates a photograph every bit as staged as Bourke-
White’s.70 Nor do I wish to simply repeat Quinn’s argument that Evans’s photograph 
reverses Bourke-White’s “interpretation of objects” in order to suggest a “paradoxical 
beauty and dignity amidst the squalor and pain” (352). Rather I wish to highlight how the 
composition of objects stands out in Evans’s photograph in a way that it does not in 
Bourke-White’s.71 Agee’s prose repeats this close focus on material things. Objects that, 
as Quinn argues, function poetically in Praise also manifest the difficulty of speaking and 
representing. They thus concretize Agee’s longing for a mode of representation that 
escapes the mediations and ethical complexity of subjective representation: if the tenants 
are not going to speak for themselves, perhaps it is more ethical and accurate to let 
objects do the speaking. In this way, Agee and Evans craft a mystical factualism: they 
insist that objects will give the truths of tenant life, yet they clothe them in a mysterious 
light, like that in Evans’s photographs. Things thus remain elusive even in their 
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 Curtis and Grannan argue that Evans never liked candid shots; he was a meticulous photographer who 
actively strove to intervene in the photograph as little as possible but still was interested in composition and 
detail. While all photographs in this period are somewhat posed, given the long exposure time required, his 
work “exposes not the realism of Evans’s pictures but their studied artistry and ‘painterly’ perspective” (3). 
 
71
 Peter Cosgrove focuses on the difference between the treatment of objects in Agee’s prose and Evans’s 
photographs. Whereas “the barrier that language interposes between the object and the reader is what he 
[Agee] spends much of the book trying to remove, Evans focuses on a photographic literalism that sets 
forth objects as independent, self-evident entities (335-36). 
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materiality, like the mud that Agee attempts to navigate and fails to understand. Whereas 
the unengaged subjects of Bourke-White’s family photograph function almost as objects 
themselves, becoming as much indicators of poverty as the objects in the room, the 
objects of Evans’s photograph have presence, incipient action, and pasts. They stand 
alone, subtly reinforcing the intrusive nature of documentation by hinting at their owners’ 
absence. They thus create a world for the reader to sneak into and spy upon, rather than 
framing a scene for the reader to view theatrically, at a distance. 
 While Agee may have imagined Praise explicitly as a response to or attack on the 
sentimental politics of Bourke-White and Caldwell, we as critics do better to understand 
these two documentary works as presenting the ethical dilemma of tenant representation 
from different angles, encoding different definitions of what realism is or should be. For 
Bourke-White and Caldwell, realism involves a larger sociological context and the 
presentation of historical facts. The documentary text elicits reader sympathy via a 
sentiment born from lack; identification via face recognition leads the viewer to see all 
the ways in which tenant life lacks or fails. By contrast, Agee and Evans see realism as 
centered around individual events and objects, observed directly by the one who will later 
represent them. The documentary text thus generates reader sympathy by forcing the 
reader to recognize his or her complicity in the injustice as well as all the levels on which 
identification with the subjects of documentation remains impossible. 
Agee pushes the reader to recognize the impossibility of facile identification by 
troubling representational connections, all the way down to the level of the relationship 
between a single object and a single word. His lavish description, offered and then 
undermined by self-reflexive uncertainty, mirrors the difficulties of ethical identification: 
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the material thing, like the tenant farmer, is presented as both immediately available to 
the reader and as forever inaccessible. Language’s very nature makes full identification 
impossible, while the proliferation of language creates an ambient sense of the real 
world’s presence. Like Thoreau, then, Agee participates in a paradoxical rhetoric of 
thwarted empirical appeal, first striving “to speak a good word for the truth” through 
thick descriptions and then recognizing his own performance as a bragging narrator, 
thwarted by “cant and hypocrisy” (Walden 37). 
Other critics have linked representational to ethical questions without framing 
such concerns so specifically in terms of materiality and empiricism. For example, Quinn 
argues that Praise strategically invokes representational uncertainty in order to 
circumvent ethical complacency, to navigate just such political quandaries, and to 
distance itself from the failures of other documentaries. For her, Praise invites a level of 
identification with the tenant farmers by giving details about their lives but also prevents 
readers from entering into overly sentimental identification by constantly breaking the 
illusion of unmediated connection. While You Have Seen Their Faces, according to Fox, 
is itself a “reaction against the saccharine sympathy and political dogmatism of much of 
the documentary writing of the 1930’s” in a way akin to Praise, Quinn disagrees, 
believing that Agee and Evans find the work transparent and sentimental (Fox 17-18): 
For Agee and Evans, Caldwell and Bourke-White’s book – and its critical 
and commercial success – epitomized a public attitude they viewed as 
‘morally shocking’ for masking exploitation in self-righteousness (qtd. in 
in Sott 222). But challenging the liberal politics in You Have Seen Their 
Faces also meant attacking the authors’ naive sentimentalism, which 
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assumed a simple correspondence between aesthetic representation and 
social response. (Quinn 339) 
Quinn sees in Bourke-White and Caldwell’s work an assumption that accurate 
documentation will encourage sympathy in the reader through a process of identification. 
Identification perpetuates an ideological blurring, hiding the intrusion of photographer 
and writer into the lives of the people. Such a blurring demands no responsibility on the 
part of the reader; Quinn argues that such forms create self-righteous, complacent pity 
rather than a true impetus for social change. Thus, “Agee experimented with an 
alternative rhetoric that could confound sentimental identification by presenting the 
sharecroppers as both human like us and utterly different from us” (Quinn 339). “Agee’s 
insight,” she argues, “was to conceive of identification as a dialectical process which, by 
holding identity in tension with difference, forced readers to recognize the obligations of 
social privilege” (Quinn 340). 
 For Agee, then, theoretical questions of whether language can successfully 
represent the world are linked to questions about whether writing can ever help establish 
justice between groups of people that might otherwise never meet. By “Connecting the 
gap in identification between language and the tangible things it describes to the gap in 
identification between readers and subjects, Agee therefore transforms aesthetic 
limitations into moral failure” (Quinn 359). Quinn argues that Agee’s frequent insistence 
on the failure of his prose forces readers to recognize the dangers of too easily assuming 
they can know, judge, or identify with the tenant farming families depicted. His prose 
thus forestalls “mere aestheticization of poverty viewed at a distance” as well as facile 
pity (Reed 168). Praise forces readers to interrogate how the inability of a word to 
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directly and fully represent an object introduces a level of uncertainty that is magnified 
on a larger scale – say, representing one man or woman’s whole world and life. 
 Quinn’s discussion of objects focuses on how Agee and Evans transform the 
conventional documentary use of “the catalogue of possessions, a central trope in 1930s 
documentary books” (340). For example, in Caldwell and Bourke-White’s book, 
“catalogues of objects such as houses, clothing, household furnishings, and food helped 
the authors make visible the invisible economic system that oppressed the cropper” (344). 
The lack of objects in the catalogues signified poverty. By contrast, “Agee and Evans’s 
catalogues provide a surfeit rather than a paucity of things, each presented as unique and 
beautiful [. . .] Agee overloads his text with lengthy and detailed descriptions of things” 
(352). Quinn reads the transformation in the use of objects as Praise’s ironic counter to 
the pity cultivated by Bourke-White and Caldwell’s representation of poverty. At the 
same time, she contends that Praise “recognizes that lavish description cannot transform 
the real conditions of the tenants’ lives” (352). 
I contend that the elaborate description of so many objects was not intended only 
as an ironic counterpoint to the paucity of objects in You Have Seen Their Faces but also 
as a paradoxical participation in the rhetoric of empirical appeals. The irony of Agee’s 
text involves his recognition that, to some extent, it is only via lavish description that real 
conditions can be transformed, because it is only via appeal to the materially real that 
authors and observers can convince the readers of the truthfulness of their statements. 
The prolific material description of Praise is not only an indicator of the ignored richness 
of tenant families’ lives; it is also a dramatic gesture meant to support the truthfulness of 
Agee’s and Evans’s experiences – experiences that defy full representation in language 
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specifically because of their unrepresentable material specificity. Lavish description thus 
serves as part of documentary’s chain of transformation, pointing to the processes of 
mobilization and observation that make the text possible. This lavish description creates 
an ambient sense of realness that convinces the reader that the ethical problem exists 
outside of text, having more urgency than a narrative construction or aesthetic effects. 
But this description also insists on the cultural, mediating presence of the writer/observer, 
that liminal narrating position Thoreau occupied. Thick description reminds the reader 
that the narrating voice connects to a historical person who observed; all the ethical 
power and problems of the resulting text stem from the event of this person’s intrusion 
into the environment of the tenant families. 
Thus, the described world of things is not just an ambient effect as per Morton, 
nor only an ethical strategy as per Quinn. Rather, the described world is the setting that 
Agee hopes to make “well-articulated” via his careful observations and consequent notes 
(Latour Pandora 144). In its interrogation of the ontological chasm between words and 
things, Praise repeats the dialectic play of participation and hesitation that marks the 
work’s relationship to documentary. The reader will not only see the faces but the most 
excruciatingly small details of the tenant families. At the same time, the reader will also 
be constantly reminded that he or she has not seen faces, houses, environments, or things. 
She has only seen photographs, words, and what little can be done with them. By 
insisting that the reader recognize these chains of transformations, Agee simultaneously 
validates his claims about the troubled environment and forestalls the reader’s ability to 
treat the text as a distanced aesthetic experience. 
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“Words Cannot Embody”: Language and the Material World 
In contrast to the billowing dirt clouds that dwarf the landscape and mark 
ecological disaster on an epic scale, Evans’s photographs and Agee’s prose paint a world 
that, while entirely defined by the same ecological and economic conditions evident in 
other documentary works, seems strangely focused upon itself. Lange and Tyler bring the 
reader terrifying dust clouds and the stripped Oklahoma fields of the Dust Bowl; Bourke-
White and Caldwell capture the rutted soil of the cotton-ruined South. But while Agee 
also describes the ruined soil of Alabama and how it thwarts farming, perhaps his most 
memorable and evocative image of soil is that extended description of the mud that mires 
his car and first forces him to spend the night with the tenant families. If, for Lange and 
Tyler, the blowing soil of the dust storms becomes a metaphor for the displacement of 
America’s farmers and a visible manifestation of their rootless wandering, for Agee, soil 
functions as a metaphor for the mire of suffering, a material through which he 
unsuccessfully attempts to navigate. The metaphor is apt, as the subjects of Agee’s work 
are not victims of a sudden ecological catastrophe but rather of a long, slow, unjust 
system of farming that has methodically ruined the soil and mired thousands of 
individuals in a livelihood that is eroding away as inevitably as the soil flooding down the 
Mississippi every spring. While Agee still figures soil as symbolic of larger ecological 
and economic sorrows, describing it as “this vast continental sorrowful clay” on which 
exist “encamped, imprisoned” tenant farmers, he sees this clay as a space which he as 
much as these farmers must keep struggling to escape. Praise’s representation of the 
material world as that which brings despair and brings Agee together with his subjects 
reinforces the paradoxes and hesitations that differentiate this work from other 
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photodocumentaries. Acknowledging the possibility of failure allows Praise to avoid the 
pitfalls of sentimentality, simple identification, and pity. The equally hesitant 
relationships between the human perceiver and the material world, between human 
language and the material world, simultaneously fail and make representation possible. 
 This paradoxical vision of the material world as both that which confounds 
representation and that which makes all text possible frames Agee’s prose from the 
book’s opening. The book often shifts from an impulse towards materiality to self-
reflexivity. In an early, untitled section, Praise expresses a desire to appeal directly to the 
material environment, replacing written representation with material things themselves. 
Agee states: 
If I could do it, I’d do no writing at all here. It would be photographs; the 
rest would be fragments of cloth, bits of cotton, lumps of earth, records of 
speech, pieces of wood and iron, phials of odors, plates of food and of 
excrement. [. . .] A piece of the body torn out by the roots might be more 
to the point. As it is though, I’ll do what little I can in writing. Only it will 
be very little. (10-11) 
The opening phrase expresses frustration at the necessity of using language. Agee 
imagines the ideal book not as a written thing but as some means of corralling the 
dispersive elements of experience; a book in ideality would be replaced by a collection of 
physical items. He longs to get outside of textuality while paradoxically producing a 
proliferation of words, what he calls elsewhere “lists and inventories merely, things dead 
unto themselves” (98). Timothy Morton attributes these paradoxes to ecomimesis and 
ambience. For Morton, Agee’s belief that material things would “be more to the point” 
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than textual description reproduces the way that ecomimesis gestures towards a real 
world outside the text: “This may just be language, but think of all the real things which 
do exist, could I just but capture them here.” The irony of realistic representation, as 
Morton explains, is that “The more I try to show you what lies beyond the page, the more 
of a page I have” (30). Writing can only approach the material world it aims to represent 
asymptotically, generating a sense of material reality through the production of more and 
more language. 
Agee’s appeal to the material world thus participates in what Morton calls 
“factual brutalism,” the idea “that the space of factical things can put a stop to thinking” 
(123). This empirical self-evidence provides the foundational logic behind the 
documentary impulse: if enough things are given in sufficiently concrete detail, ethical 
awareness will occur automatically. Ethical awareness does not occur only through 
identification with human subjects, as Quinn claims, but also through belief in the 
realness of the world described. If only text could be replaced with things, and if only the 
right things were presented, then the reader would be in contact with reality and would 
develop a “correct” response to the world: “Ecological [and, I would add, ethical] 
awareness would just happen to us, as immersively and convincingly as a shower of rain” 
(Morton 182-83). Agee’s passage implies that if Praise could only give the reader every 
piece of cloth and earth that he saw, then the reader would be automatically converted to 
the book’s proposed ethical position by encountering a truth that somehow escapes the 
contingencies of written documentation. 
 In pursuit of this impossible goal, Agee’s appeal to cotton and earth functions 
ambiently, Morton would say, generating a sense of realness via material description and 
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resulting in a paradoxical immanence and distance. The ambient, textual world feels 
close, brought near by the physicality of described detail. Yet it also feels distant, as the 
proliferation of description reinforces the disparity between the text and the material 
world. As Morton explains, “the very processes that try to convey the illusion of 
immediacy and naturalness keep dispelling it from within” (77-78). Agee’s list thus 
simultaneously evokes and undermines the illusion of a concrete reality just outside the 
text’s boundary. At the same time, his list also undermines its own ambience by drawing 
attention to the constructed nature of its illusory realness. In this way, the passage creates 
an illusion of presence; for even while Agee may disdain his descriptions as “lists and 
inventories merely,” these lists are evocative (98). In fact, by distinguishing between the 
phrase “lumps of earth” and the actual earth to which he refers, Agee intensifies the 
reader’s awareness of reality, goading readers to use their imaginations and engage their 
senses in order to more fully approximate a connection to the real. 
But Agee’s participation in this game of ambience, when read alongside analyses 
such as Quinn’s, initiates an equally important ethical game: he desperately needs the 
reader to believe in the realness of the world he describes because such belief will make 
the reader see the need to change the system of tenant farming; he also desperately needs 
the reader to recognize that Praise can only give ambient illusions of reality and aesthetic 
approximations of the real, in order to prevent the reader from sentimentally identifying 
with a simplified vision of the tenant farmers’ lives. The endeavor, the “something other” 
which the ethical documentary seeks, lies somewhere between identification and 
alienation, between an unperceived material world with a meaning and existence all its 
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own and a text with its own logic of symbols and meanings – between, as Morton would 
say, inside and outside. 
Morton’s classification of representational anxiety as a kind of postmodern 
ecomimesis resonates with T.V. Reed’s analysis of Praise as “postmodern realism.” This 
“postmodern realism” is “a self-conscious, ironic, politically engaged mode of writing 
that takes reality more seriously than did the realists and aesthetic form more seriously 
than did the modernists” (Reed 157). For Reed, the goal of such dialectical play is 
political. In his assessment of Praise, anxieties about representation become possible 
ethical and political strategies. When read alongside Morton’s analysis of ecomimesis, 
Reed’s awareness of the tensions in Praise frames individual failures of word-thing 
connection as moments of both ethical fear and potential. The referent earth towards 
which the textual sign “lumps of earth” gestures serves as the elusive, ambient world out 
there that short-circuits the self-congratulation of documentary journalism; it also serves 
as the literal grounding of the project, the “chain of transformations” connecting tentative 
writing back to historical events and material realities (Agee 211; Latour Pandora 70). 
 This passage also suggests how the paradoxes of ethical representation Reed and 
Quinn describe extend to the level of individual material objects. Even as his list invites 
the reader to approach concrete reality, Agee reminds the reader that the list he provides 
is nothing other than a proliferation of words. The very list that evokes a sense of 
environment is compromised by Agee’s qualification that this is only the “very little” that 
he can do in writing. Such a qualification points to the equal gap separating the reader in 
the drawing room from Agee in the Alabaman fields. It suggests the difference separating 
classes, geographical spaces, and experiences of the world. Thus, the tension between 
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identification and difference reminds the reader of a shared humanity paired with a 
simultaneous disparity of material circumstances. There are genuine material differences 
between the reader and the depicted subjects, and to fully understand these differences 
requires engaged processes of encounter. This tension subtly challenges the reader’s 
qualification to pass judgment, insinuating as it does that the reader is divided from that 
which he may well like to pity. And in this particular example, Agee accomplishes all of 
this tension without addressing the reader directly or talking about his primary subject, 
the farmers. This tension is relocated onto the material world of objects and the textual 
world that represents them. 
 Another example of the fundamental failures of language to capture the material 
world occurs in Agee’s analysis of one tenant farmer, George Gudger. What matters most 
to Agee is the actualness of Gudger’s existence – a realness that cannot ever be 
adequately described or explained: 
George Gudger is a human being, a man, not like any other human being 
so much as he is like himself. I could invent incidents, appearances, 
additions to his character, background, surroundings, future, which might 
well point up and indicate and clinch things relevant to him which in fact I 
am sure are true, and important, and which George Gudger unchanged and 
undecorated would not indicate and perhaps could not even suggest. The 
result, if I was lucky, could be a work of art. But somehow a much more 
important, and dignified, and true fact about him than I could conceivably 
invent, though I were an illimitably better artist than I am, is that fact that 
he is exactly, down to the last inch and instant, who, what, where, when, 
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and why he is. He is in those terms living, right now, in flesh and blood 
and breathing, in an actual part of a world in which also, quite as irrelevant 
to imagination, you and I are living [. . .] nevertheless I can think of no 
worthier and many worse subjects of attempt. (205-06) 
To even begin capturing the actualness of Gudger, Agee alludes to his material reality: 
his “flesh and blood and breathing” and his participation in an “actual part of the world.” 
While Agee invents a name in order to protect Gudger’s identity, he has not invented any 
events to characterize him as a real tenant farmer and he repeatedly points to elements 
which are real but cannot be conveyed. Thus, he cannot put corporeality or historicity 
into language in the way he can describe Gudger’s mannerisms, conditions, and 
statements. This insistence on elusive, material elements as the truest part of George 
Gudger counters the way tenant farmers function as examples or specimens in Bourke-
White’s and Caldwell’s or Lange’s and Tyler’s work. Here, the tenant farmer is not just 
indicative of a certain set of conditions. He also has an elusive quality that defies simple 
analysis or representation, and hence this farmer is not fungible. He cannot be swapped 
with any other farmer who, when associated with a similar series of real or invented 
“incidents, appearances, additions to his character, background, surroundings, [or] 
future,” would equally represent tenant farming. Because this fundamental yet elusive 
realness serves as a critical point of departure for Agee as opposed to his journalistic 
contemporaries, his crisis about language centers around this realness. That is, in 
appealing to the material world that cannot be translated into language, he points to that 
which cannot be represented, that which defies easy textual expression and 
interchangeability. 
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Agee thus insists that there is no easy connection between the actuality of 
Gudger’s existence and a textual representation of him. The only connecting point for 
Agee is his, Gudger’s, and the reader’s mutual existence in a material world where all 
three are living. Agee only becomes aware of this material reality through embodied, 
active processes of researching and writing; the reader will become aware of this reality 
only through the process of reading the resulting book. Thus, nonfiction writing relies not 
on one-to-one-correspondence between text and world but upon a chain of 
transformations initiated by the writer’s encounter with the world and his extension of a 
representational system out into this world through processes of observation and 
recording. Truth and meaning must be extended, and this movement troubles neat 
divisions between text and world. A purification into pure world and pure text, of the 
type described by Latour’s modern constitution, can simplify the interpretive process but 
cannot explain the processes creating the nonfictional text.72 “In a novel,” Agee explains,  
a house or person has his meaning, his existence, entirely through the 
writer. Here, a house or a person has only the most limited of his meaning 
through me: his true meaning is much huger. It is that he exists, in actual 
being, as you do and as I do, and as no character of the imagination can 
possibly exist. His great weight, mystery, and dignity are in this fact. (9) 
Here, meaning, which is usually associated with textuality and language, is relocated onto 
the material world. Meaning is being, not a sociological analysis, a political position, or 
an aesthetic theme. Agee then connects this weighty, material sense of meaning to the 
reclamation of the tenant farmer’s dignity. The ethical representation of the tenant farmer 
                                                 
72
 For a detailed definition of Latour’s modern constitution, see Chapter II or Latour’s We Have Never Been 
Modern (32). As I described in Chapter II, the modern constitution is a conceptual framework that purifies 
objective nature from subjective culture, the material from the ideal, and the subject from the object. 
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requires the writer to adhere as closely as possible to the materiality of the farmer, all the 
while disavowing the possibility of such reality translating successfully. Thus, language’s 
failure is finally reducible to a failure to embody and its potential is reducible to a gesture 
towards embodiment. The writer must acknowledge that “Words like all else are limited 
by certain laws,” the most fundamental of which is that, “Words cannot embody; they can 
only describe” (210). 
 What Agee really seeks is writing that gives the world “in its own terms” (207). 
He is seeking a way to let the world speak for itself, but he cannot find such 
representation. Instead, he keeps returning to the central paradox of ecomimesis: the way 
writing proliferates more writing, no matter how earnestly it seeks to approach the world 
and become something other than language. Even “naturalism” or “realism” falls into this 
trap, for there is no escape from language, as we see in the following passage: 
Trying, let us say, to represent, to reproduce, a certain city street under the 
conviction that nothing is as important, as sublime, as truly poetic about 
that street in its floatation upon time and space as the street itself. Your 
medium, unfortunately, is not a still or moving camera, but is words. You 
abjure all metaphor, symbol, selection and above all, of course, all 
temptation to invent, as obstructive, false, artistic. As nearly as possible in 
words (which, even by grace of genius, would not be very near) you try to 
give the street in its own terms [. . .] all this gathers time and weightiness 
which the street does not of itself have: it sags with this length and weight: 
and what have you in the end but a somewhat overblown passage from a 
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naturalistic novel: which in important ways is at the opposite pole from 
your intentions, from what you have seen, from the fact itself. (207-208) 
Intention matters little here, for even when stripped of literary markers – of “all 
metaphor, symbol, selection” – still language gathers “time and weightiness.” In other 
words, the progression of language over time and over the space of the page, one word at 
a time, cannot ever replicate the experience of direct perception and simultaneous 
existence within a shared material world. What results is not the thing itself, but a 
proliferation of text that is the opposite of material things. 
 For Agee, and I would argue for Morton, this inescapable pull of textuality and 
language is a potentially dangerous feature of writing; for a real world is at stake. Agee 
must express reality and escape textuality if he is to achieve justice for the tenant farmers 
that are his subjects. Despite his reservations about the limitations of language, he must 
tell what he has seen to all those who will not or cannot see. While he may be frustrated 
with the complicated dance between text and world, as Agee says, “you [the reader] have 
no other way of knowing” certain truths than through the words that authors provide 
(217). Agee’s writing thus must bear the full weight of recognizing its own limitation, its 
own failure, and its own perpetuation of certain divides and ideologies. Yet the danger of 
simply disavowing ecomimesis is remaining simply stuck, never daring to approach or 
enter the tenant farmers’ lives. What exactly a writer could do aside from producing 
words on a page remains unclear. Agee needs a way to harness the dangers of 
representation, to simultaneously remind readers of their own complicity in oppression 
and encourage them to pursue an alternative. 
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“In My Mind’s and Memory’s Eye”: The Contingency of Perception 
 Agee finds a way into this constrained realist relationship with language and 
reality by recognizing the similar limitation, contingency, and success of his own 
perception. When dismissing a textual representation of a street in favor of his own 
experience observing the street, or in privileging his simultaneous existence “in an actual 
part of the world” with George Gudger, Agee privileges presence, believing that 
perception provides a direct access to actuality that escapes the contingency of 
representation. Yet if language limits what a text can disclose because representation 
must take place in the “terms” available to the author, then perception equally limits the 
author, who can convey or transmit “only what I saw” (9). If we return to the specific 
example of George Gudger, we see this dual limitation at work. Not only is Agee’s 
representation of Gudger limited by the “terms in which I know him,” but also by Agee’s 
perception, a perception ultimately constrained by Agee’s physical and intellectual 
boundaries: 
George Gudger is a man, et cetera. But obviously, in the effort to tell of 
him (by example) as truthfully as I can, I am limited. I know him only so 
far as I know him, and only in those terms in which I know him; and all of 
that depends as fully on who I am as on who he is. I am confident of being 
able to get at a certain form of the truth about him, only if I am as faithful 
as possible to Gudger as I know him, to Gudger as, in his actual flesh and 
life (but there again always in my mind’s and memory’s eye) he is. But of 
course it will only be a relative truth. Name me one truth within human 
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range that is not relative and I will feel a shade more apologetic of that. 
(211) 
As Agee continues to consider how capable he is of representing George Gudger, he 
begins to see that some level of truth comes through his observations, even given 
limitations. While he is admittedly limited by his “mind’s and memory’s eye,” he also 
finds confidence in his ability to gather a relative knowledge of Gudger’s life. Just as 
writing first requires Agee to accept the laws limiting writing’s referentiality and then to 
strive within these boundaries, ethical perceptual awareness requires Agee to accept the 
relative nature of perception and then to strive within this situated position to be as close 
to the world outside himself as possible. Agee must give up on the dream of objective 
journalism that obliterates the mediated positionality of the documenting subject. To 
invoke the power of having shared an actual world with George Gudger, Agee must 
recognize his own historical, embodied existence within a material world as well as the 
historical processes of representation that generate texts. He must stop being merely an 
observer or merely a creator of text; he must make himself an embodied subject within 
both the real world and text. 
To claim that Agee does this is not to posit a simple one-to-one correlation 
between Agee as a historical, experiencing subject and Agee as a textual, constructed 
character. Rather, by muddying the neat distinction between objective narrator and 
textual character, Agee both challenges and reinforces the difference between the text and 
the real world. A historical Agee creates a textual Agee based on the experience of the 
observer Agee; a chain of translation runs through these various personas, united by 
Agee’s historical continuity as a thinking, experiencing, representing body. It is this 
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tenuous continuity that provides the linkage, the chain of truths, that can hold Praise in 
connection with the historical world of Mill Hill, Alabama. 
But to access this chain of truth, Agee must both recognize and disavow his desire 
for idealized objectivity. He admits, “I would do just as badly to simplify or eliminate 
myself from this picture as to simplify or invent character, places or atmospheres” and 
this admission allows him to claim that 
A chain of truths did actually weave itself and run through: it is their 
texture that I want to represent, not betray, nor pretty up into art. The one 
deeply exciting thing to me about Gudger is that he is actual, he is living, 
at this instant. He is not some artist’s or journalist’s or propagandist’s 
invention: he is a human being: and to what degree I am able it is my 
business to reproduce him as the human being he is; not just to 
amalgamate him into some invented, literary imitation of a human being. 
(211-212) 
The importance of recognizing the author’s embodiment and involvement corresponds 
directly to the capacity of the text to capture the chain of truths linking a text to the world 
it describes. Just as Latour’s “chain of transformation” requires a recognition of the 
historical, constructed nature of scientific knowledge, Agee’s “chain of truths” 
necessitates a recognition of the documentary observer’s historical, limited participation 
in the scenes he describes. While the truth Agee will be able to discover and transmit 
about George Gudger will be a truth relative to his perception, this relative truth is still a 
genuine, valuable knowledge. 
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 This insistence on his own embodiment represents another way that Agee 
differentiates his work from the documentary journalism of the time, with its sociological 
tone, its historical scope, and its seeming lack of positionality. Reed and Bruce Jackson 
both claim that Agee makes himself vulnerable by becoming as flawed a character in the 
narrative as any of his subjects. But more specifically, Agee makes himself a body among 
suffering bodies. His knowledge of the tenants’ lives is not just that of a surveillance 
camera in their midst, though that is how he imagines himself in order to address the guilt 
of his intrusion. His knowledge is actually the knowledge of an uncomfortable body 
creeping around in a world of material things, temporarily experiencing much of the same 
physical discomfort as those he describes. Just as Evans’s photographs make us as 
viewers feel as though we are sneaking inside a room full of things rather than simply 
watching suffering play out on a stage, Agee’s prose keeps creeping back into the midst 
of the things he saw, even while longing for an unimplicated, unlimited perspective. To 
be a voyeur is to live in the world of materiality. 
This tension between pursuing an objective ideal and recognizing positionality is 
where failure becomes potential. The failure of objectivity makes space for an ethical, 
relative, and earnest way of seeing and of knowing. For example, at the beginning of 
Chapter One, Agee describes successful perception and representation explicitly as an 
erasure of one’s interfering presence: 
I feel that if I can by utter quietness succeed in not disturbing this silence, 
in not so much as touching this plain of water, I can tell you anything 
within realm of God [sic], whatsoever it may be, that I wish to tell you, 
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and that what so ever it may be, you will not be able to help but 
understand it. (46) 
The narrator strives for “utter quietness [. . .] not so much as touching” the medium in 
which he sees the world reflected (46). By erasing himself, he will achieve the political 
dream of journalistic representation: accurate communication whose truth cannot be 
avoided. However, this ideal is an impossibility that Agee cannot achieve. If “success” is 
defined as “utter quietness,” as a disembodied pseudo-presence that sees without limit, 
without ever disturbing the world, or without taking up material space, then the invasive, 
embodied perception of all journalism is by definition a failure. Yet such disruption is the 
inevitable condition of perception and also of documentation: one must move bodily 
within the conditions one wishes to describe, risking harm to oneself and to others. One 
must disturb the very conditions one wishes to observe and study, for no possibility of 
observation avoids these risks. Agee admits this contingency when he muses, “If I were 
not here [. . .] this would never have existence in human perception” (164). But in the 
midst of that confession, the recognition that “I am an alien” fights with the dream that he 
could be “a bodyless eye” (164). Agee’s reflection reproduces the tension between the 
ideal of objectivity and the actual nature of observation. He continues fretfully: 
this would never have existence in human perception. It has none. I do not 
make myself welcome here. My whole flesh; my whole being; is 
withdrawn upon nothingness. [. . .] What is taking place here, and it 
happens daily in this silence, is intimately transacted between this home 
and eternal space; and consciousness has no residence in nor pertinence to 
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it save only that, privileged by stealth to behold, we fear the legend: 
withdraw, bow down; nor dare the pride to seek to decipher it [. . .]. (164) 
Within one paragraph, Agee espouses opposite positions, at once trying to make his body 
disappear and admitting that nothing has reality outside of his embodied perception. 
Should he stop rippling the surface, perhaps he would know nothing. Agee thus 
foregrounds the paradox at the center of concepts such as “honest” or “objective” 
journalism. The ideal of objectivity suggests distance, withdrawal, disappearance, 
condemning interpretation, and construction. But the journalist observer is not a bodiless 
eye; to learn, the journalist observer cannot withdraw. Instead he occupies a position 
halfway between that of a bodiless eye (pure perception without materiality) and that of a 
wasp Agee describes with envy (a fully embodied creature lacking self-awareness and 
thus able to fully dissolve into the world of the tenant farmers’ home). To practice a truly 
honest journalism, one might recognize one’s position stuck between these poles and 
write from a position of both alienation and embodiment. 
Here, Agee moves towards a model more akin to Merleau-Ponty’s perception or 
Latour’s constructed, contingent scientific knowledge. His knowledge of the Gudgers 
does not happen automatically, crossing the threshold from materiality to mind in an 
ontological leap that escapes ethical quandary. Instead, knowledge functions as a 
contingent process that develops over time because of his immersion in the same 
perceptual world as the Gudgers. He can identify with their bodily experiences and thus 
begins to have a small sense of what they have experienced, thought, and felt. Agee 
argues this when he explains how spending night after night in the Gudger home allows 
him to begin to know something of them: “it is not only their bodies but their postures 
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that I know, and their weight on the bed or on the floor, so that I lie down inside each one 
as if exhausted in a bed, and I become not my own shape and weight and self, but that of 
each of them, the whole of it” (52). Imagined here as the transformation of the observer’s 
body into that of the observed, knowledge is embodied. In this model, the experience of 
the tenant farmers is not something that Agee can access directly. But it is something that 
he can know through his own bodily immersion in their life and through his own sensing, 
perceiving body’s growing familiarity with the environment shaping their existences. 
This process of identification necessarily takes place over time as individual events of 
perception contribute to a growing knowledge of the world. Thus, like text, perception 
unfolds over time; immediacy and directness remain fantasies. 
 We see this process of gradual perceptual awareness at work when Agee tells the 
story of finally meeting the Gudgers. Sitting out an early afternoon rainstorm in their 
home before he mires his car in the mud, Agee describes his awakening awareness. At 
this point, he realizes he has not understood the life of the Gudgers at all through simply 
photographing them, an ignorance mirrored in the scene of the storm, where darkness 
prevents him from seeing the family’s faces or their surroundings: 
here in this room we are in a near dead darkness, in which at first I know, 
only that it is full of people, whom I do not yet see. Through two walls of 
this shuttered room and parts of the ceiling daylight is let in short lead 
slivers [. . .] I see there are on the bed and floor a woman and children, 
none of whom makes a sound or says a word, nor can I yet make out their 
faces or their eyes [. . .]. (349) 
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In direct contrast to the past tense assertiveness of a claim like You Have Seen Their 
Faces, Agee offers a tentative confession that this family is composed of people “whom I 
do not yet see.” Their “faces and their eyes” remain hidden from him even as he sits in 
their midst. Similarly, upon first entering the Gudgers’ lives, Agee can know very little 
about them or their experiences. Staying with them is a process of beginning to see. After 
Gudger lights an oil lamp – a process as full of failures and missteps as Agee’s process of 
representation – Agee begins to learn more: 
George is scratching a match; it glints and dies; another; dead wet pulp; 
another, flares; he guards it in his palm, he touches the wick; the dark 
flame climbs shapeless in braiding of oleaginous smoke; he sets the 
chimney round it, brings it trim, the flame pales, takes shape, brightens 
and swells to level, and stands there in glass; I look around me: the 
sobriety of its fragrant light is spread not quite to the two far walls but on 
all surfaces of wood more near, details of furniture, bed iron, bodies, faces 
[. . .]. (349) 
This lamp is the same one that Agee has previously described at length in “On the 
Porch:1.” In that scene, as here, the lamp symbolizes both the possibilities and the 
failures of perception: it is difficult to light, and yet it is the only vehicle allowing one to 
observe the details of another’s life. The light from this flame cannot illuminate 
everything in the Gudgers’ cabin, since its light extends “not quite to the two far walls.” 
The lamp thus provides a metaphor for limited but accurate, embodied perception, one 
which can provide adequate light to see some details of material life but only through a 
process of gradual illumination. The material conditions of life become progressively 
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clearer: first, the furniture of the tenant family; then their bodies; finally, their faces. As 
Agee comes to know Gudger as a host and familiarizes himself with the environment of 
the Gudgers’ home, perception and mutual embodiment emerge as positive conditions of 
knowing rather than simply impediments to idealized, disembodied seeing. Agee 
“begin[s] to see around me a little” and this seeing eventually enables him to say “what 
little I can in writing” (349; 10). 
 If we return to Agee’s discussion of the natural environment, we see a similar 
two-step process of mediation at work. While acknowledging the inherent limitations of 
his own perception and of language, Agee participates in a gradual awakening of 
perception that puts him into contact with a sensibly real environment: 
The dead oak and pine, the ground, the dew, the air, the whole realm of 
what our bodies lay in and our minds in silence wandered, walked in, 
swam in, watched upon, was delicately fragrant as a paradise, and, like all 
that is best, was loose, light, casual, totally actual. There was, by our 
minds, our memories, our thoughts and feelings, some combination, some 
generalizing, some art, and science; but none of the close-kneed 
priggishness of science, and none of the formalism and straining and lily-
gilding of art. All the length of the body and all of its parts and functions 
were participating, and were being realized and rewarded, inseparable 
from the mind, identical with it: and all, everything, that the mind touched, 
was actuality, and all, everything, that the mind touched turned 
immediately, yet without in the least losing the quality of its total 
individuality, into joy and truth, or rather, revealed, of its self, truth, which 
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in its very nature was joy, which must be the end of art, of investigation, 
and of all anyhow human existence. (199) 
Now Agee specifically situates himself as a body within a world of material items. By 
thus situating himself, Agee recognizes himself as a thinking, perceiving body immersed 
in a “loose, light, casual, totally actual” world of trees, ground, and air. His recognition of 
the simultaneity of embodiment and mental reflection imagines an interactive process of 
perception leading to understanding and awareness. If the truth Agee encounters is 
“revealed,” the material world does the revealing, playing an integral part in Agee’s 
growing awareness of “human existence.” This dawning perceptual consciousness is akin 
to Latour’s translation or the processes of intertwined perception that Merleau-Ponty 
describes. Understanding of the world is an event that takes place over time and is at no 
point automatic or guaranteed. The observing mind participates in this process, since 
there is, as Agee admits, “some combination, some generalizing, some art, and science.” 
Yet Agee also imagines this process as interactive, as we see by the sexualizing of 
understanding and representation. Science appears as “close-kneed,” whereas Agee 
imagines his own understanding as receptive to letting the world in. Knowledge becomes 
something conceived via the open receptiveness of an observing human mind and body, 
where “All of the length of the body and all of its parts and functions were participating.” 
This description of perception accounts for various levels of mediation involved in the 
creation of human knowledge: involvement with the material realm of the “actual”; the 
participation of the sensing body; the necessary combination and re-creation by human 
consciousness required to translate perception into language and knowledge; the 
achievement, or at least the approach towards, an art or investigation that connects back 
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through a chain of truths to the “totally actual” world of ground, dew, air, trees, and 
bodies. 
Despite the inevitable failures of language and of perception, then, Agee 
formulates a hopeful vision of representation. He imagines an art of an “immediate 
world” where “everything is to be discerned, for him who can discern it” when the 
observer approaches this world “with the whole of consciousness seeking to perceive it as 
it stands” and when “all of consciousness is shifted from the imagined, the revisive, to the 
effort to perceive simply the cruel radiance of what is” (9). In these descriptions, the 
author’s endeavor to align his or her perception and language as closely as possible with 
the world creates the possibility of successful representation. 
“Not by Its Captive but by Its Utmost Meanings”: Endeavors at Truth 
 It is thus that Agee imagines his project as an endeavor, approaching a 
constrained translation of the actual. The effort to immerse oneself in the perceptual 
universe, to the point that one’s body stops being an impediment and starts to be a vehicle 
for awareness, can open up the possibility for a kind of documentary writing that shares 
enough relative, contingent, yet truthful knowledge to challenge existing, unjust systems 
such as tenant farming. Like the scientific experimenter in Latour’s analysis, the Ageeian 
observer is actively immersed in the world of material things, engaging it bodily and 
translating what he learns through this medium into language. While admitting the 
influence of his individual perspective and bias, he strives as much as possible to put this 
influence into conversation with what he observes. 
 265 
 
 If we return to Agee’s initial frustration at language’s inability to embody, we see 
him responding precisely by striving, making an effort. “[A] certain kind of artist,” he 
insists, 
whom we will distinguish from others as a poet rather than a prose writer, 
despises this fact about words or his medium, and continually brings 
words as near as he can to an illusion of embodiment. In doing so he 
accepts a falsehood but makes, of a sort in any case, better art. [. . .] 
becoming, as a result, both nearer the truth and farther from it than those 
things which, like science and scientific art, merely describe, and those 
things which, like human beings and their creations and the entire state of 
nature, merely are, the truth. (210) 
Here, Agee accepts the inherent limitations of language and imagines writing as an 
endeavor that will push these limits as far as possible. It is this pushing that distinguishes 
the “poetry” of a work from other “prose” journalism as well as from scientific writing. 
Given how language is bound to fail, Praise “accepts a falsehood [. . .] accepts the most 
dangerous and impossible of bargains[,] and makes the best of it” (210). In this passage, 
Agee begins to imagine writing as something which, despite its shortcomings, eventually 
transcends its isolation in a realm of pure aesthetics or pure textuality, coming as close as 
possible to things that “simply are.” Thus, the inevitable failure of language to embody 
the material world becomes one law that Agee must accept, while yet pushing as close as 
he can towards the limit of material identification, where language may embody or 
materialize things. 
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Agee's self-conscious, hesitant ecomimetic invocation of the material 
environments of the tenant farmers thus becomes a central weapon in his attack on 
ideology. This dialectical capacity of representation allows him to alert readers to their 
tendency to see the world of Southern tenant farming as either too removed from or too 
akin to daily life in their own towns. Agee wants readers to recognize that the distance 
between the reader and the tenant farmer is as insurmountable as the distance between a 
clod of Alabama dirt and the words “Alabama dirt” on a mass-produced page. At the 
same time, the connection between the two is as real as the image of dirt that such a 
phrase calls to mind. 
The process of effort that Agee imagines is collaborative, involving the 
relationships between reader, writer, and subject; writing is for him a “human effort 
which requires co-operation” (98). In order to approach the language of reality, the first 
responsibility lies on the writer. The writer’s obligations include recognizing the limited 
referential capacity of language, admitting to the perspectival nature of one’s situated 
perception, on a bodily as well as a social level, and cultivating an attitude of humility in 
the face of all these conditions. The ideal that Agee postulates is 
To come devotedly into the depths of a subject, your respect for it 
increasing in every step and your whole heart weakening apart with shame 
upon yourself in your dealing with it: To know at length better and better 
and at length into the bottom of your soul your unworthiness of it: Let me 
hope in any case that it is something to have begun to learn. Let this all 
stand however it may: since I cannot make it the image it should be, let it 
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stand as the image it is: I am speaking of my verbal part of this book as a 
whole. (281) 
While this stance is not fail-safe, it can be a step towards the contingent, ethical 
“something other” which Reed claims Agee and Evans sought. Yet the recognition of 
such contingency remains a critical part of this process of effort: “Failure, indeed, is 
almost as strongly an obligation as an inevitability, in such a work: and therein sits the 
deadliest trap of the exhausted conscience” (210). Thus, the ethical necessity of failure 
makes space for the participatory role of the subjects, both the tenant farmers themselves 
and the nonhuman actants constituting the environment depicted. 
 Yet the dual motion of effort, of participating in an attempt that may well fail, 
also recognizes representation as necessary. The need to represent remains urgent given 
the unjust system that perpetuates the unsustainable, ecologically destructive practices of 
cotton farming. While the act of capturing the materiality of Alabama and the actuality of 
the Gudgers fails, the effort and the act of telling remains important, similar to Thoreau’s 
endeavor to “wake up my neighbors” through his own attempts to speak. Agee shares 
with his contemporary journalists a desire to wake up his neighbors, but he wants to 
admit the contingency and shortcomings of his attempts, acknowledging, “There is no 
way of taking the heart and the intelligence by the hair and of wresting it to its feet, and 
of making it look this terrific thing in the eyes ” (283). Without being able to force his 
readers to recognize the political and ethical difficulties of which he speaks, Agee still 
hopes to elicit their awareness. “We undertake not much yet some, to say,” he claims 
(97). The ethical impetus behind the need to say becomes clear as Agee sketches the 
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disparity between Mrs. Gudger’s discomfort and his own efforts to describe her 
circumstances: 
how conceivably in words is it to be given as it is in actuality, the 
accumulated weight of these actions upon her; and what this cumulation 
has made of her body; and what it has made of her mind and of her heart 
and of her being. And how is this to be made so real to you who read of it, 
that it will stand and stay in you as the deepest and most iron anguish and 
guilt of your existence that you are what you are, and that she is what she 
is, and that you cannot for one moment exchange places with her, nor by 
any such hope make expiation for what she has suffered at your hands, and 
for what you have gained at hers: but only by consuming all that is in you 
into the never relaxed determination that this shall be made different, and 
shall be made right, and that of what is ‘right’ some, enough to die for, is 
clear already [. . .]. (283) 
As this passage makes clear, the writer’s effort to say, to give an actuality in words, is an 
effort to reach in two directions: back to the material realities shaping the life of each 
tenant farmer; and forward to the reader, inviting him or her into an active, imaginative 
participation that helps to retrace the “chain of truths” woven through each documentary 
act. Such participation will hopefully be invoked by the recognition of futility and failure. 
Agee’s inability to say is not just a recognition of the incommensurate distance between 
the reader and the subject; it is not just a means of forestalling identification or pity. It 
also frames a mirror image of the reader’s inability to “make expiation” for a system in 
which he or she has unknowingly participated. Just as the writer’s only option in the face 
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of certain failure is to participate in an ongoing effort to say, the reader’s only option is to 
participate in a “never relaxed determination” to seek understanding, albeit in guilt and 
anguish. Such effort, such emotion would be the opposite of complacency and pity, 
feelings that spring from identification and ready dismissal. The unresolvable guilt that 
cannot ever result in “expiation” will hopefully cultivate an ongoing urge, even need, in 
the reader to seek change. 
While this quest to find the world “made different” and “made right” may be as 
doomed to failure as Agee’s attempt at adequate representation, the direction and energy 
of such an impulse seems better than a pity that simply reinforces readers’ separation 
from America’s rural poor and the systems that sustain them. It is an invitation to readers 
to become actively involved in the processes of representation and the processes of social 
change, an invitation that Agee yearns for by calling to readers to see in his writing 
something beyond simple textual isolation, to see in themselves something beyond 
complacent pity. To reach such a goal will require readers to make an effort, which Agee 
invokes by begging the reader, “let us most quietly and in most reverent fierceness say, 
not by its captive but by its utmost meanings” (387). While this line introduces the Lord’s 
Prayer, the sentiment it invokes is the same for the writer and the reader – a hope that 
reverence and an effort to move beyond limitations might help individuals live into a 
potential as elusive as the materiality of the earth. 
 Agee thus turns to a kind of constrained realism in order to salvage documentary 
journalism. While writing will fail to reproduce the event of encounter between a 
perceiving body and a material, perceptual world, the reader can help to prevent the 
sedimentation of perception and text into “lists and inventories merely, things dead unto 
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themselves” (98). As Agee implores, “if they [words] sink, lose impetus, meter, 
intension, then bear in mind at least my wish, and perceive in them and restore them what 
strength you can of yourself” (98). Of course, by invoking the necessary participation of 
the reader, Agee also highlights difficulties and failures inherent to his method. By 
resorting to a highly aesthetic and literary version of self-reflexivity, Agee employs a 
register likely to alienate his reading audience and his subjects alike. But, arguably, the 
very mode of documentary perpetuates such alienation; whether or not it is ethically 
effective to exaggerate such alienation to a breaking point is open to debate. Agee 
alienates the reader, accepting that some level of alienation is inevitable. He admits, 
anything set forth within an art form, ‘true’ as it may be in art terms, is 
hermetically sealed away from identification with everyday ‘reality.’ No 
matter how strong and vivid it may be, its strength and vividness are not of 
that order which, in the open air of our actual, personal living, we draw in 
every time we breathe. Even at its very best it is make believe, requiring 
the killing insult of ‘suspension of disbelief,’ because it is art. This is in 
some degree true even of the most ‘real’ writing I know (212). 
Agee recognizes all artwork as merely a construction or an effect. But he counters this 
perspective, arguing against himself, “And yet is there any good reason why socalled 
[sic] art cannot, without any complicated wrench of the mind, be accepted as living, as 
telling of the living ‘truth,’ so long as art meets you halfway, and tries to tell of nothing 
else?” (212). Agee acknowledges a fundamental difference between art and reality but 
asks why we cannot accept writing as an effort that does more than create fictions. While 
fully recognizing the ontological difference between the “hermetically sealed” world of 
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textual art and the material world of “everyday reality,” Agee invokes the mind and the 
idea of effort, of an art that meets reality halfway, as a possible way to know the world 
relatively yet truly. 
 Agee's concern about the limits of representation thus mirrors a question that 
continues to haunt critical theory: how can we understand the relationship between 
produced texts and the material world that they strive to represent? Agee's work implies 
that literature's ability to change the way humans think about their world depends on 
whether, as Latour has said, texts can “pack the world into words” (Pandora 24). Without 
a relationship between reality and text, literature has no ability to speak of the world and 
to speak for justice within that world. This potential impotency is the haunting legacy of 
post-structuralism: if there is nothing outside the text, can a text speak of the world? can 
it speak to the world? can readers and writers connect world and text? Clearly 
negotiations between world and text happen all the time; to doubt this would be to 
surrender to what Ursula Heise has called “the obfuscations of political discourse” (505). 
However, Let Us Now Praise Famous Men reveals that a simple belief in correspondence 
may also perpetuate suspect identifications or allow divides between readers and subjects 
to remain unchallenged. The slippery uncertainties in language highlighted by 
poststructuralist theory have helped theorists understand how representations of places 
and groups of people may be insufficient or inadequate; and to surrender this insight to 
pragmatic political purposes may lead to sentimental identification of the kind Agee 
disdains. Then, like Agee, ecocritics may ask: how do you write to save what you love, 
when writing is all you have and it very well may not be enough? How do you recognize 
the failings of this writing while continuing to validate the importance of making an 
 272 
 
effort? And how can we understand the contributions that formal strategies make to 
writers' attempts to represent realities that must be represented to readers who must 
understand in order for justice to be accomplished? Agee's complicated dialectical 
rhetoric provides an example of a text that negotiates these tricky straits, neither 
surrendering to facile realism nor surrendering its purpose to language's limitations or to 
self-conscious despair. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION – CONSTRAINED REALISM AND POLITICAL ECOLOGY 
[W]e cannot choose whether to engage in political ecology or not; but we 
can choose whether to engage in it surreptitiously, by distinguishing 
between questions of nature and questions of politics, or explicitly, by 
treating these two sets of questions as a single issue that arises for all 
collectives. 
Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into 
Democracy  
 
 Using the redefinition of politics that Latour offers here, this project has 
attempted to build on the idea that literature can be political and, at the same time, 
ecological. As the range of texts included suggests, the ecology I have in mind is not 
limited to the scientific discipline of ecology – the kind of grounding in scientific thought 
and culture advocated by both Dana Phillips and Glen Love.73 Rather, this ecology 
recognizes the interrelation of questions of nature and politics within literary texts, 
asserting a parallel interrelation between language and the material world. Literary texts 
can provide a step in political/ecological chains of transformation, mobilizing individual 
observations of the material world and “making [them] available for arguments” 
(Pandora 100). Like Thoreau’s Walden, literary texts can mobilize the world in hopes of 
reforming relationships between human societies and the more-than-human world. 
Conversely, literary texts can document the dominant tendency to disavow mobilization, 
illustrating our participation in modern purifications and proliferations that thwart our 
                                                 
73
 In Practical Ecocriticism, Love argues, “I use the word ecology here the way Darwinist Gould would 
prefer, in its scientific sense, to refer to the study of the relationship between organisms and their living and 
nonliving environment. Ecocriticism’s future is, I believe, encoded in the prefix eco [. . .] The new study of 
literature and nature is connected to the science of ecology – taking from it not only the popular term 
ecocriticism but also the basic premise of the interrelatedness of a human cultural activity like literature and 
that natural world that encompasses it” (37-38). In The Truth of Ecology, Phillips laments ecocriticism’s 
scientific illiteracy, arguing that ecology as used in criticism tends to be “metaphorical window dressing” 
or a philosophy of holistic “organicism” (112; 114). 
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ecological aims. Like Faulkner’s “The Bear” and Absalom, Absalom!, literary texts can 
show us how a continued insistence on the separation of culture from nature and text 
from world can mask deep-seated racial and environmental injustices, fostering 
unbalanced understandings of our place in the world. 
In either framework, literary texts stop being purely textual entities, separated 
from the material world by a fundamental ontological dualism. Instead, a 
political/ecological criticism recognizes texts’ hybridity, whether arguing for writers’ 
self-conscious use of such hybridity in pursuit of political aims or connecting texts’ 
struggle with hybridity to their engagement with political questions that involve the 
material world. Notably, this collective model of representation provides more than a 
critical reconciliation of disciplinary conflicts about the nature of representation. It also 
offers a more generous model for approaching texts’ political projects, articulating their 
potential veracity. When criticism focuses only on the textual artifact or the social effects 
of the text, the author’s and the text’s involvement in a larger network of material and 
social relations can become invisible. Why does this matter to literary criticism? Because 
it leads criticism to reproduce and struggle within the same conceptual dichotomies 
facing the authors, narrators, and characters of literary texts. It leaves critical analysis 
trying to reconcile Thoreau’s empirical and transcendental impulses; Norris’s political 
and aesthetic commitments; Faulkner’s “sensitivity to nature” and obsession with 
language; Agee’s self-reflexivity and ethics (Kartiganer xi). It leaves criticism convinced, 
just like Quentin Compson or Presley, that language is ultimately ineffective: a stalemate, 
a purely co-optable commodity, an extension of ideology, a “problem in impure 
properties carried tediously to an unvarying nil” (Sound 124). By contrast, a Latourian 
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vision of political ecology positions texts as participants in the struggle to reframe the 
reductive poles of the modern constitution. This is not to say that authors deliberately 
attempt to escape the dichotomies of nature and culture, text and world, but rather that 
serious engagement with questions of nature and society necessarily proliferates hybrids, 
allowing critics to recognize resulting textual contradictions as responsive to or ignorant 
of their own hybridity. 
But even if a Latourian political ecology and a Latourian model of reference 
promise new and interesting critical approaches to complex, contradictory texts, does 
such a conceptual revision provide anything useful for environmentalism? Does it do 
anything besides add critical complexity to literary discussions and literary 
representation? Paraphrasing R.H. Peters, Dana Phillips argues that “the goal of ecology, 
especially at a time of global environmental crisis, should not be to generate a correct 
picture, complete in all its details, of the workings of ecosystems, but to explore ways in 
which particular environmental problems can be more effectively addressed and 
redressed” (Truth 74-75). Do hybrid models of representation offer any such effective 
strategies to environmental practice? Perhaps Phillips is right in asserting that we do not 
need better representations of trees, ecosystems, and environments in order to develop 
effective means of redress; that is, we don’t necessarily need more thick description just 
for its own sake. But we do need ways of conceiving human relationship to the more-
than-human world that evades reductive dualisms. Thick description provides one 
important tool that writers use in the struggle to better understand humans’ position in the 
larger ecological collective. Hybridity, mobilization, and translation provide others. 
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I believe that these tools can contribute to more successful ecological and critical 
approaches. Criticism benefits from this model because, without reverting to authorial 
intent, we gain a way of assessing mobilizations and thinking about how discursive uses 
of the material world affect our engagement with our environments – both social and 
natural. This model of representation also reinforces one of the special things that the 
environmental humanities, and environmental literary criticism in particular, can bring 
into environmental discourse: a careful attention to the relationship between words and 
the world, and a watchful insistence that readers, writers, and other actants recognize 
their participation in the construction of the world we know. While an over-insistence on 
the cultural nature of the environment can lead to the relativism Heise feared, an over-
confidence in the solidity and substance of a pure “nature” likewise contributes to the 
rash perpetuation of ecological positions that are not politically viable. 
I am lucky at this university to have had discussions with a lively community of 
interdisciplinary environmental scholars, and many of the most pointed debates I’ve 
heard going on within non-literary environmental circles still struggle to balance the 
seemingly competing claims of the natural and the social worlds. Do we value the 
preservation of a seemingly untouched wilderness space over the competing claims of 
indigenous communities? Can a local food politics or a greening of individual 
consumption make up for our larger social implication in networks of unjust exchange – 
networks that continue to exploit distant communities even if we “go green” in our 
hometown? Environmental justice criticism drew our attention to these nature/culture 
imbroglios. But as long as we continue to frame nature and society as two distinct realms, 
forced into uncomfortable proximity only by the particularly weird problems of ecology, 
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it can be hard to embrace the pursuit of solutions that serve all communities equally.74 
Despite our best intentions, we feel we must choose between communities and 
environments, because only pure nature is an ecological choice. 
If we relinquish this purification, we can more forcefully participate in debates 
about what is to be done in a given environment, accounting for the needs of all 
participants. We can recognize, with Latour, how “everywhere, every day, people are 
fighting over the very question of the good common world in which everyone—human 
and nonhuman—wants to live. Nothing and no one must come to simplify, shorten, limit, 
or reduce the scope of this debate in advance by calmly asserting that the argument bears 
only on ‘representations that humans make of the world’” (Politics 129-130). As Latour’s 
argument suggests, better politics require us to rethink representation. As long as we 
imagine representation as something false, something separate from the world about 
which we argue and in which we act, we will continue to limit political debates and 
discourse. Re-imagining the relationship between humans and the more-than-human 
world requires us to reimagine the relationship between language and the human world. 
Doing so will make our arguments, our discourse, and our literary texts meaningful 
participants in an ecological debate that also includes mobilized nonhumans. 
  
                                                 
74
 In The Environmental Justice Reader, Joni Adamson, Mei Mei Evans, and Rachel Stein define 
environmental justice in terms that demand consideration of the supposedly separated realms of so-called 
nature and so-called society: “We define environmental justice as the right of all people to share equally in 
the benefits bestowed by a healthy environment. We define the environment, in turn, as the places where 
we live, work, play, and worship” (4). 
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APPENDIX: 
ABBREVIATED TITLES OF WORKS FREQUENTLY CITED 
 
Absalom William Faulkner, Absalom, Absalom!  
 
Faces Margaret Bourke-White and Ernest Caldwell, You Have Seen Their Faces.  
 
Future Lawrence Buell, The Future of Environmental Criticism: Environmental 
Crisis and Literary Imagination. 
 
Imagination Lawrence Buell, The Environmental Imagination: Thoreau, Nature 
Writing, and the Formation of American Culture. 
 
Modern Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern. 
 
Moses  William Faulkner, Go Down, Moses. 
 
Pandora Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies. 
 
Politics Bruno Latour, The Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into 
Democracy. 
 
Praise James Agee and Walker Evans, Let Us Now Praise Famous Men: Three 
Tenant Families. 
 
Sound William Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury. 
 
Walden Henry David Thoreau, Walden, Civil Disobedience, and Other Writings. 
Ed. William Rossi. 
 
Worlds Laura Dassow Walls, Seeing New Worlds. 
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